Abstract
This article contrasts the protections provided to participants in U.S. securities markets with the protections provided to participants in the U.S. mortgage markets. Participants in securities markets purchase and sell equity and debt securities. Participants in the mortgage markets borrow money to buy homes, using those homes as collateral for the mortgage loans they receive. Even after Dodd-Frank, participants in securities markets are afforded significantly higher levels of protection than participants in mortgage markets. The doctrine of suitability is a prime example of this inequity. Exploring possible explanations for this odd asymmetry of treatment, I conclude that interest group politics is to blame for the anomaly.
- Copyright © 2017 by Russell Sage Foundation. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Reproduction by the United States Government in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose. I gratefully acknowledge helpful suggestions from Michael Barr and two excellent anonymous reviewers. I received outstanding research assistance from Kayla DeLeon, Yale Law School class of 2017. Direct correspondence to: Jonathan Macey at jonathan.macey{at}yale.edu, Yale Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520.
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