Income, Ideology, and Representation

REFERENCES

1. ↵
   Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2012. “Blind Retrospection: Why Shark Attacks Are Bad for Democracy.” Working paper. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.
2. The Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania. 2000. “2000 National Annenberg Election Survey.” http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/political-communication/naes/ (accessed May 25, 2016).
3. The Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania. 2004. “2004 National Annenberg Election Survey.” http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/political-communication/naes/ (accessed May 25, 2016).
4. Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2010a. “CCES, Common Content, 2006.” Harvard Dataverse, V4. http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14002 (accessed May 25, 2016).
5. Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2010b. “CCES, Common Content, 2008.” Harvard Dataverse, V6. http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14003 (accessed May 25, 2016).
6. Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2012. “CCES, Common Content, 2010.” Harvard Dataverse, V3. http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17705 (accessed May 25, 2016).
7. ↵
   1. Ansolabehere, Stephen,
   2. Jonathan Rodden, , and
   3. James M. Snyder

   . 2008. “The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting.” American Political Science Review 102(2): 215–32.

   OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
8. Ansolabehere, Stephen, Brian Schaffner. 2013. “CCES Common Content, 2012.” Harvard Dataverse, V8. http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/21447 (accessed May 25, 2016).
9. ↵
   Bartels, Larry M. 2009. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
10. ↵
    Bhatti, Yosef, and Robert S. Erikson. 2011. “How Poorly Are the Poor Represented in the U.S. Senate?” In Who Gets Represented? edited by Peter K. Enns and Christopher Wlezien. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
11. ↵
    1. Black, Duncan

    . 1948. “On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making.” Journal of Political Economy 56(1): 23–34.

    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
12. ↵
    1. Bonica, Adam,
    2. Nolan McCarty, ,
    3. Keith T. Poole, , and
    4. Howard Rosenthal

    . 2013. “Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(3): 103–23.

    OpenUrlCrossRef
13. ↵
    1. Brambor, Thomas,
    2. William Roberts Clark, , and
    3. Matt Golder

    . 2006. “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis 14(1): 63–82.

    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
14. ↵
    1. Brunner, Eric,
    2. Stephen L. Ross, , and
    3. Ebonya Washington

    . 2013. “Does Less Income Mean Less Representation?” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5(2): 53–76.

    OpenUrl
15. ↵
    Butler, Daniel M. 2014. Representing the Advantaged: How Politicians Reinforce Inequality. New York: Cambridge University Press.
16. ↵
    Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1966. The American Voter. New York: Wiley.
17. ↵
    1. Caplin, Andrew, and
    2. Barry Nalebuff

    . 1991. “Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 59(1): 1–23.

    OpenUrl
18. ↵
    1. Clinton, Joshua D

    . 2006. “Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House.” Journal of Politics 68(2): 397–409.

    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
19. ↵
    1. Clinton, Joshua,
    2. Simon Jackman, , and
    3. Douglas Rivers

    . 2004. “The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data.” American Political Science Review 98(2): 355–70.

    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
20. ↵
    1. Downs, Anthony

    . 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal of Political Economy 65(2): 135–50.

    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
21. ↵
    Fiorina, Morris P., and Samuel J. Abrams. 2012. Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics. Vol. 11. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
22. ↵
    Gilens, Martin. 2012. Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
23. ↵
    1. Gilens, Martin, and
    2. Benjamin I. Page

    . 2014. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics 12(3): 564–81. doi: 10.1017/S1537592714001595.

    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
24. ↵
    Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2011. Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. New York: Simon & Schuster.
25. ↵
    1. Hill, Seth J., and
    2. Chris Tausanovitch

    . 2015. “A Disconnect in Representation? Comparison of Trends in Congressional and Public Polarization.” Journal of Politics 77(4): 1058–75.

    OpenUrl
26. ↵
    Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Chris Tausanovitch. 2013. “Has Joint Scaling Solved the Achen Objection to Miller and Stokes?” Working paper. Los Angeles: University of California, Department of Political Science.
27. ↵
    Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press.
28. ↵
    1. Schofield, Norman

    . 2007. “The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium.” Review of Economic Studies 74(3): 965–80.

    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
29. ↵
    1. Tausanovitch, Chris, and
    2. Christopher Warshaw

    . 2013. “Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities.” Journal of Politics 75(2): 330–42.

    OpenUrlCrossRefWeb of Science
30. ↵
    Tausanovitch, Chris, and Christopher Warshaw. 2014. “Do Legislator Positions Affect Constituent Voting Decisions in U.S. House Elections?” Unpublished paper. University of California, Los Angeles, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
31. ↵
    Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.