We derive optimal insurance for patients and payment method for physicians when neither
the input decided by the patient (quantity of treatment) nor the input decided by the physician (…

Disparities in health can result from the clinical encounter between a doctor and a patient.
This paper studies three possible mechanisms: prejudice of doctors in the form of being less …

This paper is concerned with the economics of mental health. We argue that mental health
economics is like health economics only more so: uncertainty and variation in treatments are …

Demand-side cost sharing and the supply-side reimbursement system provide two separate
instruments that can be used to influence the quantity of health services consumed. For risk-…

In response to a change in reimbursement incentives, hospitals may change the intensity of
services provided to a given set of patients, change the type (or severity) of patients they see, …

Objectives. To use an innovative videotape analysis method to examine how clinic time was
spent during elderly patients' visits to primary care physicians. Secondary objectives were to …

This chapter reviews the theory and empirical literature on physician market power, behavior,
and motives, referred to collectively as the issue of “physician agency.” The chapter is …

This paper develops a model in which physicians choose the level of services to be provided
to their patients. We show that if physicians undervalue benefits to patients relative to …

Minorities have, in general, equal or better mental health than white Americans, yet they suffer
from disparities in mental health care. This paper reviews the evidence for mental health …

This paper develops a general model of physician behavior with demand inducement
encompassing the two benchmark cases of profit maximization and target-income behavior. It is …