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Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Timothy J. Feddersen  and
Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Timothy J. Feddersen
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Abstract

We analyze a model of a two-candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences. We demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that, nevertheless, elections effectively aggregate voters' private information. Using examples, we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts. Increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed, however, may lead to higher levels of abstention. We conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 93 , Issue 2 , June 1999 , pp. 381 - 398
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999

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