Rhodes, Nteta, Wall, and Hopkins: "Why Reparations?" <u>ONLINE APPENDICES</u>

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Appendix 1: Limiting Sample to Whites Only

We replicate the main analyses presented in the paper, limiting the sample to white respondents. Among whites, the effect of the FIRE Index on opposition to reparations policies is positive, statistically significant, and very strong, typically dwarfing the effect of partisanship or ideology.

OLS Regression	Model of Opposition	to Cash Payments	, April 2021	Survey - Whit	tes Only
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	Oppose Cash
	Payments
Male	-0.00896
	(0.0229)
Age	0.263***
	(0.0600)
Education	-0.0417
	(0.0480)
Income	-0.0293
	(0.0611)
Employed	0.0233
	(0.0235)
Party ID (1=	0.0857
Strong Republican)	(0.0528)
Ideology (1=Very	0.398***
Conservative)	(0.0662)
Religiosity	-0.139***
	(0.0404)
FIRE Index	0.415***
	(0.0614)
Constant	0.243***
	(0.0421)
Observations	540
R-squared	0.486

	Oppose Cash	Oppose Apology	Oppose College	Oppose Housing
	Payments		Assistance	Assistance
Male	5.79e-05	-0.0443*	-0.00764	-0.0359+
	(0.0222)	(0.0224)	(0.0217)	(0.0216)
Age	0.223**	0.142*	0.269***	0.250***
	(0.0755)	(0.0664)	(0.0714)	(0.0720)
Education	-0.0893*	-0.0693+	-0.115**	-0.104*
	(0.0414)	(0.0402)	(0.0421)	(0.0428)
Income	0.0928+	0.0869	0.0969+	0.142**
	(0.0497)	(0.0570)	(0.0513)	(0.0509)
Employed	-0.0170	-6.08e-05	-0.00450	0.0159
	(0.0268)	(0.0248)	(0.0262)	(0.0248)
Party ID	0.0159	0.142**	0.0495	-0.0196
(1=Strong	(0.0532)	(0.0505)	(0.0507)	(0.0571)
Republican)				
Ideology	0.409***	0.305***	0.405***	0.367***
(1=Very	(0.0708)	(0.0578)	(0.0654)	(0.0727)
Conservative)				
Religiosity	-0.0462	-0.0650+	-0.0599+	-0.0318
	(0.0336)	(0.0366)	(0.0350)	(0.0369)
FIRE Index	0.509***	0.738***	0.554***	0.642***
	(0.0499)	(0.0616)	(0.0540)	(0.0533)
Constant	0.215***	0.0102	0.126*	0.129*
	(0.0545)	(0.0511)	(0.0519)	(0.0502)
Observations	538	538	538	538
R-squared	0.554	0.605	0.583	0.572

OLS Regression Model of Opposition to Reparations Policies, December 2021 Survey -Whites Only

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OLS Regression Model of Opposition to Cash Payments, January 2023 Survey - Whites Only

	Oppose Cash
	Payments
Male	-0.0120
	(0.0214)
Age	0.529***
	(0.0667)
Education	-0.0164
	(0.0323)
Income	0.114*
	(0.0503)
Employed	0.00188
	(0.0280)
Party ID	0.159***
(1=Strong	(0.0452)
Republican)	
Ideology (1=Very	0.253***
Conservative)	(0.0594)
Religiosity	-0.141***
	(0.0385)
FIRE Index	0.418***
	(0.0590)
Constant	0.0685
	(0.0446)
Observations	552
R-squared	0.489
<u> </u>	1

Appendix 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Racial Attitudes and Racial Policies Variables

In modeling the relationship between racial attitudes and opinions toward race-related policies (like reparations) with observational survey data, one potential obstacle to inference is that these may all be manifest indicators of the same underlying (latent) construct. If this is the case, we would expect there to be a strong relationship between racial attitudes and opinions toward reparations; but this relationship would be tautological, rather than predictive in a meaningful way.

To assess whether this problem confounds our analysis, we implemented an exploratory factor analysis, using data from our 2022 CES survey (only white respondents are included). We used principal factor analysis, and limited the analysis to six factors to keep the output readable. We instituted an oblique rotation to allow for distinct but correlated factors. The rotated factor loadings from the exploratory factor analysis are presented in the table below. "Significant" factor loadings for individual items - which we define as loadings with an absolute value $\geq =.30$ - are in bold.

The factor loadings in the table indicate that the dependent and independent variables do not load on the same underlying factor. Most, but not all, of the independent variables load primarily on the first factor, though some load on factors 3, 4, or 5. In contrast, all of the items measuring opposition to reparations policies load very strongly on factor 2. Because our measures of racial attitudes do not load on the same underlying factor as do our measures of opposition to reparations policies, we conclude our models of opposition to reparations policies are not tautological.

	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	Factor6
Oppose Cash Payments (DV1)	0.117	0.820	-0.019	-0.076	0.058	-0.028
Oppose Apology (DV2)	0.225	0.596	0.025	0.006	0.030	0.024
Oppose College Tuition (DV3)	0.058	0.880	-0.018	0.043	-0.026	0.033
Oppose Housing Assistance (DV4)	0.024	0.896	0.016	0.027	-0.025	-0.022

Whites Have Advantages (FIRE 1)	0.689	0.090	0.114	0.000	-0.086	0.123
Racial Problems are Rare (FIRE 2)	0.376	0.051	0.356	0.016	0.056	0.014
Angry Racism Exists (FIRE 3)	0.117	0.071	0.229	0.053	0.306	0.028
No Special Favors (Resent 1)	0.789	0.231	-0.109	0.029	-0.047	-0.134
Generations of Slavery (Resent 2)	0.813	0.149	-0.058	-0.003	0.027	0.093
Blacks Gotten Less (Resent 3)	0.624	0.180	0.055	-0.018	0.068	0.079
Blacks Try Harder (Resent 4)	0.718	0.027	0.015	0.120	0.094	-0.135
Race Important to Identity (Group ID1)	-0.035	-0.026	0.011	0.578	0.098	-0.016
Race Work Together (Group ID2)	0.142	0.055	-0.002	0.565	-0.072	0.010
Closeness to Racial Minorities	0.049	0.024	0.020	-0.097	-0.301	0.046
US Already Made Changes (Race Equal)	0.598	0.163	0.205	-0.031	-0.034	-0.065

Appendix 3: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Components of FIRE Index

Our main measure of negative racial attitudes, the FIRE Index, is a composite index of three items. This measurement strategy is more defensible if - in addition to showing measurement reliability, as we do in the text of the paper - we can demonstrate that the items are all manifest indicators of a single underlying (latent) construct.

To do this, we undertook an exploratory principal factor analysis of the three items comprising the index. We estimated our exploratory principal factor analysis with three factors, and then observed the number of retained factors, as well as the factor loadings for each item.

The details are provided below. In sum, on all of the surveys each of the three items in the FIRE Index loaded strongly on the same factor. This finding supports our combination of these items into a single measure.

April 2021 Survey

The exploratory factor analysis yielded a solution with one retained factor. The factor loadings are presented below. All three items load strongly on this factor.

Variable	Loadings on Factor 1
Whites Have Advantages	0.739
Racial Problems are Rare	0.730
Angry Racism Exists	0.542

December 2021 Survey

The exploratory factor analysis yielded a solution with one retained factor. The factor loadings are presented below. All three items load strongly on this factor.

Variable	Loadings on Factor 1
Whites Have Advantages	0.711
Racial Problems are Rare	0.728
Angry Racism Exists	0.572

November 2022 Survey

The exploratory factor analysis yielded a solution with one retained factor. The factor loadings are presented below. All three items load strongly on this factor.

Variable	Loadings on Factor 1
Whites Have Advantages	0.519
Racial Problems are Rare	0.471
Angry Racism Exists	0.760

January 2023 Survey

The exploratory factor analysis yielded a solution with one retained factor. The factor loadings are presented below. All three items load strongly on this factor.

Variable	Loadings on Factor 1
Whites Have Advantages	0.576
Racial Problems are Rare	0.668
Angry Racism Exists	0.696

Appendix 4: Disaggregating the FIRE Index

The main analyses presented in the paper rely on a 3-item index of racial attitudes, the FIRE Index. In using an index, we may be masking heterogeneity in the effect of the individual items comprising the index on opposition to reparations. In this Appendix, we disaggregate the FIRE Index, examining the effect of individual items on opposition to reparations policies across our surveys. We find that each of the individual items comprising the FIRE Index has a positive, statistically significant, and substantively meaningful effect on opposition to reparations, though across the surveys the item "Whites Have Advantages" seems to have the largest effect of the three.

	Oppose Cash	Oppose Cash	Oppose Cash
	Payments	Payments	Payments
Male	0.00886	-0.00666	-0.000179
	(0.0203)	(0.0214)	(0.0221)
White	0.127***	0.160***	0.157***
	(0.0236)	(0.0249)	(0.0257)
Age	0.208***	0.275***	0.239***
	(0.0511)	(0.0539)	(0.0552)
Education	-0.0474	-0.0577	-0.0665
	(0.0391)	(0.0401)	(0.0407)
Income	0.0171	0.0285	0.0218
	(0.0510)	(0.0523)	(0.0527)
Employed	0.0350	0.0302	0.0383
	(0.0220)	(0.0230)	(0.0235)
Party ID	0.157***	0.251***	0.284***
(1=Strong Republican)	(0.0453)	(0.0468)	(0.0459)
Ideology (1=Very	0.292***	0.358***	0.390***
Conservative	(0.0555)	(0.0586)	(0.0568)
Religiosity	-0.131***	-0.159***	-0.140***
	(0.0320)	(0.0345)	(0.0340)

OLS Regression Model of Opposition to Cash Payments, April 2021 Survey - FIRE Index Disaggregated

Whites Have	0.383***		
Advantages	(0.0362)		
Racial Problems		0.214***	
are Rare		(0.0374)	
Angry Racism			0.187***
Exists			(0.0453)
Constant	0.111**	0.0653+	0.0851*
	(0.0366)	(0.0391)	(0.0385)
Observations	802	802	802
R-squared	0.500	0.451	0.437

OLS Regression Model of Opposition to Cash	Payments, December	2021 Survey - FIRE
Index Disaggregated		

	Oppose Cash	Oppose Cash	Oppose Cash
	Payments	Payments	Payments
			-
Male	0.0233	0.0194	0.0325
	(0.0197)	(0.0207)	(0.0208)
White	0.135***	0.167***	0.168***
	(0.0246)	(0.0262)	(0.0268)
Age	0.223***	0.292***	0.243***
	(0.0610)	(0.0673)	(0.0676)
Education	-0.0471	-0.0695+	-0.0792*
	(0.0366)	(0.0383)	(0.0383)
Income	0.131**	0.116*	0.110*
	(0.0463)	(0.0481)	(0.0485)
Employed	-0.0177	-0.0156	-0.0113
	(0.0230)	(0.0242)	(0.0245)
Party ID	0.0572	0.176***	0.209***
(1=Strong	(0.0418)	(0.0451)	(0.0437)
Republican)			
Ideology	0.342***	0.383***	0.425***

(1=Very	(0.0516)	(0.0582)	(0.0557)
Conservative)			
Religiosity	-0.104***	-0.0993**	-0.0774*
	(0.0288)	(0.0316)	(0.0317)
Whites Have	0.429***		
Advantages	(0.0376)		
Racial Problems		0.249***	
are Rare		(0.0359)	
Angry Racism			0.250***
Exists			(0.0443)
Constant	0.0490	0.00955	0.0244
	(0.0404)	(0.0432)	(0.0434)
Observations	783	783	783
R-squared	0.542	0.482	0.470

OLS Regression Model of Opposition to Apology, December 2021 Survey - FIRE Index Disaggregated

	Oppose Apology	Oppose Apology	Oppose Apology
Male	-0.0119	-0.0208	-0.00225
	(0.0194)	(0.0212)	(0.0215)
White	0.0414+	0.0859***	0.0887***
	(0.0215)	(0.0236)	(0.0244)
Age	0.110+	0.210***	0.136*
	(0.0572)	(0.0603)	(0.0617)
Education	-0.0630+	-0.0910*	-0.106**
	(0.0351)	(0.0382)	(0.0379)
Income	0.112*	0.0949+	0.0859+
	(0.0511)	(0.0522)	(0.0517)
Employed	-0.00204	0.000873	0.00790
	(0.0217)	(0.0230)	(0.0238)
Party ID	0.166***	0.308***	0.354***

(1=Strong Republican)	(0.0423)	(0.0454)	(0.0438)
Ideology	0.241***	0.277***	0.334***
(1=Very Conservative)	(0.0473)	(0.0545)	(0.0515)
Religiosity	-0.0759*	-0.0724*	-0.0383
	(0.0303)	(0.0336)	(0.0330)
Whites Have	0.562***		
Advantages	(0.0398)		
Racial Problems		0.373***	
are Rare		(0.0429)	
Angry Racism			0.411***
Exists			(0.0490)
Constant	-0.0121	-0.0714+	-0.0531
	(0.0401)	(0.0420)	(0.0435)
Observations	783	783	783
R-squared	0.583	0.509	0.495

	Oppose College	Oppose College	Oppose College
	Tuition	Tuition	Tuition
Male	0.0128	0.00982	0.0221
	(0.0187)	(0.0201)	(0.0203)
White	0.101***	0.136***	0.138***
	(0.0222)	(0.0244)	(0.0249)
Age	0.202***	0.274***	0.224***
1.80	(0.0553)	(0.0624)	(0.0624)
Education	-0.0969**	-0.121**	-0.132***
2000000	(0.0360)	(0.0382)	(0.0376)
Income	0.167***	0.151**	0.145**
	(0.0469)	(0.0480)	(0.0475)
Employed	-0.0363+	-0.0340	-0.0290
1 5	(0.0219)	(0.0237)	(0.0236)
Party ID	0.0939*	0.226***	0.256***
(1=Strong Republican)	(0.0400)	(0.0437)	(0.0420)
Ideology	0.333***	0.382***	0.418***
(1=Very Conservative)	(0.0503)	(0.0555)	(0.0528)
Religious	-0.0892**	-0.0838**	-0.0600+
	(0.0287)	(0.0323)	(0.0325)
Whites Have	0.464***		
Advantages	(0.0379)		
Racial Problems		0.253***	
Are Rare		(0.0385)	
Angry Racism			0.292***
Exists			(0.0457)
Constant	0.0380	-0.00216	0.00901
	(0.0378)	(0.0416)	(0.0415)
Observations	783	783	783

OLS Regression Model of Opposition to Free College Tuition, December 2021 Survey -FIRE Index Disaggregated

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R-squared	0.582	0.510	0.505

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

OLS Regression Model of Opposition to Housing Assistance, December 2021 Survey -FIRE Index Disaggregated

	Onnone Housing	Ornege Henring	Ornega Hausing
	Oppose Housing Assistance	Assistance	Assistance
	Assistance	Assistance	
Male	-0.00814	-0.0131	0.00308
	(0.0191)	(0.0207)	(0.0209)
White	0.114***	0.153***	0.154***
	(0.0228)	(0.0248)	(0.0258)
Age	0.244***	0.327***	0.267***
-	(0.0568)	(0.0644)	(0.0652)
Education	-0.0707+	-0.0972*	-0.109**
	(0.0366)	(0.0395)	(0.0395)
Income	0.171***	0.154**	0.146**
	(0.0473)	(0.0488)	(0.0488)
Employed	0.00387	0.00644	0.0112
	(0.0215)	(0.0235)	(0.0239)
Party ID	0.0410	0.181***	0.223***
(1=Strong Republican)	(0.0442)	(0.0470)	(0.0458)
Ideology	0.273***	0.320***	0.374***
(1=Very Conservative)	(0.0515)	(0.0602)	(0.0573)
Religiosity	-0.0654*	-0.0604+	-0.0348
	(0.0297)	(0.0336)	(0.0334)
Whites Have	0.510***		
Advantages	(0.0375)		
Racial Problems		0.299***	
are Rare		(0.0382)	
Angry Racism			0.285***
Exists			(0.0460)

Constant	0.00412	-0.0432	-0.0240
	(0.0392)	(0.0422)	(0.0434)
Observations	783	783	783
R-squared	0.557	0.473	0.453

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

OLS Regression Model of Opposition to Cash Payments, January 2023 Survey - FIRE Index Disaggregated

	Oppose Cash	Oppose Cash	Oppose Cash
	Payments	Payments	Payments
Male	-0.00409	0.00775	0.00370
	(0.0195)	(0.0208)	(0.0207)
White	0.0650**	0.0881***	0.0988***
	(0.0239)	(0.0262)	(0.0263)
Age	0.392***	0.482***	0.474***
	(0.0573)	(0.0615)	(0.0624)
Education	0.000946	-0.00965	-0.0168
	(0.0321)	(0.0348)	(0.0342)
Income	0.161***	0.158**	0.180***
	(0.0463)	(0.0521)	(0.0499)
Employed	-0.0115	-0.00618	-0.0115
	(0.0228)	(0.0249)	(0.0248)
Party ID	0.155***	0.267***	0.252***
(1=Strong	(0.0405)	(0.0407)	(0.0395)
Republican)			
Ideology	0.229***	0.308***	0.311***
(1=Very	(0.0475)	(0.0538)	(0.0503)
Conservative)			
Religiosity	-0.148***	-0.166***	-0.153***
	(0.0325)	(0.0333)	(0.0334)
Whites Have	0.368***		

Advantages	(0.0362)		
Racial Problems		0.107**	
are Rare		(0.0351)	
Angry Racism			0.199***
Exists			(0.0448)
Constant	0.0481	0.0159	0.000153
	(0.0371)	(0.0411)	(0.0414)
Observations	779	779	779
R-squared	0.504	0.429	0.441

Appendix 5: Explicit Measure of Closeness to Racial Minorities

In our analysis of whites' attitudes toward reparations policies in the 2022 CES, we include a measure of closeness to racial minorities in our statistical models. Our measure of closeness to racial minorities is an *explicit* measure. Our measure uses an item that captures the closeness of a respondent's interactions with racial minorities by directly asking white respondents, "How <u>distant</u> or <u>close</u> are your interactions with people from racial minority backgrounds?" with response items ranging from "Very distant" to "Very close."

This measure is quite different from that employed by Craemer (2008, 2009, 2014) which employs an *implicit* measure of closeness to African Americans. In his work, Craemer measures whites' implicit closeness to African Americans using a reaction-time task. First, respondents rate themselves and African Americans as a group on 90 different personality traits. This allows Craemer to determine which of the trait words the respondent would use to describe the self as well as the group (matching traits) and which trait words the respondent would use for the self but not the group, or vice versa (mismatching traits). Second, in the reaction time task, respondents are asked to describe themselves as quickly as possible using the same 90 traits. When reaction times in this task are compared for matching and mismatching traits separately, individuals who feel close to the group will demonstrate faster reaction times for matching than for mismatching traits. But these effects will not occur for respondents who do not feel close to the group.

Craemer argues that a major benefit of this implicit measure of closeness is that it is unlikely to be biased upward by social desirability bias - that is, the tendency of white respondents to answer explicit questions about sensitive matters such as race in such a way as to create a favorable impression with the interviewer. In contrast, explicit measures of closeness to blacks may be upwardly biased by social desirability. Interestingly, however, in his 2009 study Craemer shows through a comparison of explicit and implicit measures of closeness that white respondents tend to *understate* (not overstate!) their closeness to African Americans, though Craemer cautions that "implicit feelings of closeness to Blacks may contradict ingrained notions of ingroup solidarity and outgroup-competition for many Whites, leading to conscious understatement" (Craemer 2009: 675).

Is our explicit measure of closeness to racial minorities upwardly biased by social desirability concerns, and does this adversely affect our ability to assess how feelings of closeness affect opposition to reparations policies?

Below, we provide the distribution of perceived closeness to racial minorities among whites.

Very distant	Somewhat distant	Neither distant nor close	Somewhat close	Very close
2.9%	11.0%	39.5%	30.8%	15.7%

Admittedly, we do not have a direct means of assessing the impact of social desirability bias on our explicit measure of closeness toward racial minorities. Therefore, some caution should be used in evaluating our explicit measure. However, other results from the 2022 CES indicate that white respondents are not terribly shy about reporting conservative views on racial matters, suggesting that the social desirability bias afflicting our explicit measure of closeness to racial minorities may not be too severe.

Many Whites Lack Guilt about Social Inequality

More than half (54.7%) of whites in the CES sample say that they feel "not guilty at all" about "social inequality between White and Black Americans", and another 12.7% say they feel only "a little guilty".

Many Whites Express Racially Resentful Attitudes

More than half of whites (57.4%) strongly or somewhat agree with the statement that "Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors", and another 16.7 percent express a neutral view.

Nearly half (47.5%) of whites strongly or somewhat disagree with the statement "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class", and another 16.6% express a neutral view.

Nearly half (48.9%) of whites strongly or somewhat disagree with the statement "Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve", and 25% neither agree nor disagree.

And 36.3% of whites strongly or somewhat agree with the view that "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be as well off as Whites," while another 29% neither agree nor disagree.

Many Whites Express Skepticism about Efforts to Address Racial Inequality

Finally, as the table below suggests, a strong plurality of whites believes that the United States has already made the changes necessary to achieve equal rights, and a super-majority expresses skepticism about efforts to address racial inequality. A super-majority of whites now indicates that policies designed to address racial injustices lead to discrimination against whites.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
The U.S. has already made the changes necessary to give all races equal rights.	28.5%	21.1%	20.7%	11.1%	18.6%
When we pass laws to try to create greater racial equality, we often just wind up creating more problems.	35.1%	26.6%	21.4%	11.3%	5.6%
Nowadays, policies supposedly aimed at "racial equality" or "racial justice" tend to discriminate against White people.	28.6%	28.9%	19.5%	7.8%	15.1%

Implications

Whites are not reticent about expressing negative racial views and skepticism about policies designed to help African Americans. While we cannot measure empirically the extent to which our explicit measure of racial closeness is inflated by social desirability bias, the fact that many whites do not shy away from expressing conservative racial views suggests that social desirability bias in our measure is not severe.

Appendix 6: Model Robustness Checks

Because the statistical models presented in the paper use observational data, there is always the possibility that coefficient estimates may be attributable, at least in part, to modeling decisions. This could be problematic for our inferences if the apparent positive, statistically significant, and substantively large effects we are observing for the FIRE Index are due in large part to model dependence. To help address this problem, we used the MRobust program (Young and Holsteen 2017) to assess the impact of one critical modeling decision - the inclusion of control variables - on the coefficient estimate for our main variable of interest, the FIRE Index. The MRobust program allows users to assess the influence of the inclusion of covariates on inferences by estimating every possible model including combinations of the covariates and reporting on how the inclusion and exclusion of (combinations of) control variables affect the magnitude, direction, and statistical significance of the main variable of interest.

For each model reported in the body of the paper, we use MRobust to estimate every possible model containing combinations of the control variables used in our preferred model, and assess how alternative model specifications influence the sign stability, statistical significance, and magnitude of estimates for the FIRE Index. To the degree that the sign stability and statistical significance of estimates for the FIRE Index remain stable across specifications, and the magnitude of the coefficient estimate for the FIRE Index is not excessively inflated in our preferred model relative to other possible models, we can have greater confidence in the findings reported in the paper.

The details of the robustness checks for each survey are presented below. In summary, our robustness checks overwhelming support our conclusion that negative racial attitudes, as measured by the FIRE Index, are positively, strongly, and statistically significantly associated with opposition to a wide variety of reparations programs.

April 2021 UMass Poll Survey

We estimated the 512 possible models of opposition to cash payments including combinations of the controls. Across the models, the coefficient estimate for the FIRE Index was positive and statistically significant at at least the p<.05 level in 100% of possible models. We also find that our preferred coefficient estimate is at the low end (the 14th percentile) of all coefficient estimates across the 512 models. These observations indicate that our preferred estimate of the effect of the FIRE Index on support for cash payments is not biased by our model specification in a way that would lead us to overstate the importance of this variable. We can thus conclude that the FIRE Index has a large and statistically significant effect on opposition to cash payments.

December 2021 UMass Poll Survey

For each of the dependent variables examined, we estimated 512 possible models and examined how model specification decisions influenced the sign stability, statistical significance, and magnitude of estimates for the FIRE Index.

Oppose Cash Payments

Across the 512 models, the FIRE Index was positively signed and statistically significant at at least the p<.05 level in 100% of models. Additionally, our preferred estimate is at the low end (the 20th percentile) of all possible estimates, meaning that 80 percent of possible models including some combination of the covariates had larger estimates for the FIRE Index than our preferred model. This suggests that the inclusion of the covariates in our preferred model tends to reduce the magnitude of the FIRE Index, as one would expect if the FIRE Index were correlated with control variables in the model. Together these observations indicate that our preferred estimate of the effect of the FIRE Index on opposition to cash payments is not biased upward by our preferred model specification. We can therefore conclude that the FIRE Index has a large and statistically significant effect on opposition to cash payments.

Oppose Apology

Across the 512 models, the FIRE Index was positively signed and statistically significant at at least the p<.05 level in 100% of models. We again find that our preferred estimate is at the lower end (23rd percentile) of all possible estimates across the 512 models. We conclude that our preferred estimate is not unduly biased upward by our preferred model specification, suggesting that the FIRE Index has a large and statistically significant effect on opposition to an apology for slavery.

Oppose College Tuition

The FIRE Index was positively signed and statistically significant at at least the p<.05 level in 100% of the possible 512 models. Our preferred estimate for the FIRE Index was also in the 21st percentile of all coefficient estimates for the FIRE Index in the 512 possible models. These observations strongly suggest that our estimate of the effect of the FIRE Index on opposition to college tuition payments is not upwardly biased by our preferred model specification, and that our inference about the effect of the FIRE Index on opposition to college tuition assistance as a form of reparations is warranted.

Oppose Housing Assistance

The FIRE Index was positively signed and statistically significant at at least the p<.05 level in 100% of the possible 512 models of opposition to housing assistance. Our preferred estimate of the effect of the FIRE Index was in the 24th percentile of estimates in the 512 possible models. Based on these observations, we conclude that our preferred estimate of the effect of the FIRE Index is not unduly inflated by our preferred model specification, and that the FIRE Index has a strong and statistically significant effect on opposition to housing assistance. November 2022 Cooperative Election Study Survey

For each of the dependent variables examined, we estimated 2,048 possible models (the number of possible models is larger because the number of control variables in the model presented in the paper is larger) and examined how model specification decisions influenced the sign stability, statistical significance, and magnitude of estimates for the FIRE Index.

Oppose Cash Payments

The FIRE Index had a positive and statistically significant effect (at at least the p<.05 level) on opposition to cash payments in 100% of the 2,048 models. Our preferred estimate was in the 25th percentile of the modeling distribution, meaning that our preferred estimate was smaller than the estimate in 75 percent of all possible models including combinations of the covariates. We conclude that the estimated effect of the FIRE Index presented in the body of the manuscript was not excessively inflated by our choice of control covariates, and that the FIRE Index has a strong and statistically significant positive effect on opposition to cash payments net of the controls.

Oppose Apology

Across the 2,048 models, the FIRE Index has a positive and statistically significant effect (at at least the p<.05 level) in 100% of models. Moreover, our preferred estimate is in the 1st percentile of the modeling distribution. This means that our preferred estimate is smaller than 99 percent of all possible models containing combinations of the control variables. Together, these observations lead us to conclude that our preferred model did not upwardly bias our estimate of the effect of the FIRE Index on opposition to an apology for slavery. We believe these observations strongly support our claim that the FIRE Index is a strong and statistically significant predictor of opposition to a federal apology for slavery.

Oppose College Tuition

The FIRE Index is positive and statistically significant at at least the p<.05 level in 100% of the 2,048 models we estimated, and our preferred estimate is at the 18th percentile of the modeling distribution. Based on these observations, we conclude that our preferred estimate is not unduly biased upward by our preferred model specification, and that the FIRE Index has a strong and positive effect on opposition to college tuition assistance as a form of reparations.

Oppose Housing Assistance

The FIRE Index is positive and statistically significant at at least the p<.05 level in 100% of 2,048 models estimated. Additionally, our preferred estimate, as presented in the manuscript, is at the 31st percentile of the modeling distribution, meaning that it is smaller than 69 percent of possible models including combinations of the controls. We conclude that the FIRE Index has a strong and positive effect on opposition to housing assistance as a form of reparations.

January 2023 UMass Poll Survey

Our estimate of the effect of the FIRE Index on opposition to cash payments was positively signed and statistically significant in 100% of the 512 estimated models. Our preferred estimate of the FIRE Index, as presented in the paper, was in the 20th percentile of the distribution of estimates of the FIRE Index in the 512 models. Because the FIRE Index is a consistently statistically significant predictor of opposition to cash payments, and is not unduly inflated by model specification decisions, we conclude it has a strong and statistically significant effect on opposition to cash payments.

Appendix 7: Re-Estimating Main Models with Ordered Logistic Regression

As a check on the main results in the paper, we re-estimated our main results using ordered logistic regression instead of OLS regression. As expected, using this alternative specification we continue to find a large, positive, statistically significant effect of the FIRE Index on opposition to reparations policies.

	Oppose Cash
	Payments
Male	-0.0357
Iviaic	(0.151)
White	1.036***
	(0.173)
Age	1.959***
	(0.373)
Education	-0.0798
	(0.292)
Income	0.256
	(0.386)
Employed	0.226
	(0.169)
Party ID	1.358***
(1=Strong	(0.359)
Republican)	
Ideology	2.019***
(1=Very	(0.446)
Conservative)	
Religiosity	-1.001***
	(0.256)
FIRE Index	3.747***
	(0.418)
Constant cut1	1.690***
	(0.286)

Ordered Logistic Regression Model of Opposition to Cash Payments, April 2021 Survey

Constant cut2	3.381***
	(0.306)
Constant cut3	4.613***
	(0.329)
Observations	802

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Ordered Logistic Regression Models of Opposition to Reparations Policies, December 2021 Survey

	Oppose Cash	Oppose Apology	Oppose College	Oppose Housing
	Payments		Tuition	Assistance
Male	0.0645	-0.321*	-0.0801	-0.195
	(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.149)
White	1.261***	0.587***	0.995***	1.120***
	(0.192)	(0.171)	(0.180)	(0.184)
Age	2.439***	1.471**	2.235***	2.528***
	(0.506)	(0.451)	(0.473)	(0.487)
Education	-0.375	-0.527+	-0.773**	-0.561+
	(0.290)	(0.282)	(0.282)	(0.294)
Income	1.059**	0.796*	1.381***	1.184**
	(0.346)	(0.383)	(0.364)	(0.361)
Employed	-0.0337	0.0245	-0.199	0.132
	(0.180)	(0.166)	(0.183)	(0.168)
Party ID	0.886*	1.131***	1.040**	0.674+
(1=Strong	(0.344)	(0.295)	(0.329)	(0.353)
Republican)				
Ideology	2.257***	1.444***	2.106***	1.552***
(1=Very	(0.433)	(0.365)	(0.404)	(0.431)
Conservative)				
			0.00011	0.440
Religiosity	-0.730**	-0.602*	-0.682**	-0.440+
	(0.240)	(0.240)	(0.243)	(0.247)
FIRE Index	4.991***	5.885***	5.118***	5.394***
	(0.479)	(0.468)	(0.481)	(0.471)
Constant cut1	2.469***	2.622***	2.291***	2.456***

	(0.347)	(0.348)	(0.343)	(0.344)
Constant cut2	4.244***	4.340***	4.148***	4.367***
	(0.382)	(0.379)	(0.372)	(0.377)
Constant cut3	5.736***	5.476***	5.611***	5.839***
	(0.414)	(0.392)	(0.394)	(0.399)
Observations	783	783	783	783

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Ordered Logistic Regression Model of Opposition to Reparations Policies, November 2022 CES Survey

	Oppose Cash Payments	Oppose Apology	Oppose College Tuition	Oppose Housing Assistance
Male	-0.195	0.263	-0.215	-0.0151
	(0.306)	(0.278)	(0.258)	(0.244)
Age	1.756+	2.037*	2.040**	2.133**
	(0.954)	(0.983)	(0.676)	(0.756)
Education	-0.798	-0.395	-0.206	-0.647
	(0.509)	(0.530)	(0.418)	(0.425)
Income	0.285	0.357	0.796	1.469*
	(0.662)	(0.569)	(0.665)	(0.626)
Employed	0.110	0.152	-0.495+	-0.263
	(0.276)	(0.359)	(0.289)	(0.286)
Party ID (1=Strong Republican)	1.626**	1.088*	1.674**	1.822**
	(0.618)	(0.467)	(0.619)	(0.557)
Ideology	-0.340	0.859	0.364	0.299
	(0.578)	(0.638)	(0.800)	(0.718)
Religiosity	-0.0662	-0.0327	-0.0191	-0.144+
	(0.0877)	(0.0884)	(0.0797)	(0.0836)
FIRE Index	4.118***	2.733**	4.417***	5.489***
	(0.736)	(0.919)	(0.874)	(0.825)
Group Identification Index	-0.0680	0.631	0.593	0.490
	(0.611)	(0.481)	(0.567)	(0.460)
Closeness to People of Color	0.555	-0.458	0.115	0.154
	(1.020)	(0.710)	(0.504)	(0.522)

Necessary Changes	2.233***	1.411**	2.351***	1.741***
on Racial Equality				
	(0.648)	(0.540)	(0.611)	(0.498)
Constant cut1	-0.231	2.272**	1.126	1.015
	(1.119)	(0.717)	(0.786)	(0.760)
Constant cut2	1.788*	3.943***	3.229***	3.256***
	(0.869)	(0.714)	(0.789)	(0.769)
Constant cut3	3.744***	5.002***	5.519***	5.598***
	(0.799)	(0.724)	(0.829)	(0.779)
Observations	523	523	523	523

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Ordered Logistic Regression Model of Opposition to Cash Payments, January 2023 Survey

	Opposition to
	Cash Payments
Male	0.0124
	(0.153)
White	0.610***
	(0.182)
Age	3.573***
	(0.466)
Education	0.126
	(0.265)
Income	1.348***
	(0.392)
Employed	-0.136
	(0.184)
Party ID	1.615***
(1=Strong	(0.318)
Republican)	
Ideology	1.591***
(1=Very	(0.380)
Conservative)	
Religiosity	-1.412***
	(0.264)

4.181***
(0.451)
2.350***
(0.333)
4.124***
(0.354)
5.767***
(0.387)
779

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

<u>Appendix 8: Estimating Opposition to Reparations Policies Using Racial Resentment Scale</u> <u>instead of FIRE Index, 2022 Cooperative Election Study</u>

In this Appendix we re-estimate the analysis of the 2022 CES data presented in the main body of the paper, using the Racial Resentment Scale rather than the FIRE Index as our measure of racial attitudes. As expected, the Racial Resentment index has a positive, statistically significant, and substantively strong influence on opposition to reparations policies. Notably, the estimated effect of this variable is noticeably larger than that of either partisanship or ideology.

	Oppose Cash Payments	Oppose Apology	Oppose Tuition	Oppose Housing
Male	-0.0278	0.0447	-0.0175	0.00522
	(0.0306)	(0.0369)	(0.0227)	(0.0214)
Age	0.0118	0.214+	0.112+	0.0943
	(0.0906)	(0.130)	(0.0659)	(0.0708)
Education	-0.0526	-0.0150	-0.0456	-0.0741+
	(0.0459)	(0.0726)	(0.0396)	(0.0396)

	Oppose Cash Payments	Oppose Apology	Oppose Tuition	Oppose Housing
Income	0.0791	0.0987	0.106+	0.182**
	(0.0611)	(0.0782)	(0.0588)	(0.0556)
Employed	-0.00100	0.0167	-0.0354	-0.0300
	(0.0230)	(0.0459)	(0.0253)	(0.0254)
Party ID (1=Strong Republican)	0.134*	0.178**	0.198***	0.188**
	(0.0610)	(0.0678)	(0.0599)	(0.0586)
Ideology (1=Very Conservative)	-0.0197	0.102	0.0303	0.0325
	(0.0564)	(0.0862)	(0.0695)	(0.0668)
Religiosity	0.00531	-0.00711	0.00841	-0.00436
	(0.00684)	(0.0119)	(0.00654)	(0.00715)
Racial Resentment Index	0.489***	0.527***	0.380***	0.487***
	(0.0698)	(0.0969)	(0.0791)	(0.0690)
Group Identification Index	0.00125	0.0409	0.0275	0.0210
	(0.0604)	(0.0633)	(0.0478)	(0.0408)
Closeness to People of Color	0.101	-0.0527	-0.00914	0.0143

	Oppose Cash Payments	Oppose Apology	Oppose Tuition	Oppose Housing
	(0.121)	(0.0868)	(0.0408)	(0.0450)
Necessary Changes on Racial Equality	0.103+	0.0884	0.196***	0.109*
	(0.0533)	(0.0844)	(0.0556)	(0.0521)
Constant	0.300**	-0.0992	0.185**	0.180**
	(0.105)	(0.0962)	(0.0662)	(0.0670)
Observations	528	528	528	528
R-squared	0.521	0.496	0.616	0.620

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Appendix 9: Racial Attitudes and Opposition to Racial Policies

In Appendix 9 we examine whether the relationships between racial attitudes and opposition to reparations that we observe in our study are distinctive to this issue, or also apply to other racialized issues. In this manuscript we have argued that reparations have been drawn into a broad racialized, partisan conflict that incorporates many issues in contemporary American politics. We therefore expect to observe similar attitudinal patterns on other racialized issues.

To assess this expectation we examine attitudes toward other racialized issues that we polled on the surveys used in this study. The availability of appropriate questions varied by survey. For this supplemental analysis we focused on analyzing responses to questions on the April 2021 and December 2021 surveys, because these surveys had more questions about issues that are likely to be racialized.

On our April 2021 survey we asked several questions about police reforms that have been advocated by the Black Lives Matter Movement and critics of anti-Black police violence: reducing police funding and reallocating those funds to social services; allowing citizens to sue individual police officers who are accused of crimes; banning the use of chokeholds; and prohibiting police officers from deactivating body cameras during interactions with civilians. We anticipate that attitudes toward these issues will be strongly influenced by racial attitudes because these issues have been highlighted by the BLM Movement and drawn into racialized, partisan struggles between critics and defenders of the police.

For this analysis, we coded attitudes toward each reform to vary between 0-1, with higher values indicating greater opposition. We used the same covariates used to examine attitudes toward reparations in estimating models of opposition to police reforms.

VARIABLES	Reduce	Allow	Ban Use of	Restrict
	Police	Citizens to	Choke Holds	Deactivating
	Funding	Sue Police		Body Cameras
		Officers		
Male	-0.00660	0.00179	0.0381*	-0.0110
	(0.0195)	(0.0177)	(0.0168)	(0.0170)
White	0.0267	0.0601**	0.00391	-0.00155
	(0.0216)	(0.0188)	(0.0169)	(0.0184)
Age	0.372***	0.289***	-0.0999*	0.0310
	(0.0536)	(0.0486)	(0.0428)	(0.0440)
Education	-0.00204	0.0373	0.0410	-0.00429
	(0.0346)	(0.0292)	(0.0299)	(0.0302)
Income	-0.0710	0.0439	0.0728+	0.0870*
	(0.0466)	(0.0411)	(0.0418)	(0.0420)
Employed	0.00277	-3.11e-05	-0.0103	-0.0117
	(0.0213)	(0.0196)	(0.0172)	(0.0191)
Party ID	0.178***	0.175***	0.128***	0.118**
(1=Strong	(0.0437)	(0.0378)	(0.0365)	(0.0385)
Republican)				
Ideology	0.311***	0.0760+	0.0972*	0.0764+
(1=Very	(0.0498)	(0.0424)	(0.0385)	(0.0441)
Conservative)				
Religiosity	-0.0274	-0.00980	-0.0384	0.0725**

OLS Regression Models of Opposition to Police Reforms, April 2021 Survey

	(0.0294)	(0.0271)	(0.0257)	(0.0270)
FIRE Index	0.549***	0.523***	0.620***	0.412***
	(0.0534)	(0.0489)	(0.0491)	(0.0519)
Constant	-0.0575	-0.184***	-0.00564	-0.0480
	(0.0385)	(0.0319)	(0.0331)	(0.0335)
Observations	803	803	803	803
R-squared	0.558	0.463	0.487	0.346

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

As we expected, individuals with more negative racial attitudes were significantly more opposed to these police reforms than were those with more positive racial attitudes, controlling for the other factors in the model. As was the case with attitudes toward reparations, the effect of racial attitudes on opposition to these policies was substantively quite large.

On the December 2021 survey we asked various questions about election reforms that would either make voting more accessible (automatic voter registration, an Election Day holiday, permanent voting by mail, same day registration) or more difficult (a photo ID requirement). Over the last two decades, and especially since the presidency of Donald Trump, attitudes toward these policies have become racialized. Advocates of policies to make voting easier have argued that these policies are necessary to ensure that everyone, but especially communities of color, has equal opportunity to vote. Meanwhile, opponents of policies to make voting easier (and advocates of election security policies such as voter ID) have argued that voter access policies increase the risk of fraud and malfeasance, particularly by unauthorized voters such as (implicitly racialized) undocumented immigrants. We therefore expect that negative racial attitudes should be associated with increased opposition to policies that make voting easier, and increased support for policies that make voting more difficult.

For this analysis, we coded attitudes toward each reform to vary between 0-1, with higher values indicating greater opposition to reforms that make voting easier (and greater support for reforms that make voting more difficult, such as voter ID).

OLS Regression Models of Attitudes Toward Election Reforms, December 2021 Survey

Oppose	Oppose	Oppose	Oppose Same	Support Photo
Automatic	Election	Permanent	Day	Voter ID
Voter	Day	Vote by Mail	Registration	Requirement
Registration	Holiday			

Male 0.0229 0.00179 0.0440^* $0.0427+$ -0.00323 (0.0224) (0.0246) (0.0204) (0.0224) (0.0224) White -0.0111 -0.0390 $-0.0407+$ -0.0253 -0.0980^{***} (0.0235) (0.0268) (0.0225) (0.0259) (0.0261) Age 0.150^* $0.139+$ 0.0666 0.163^{**} 0.0316 (0.0595) (0.0713) (0.0563) (0.0626) (0.0696) Education -0.0427 -0.0639 -0.0059 $0.0782+$ -0.0239 (0.0411) (0.0411) (0.0431) (0.0365) (0.0412) (0.0421) Income -0.00187 -0.0195 $0.0873+$ 0.0733 -0.0788 (0.0552) (0.0610) (0.0508) (0.0579) (0.0539) Employed -0.0218 $-0.0513+$ -0.0256 $-0.0475+$ -0.00422 (0.0237) (0.0275) (0.0216) (0.0253) (0.0242) Party ID 0.337^{***} 0.194^{***} 0.332^{***} 0.122^* 0.143^{**} $(1=Strong$ (0.0560) (0.0516) (0.0472) (0.0541) (0.0575) Conservative) (0.0560) (0.0616) (0.0546) (0.0575) (0.0575) Conservative) (0.0570) (0.0371) (0.0324) (0.0351) (0.0314) FIRE Index 0.521^{**} 0.353^{***} 0.569^{***} 0.555^{***} 0.349^{***} (0.0570) (0.0571) (0.0564)						
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Male	0.0229	0.00179	0.0440*	0.0427+	-0.00323
White -0.0111 -0.0390 $-0.0407+$ -0.0253 -0.0980^{***} Age 0.150^* $0.139+$ 0.0666 0.163^{**} 0.0316 Age 0.150^* $0.139+$ 0.0666 0.163^{**} 0.0316 Education -0.0427 -0.0639 -0.0059 $0.0782+$ -0.0239 (0.0411) (0.0431) (0.0365) (0.0412) (0.0421) Income -0.00187 -0.0195 $0.0873+$ 0.0733 -0.0788 (0.0552) (0.0610) (0.0508) (0.0579) (0.0539) Employed -0.0218 -0.0256 $-0.0475+$ -0.000422 (0.0237) (0.0275) (0.0216) (0.0253) (0.0242) Party ID 0.337^{**} 0.194^{**} 0.332^{***} 0.122^{*} 0.143^{**} $(1=Strong$ (0.0500) (0.0530) (0.0472) (0.0541) (0.0504) Republican) 0.162^{**} 0.185^{**} 0.238^{***}		(0.0224)	(0.0246)	(0.0204)	(0.0224)	(0.0224)
(0.0235) (0.0268) (0.0225) (0.0259) (0.0261) Age 0.150^* $0.139+$ 0.0666 0.163^{**} 0.0316 (0.0595) (0.0713) (0.0563) (0.0626) (0.0696) Education -0.0427 -0.0639 -0.00659 $0.0782+$ -0.0239 (0.0411) (0.0431) (0.0365) (0.0412) (0.0421) Income -0.00187 -0.0195 $0.0873+$ 0.0733 -0.0788 (0.0552) (0.0610) (0.0508) (0.0579) (0.0539) Employed -0.0218 -0.0216 (0.0253) (0.0242) Party ID 0.337^{***} 0.194^{***} 0.332^{***} 0.122^* 0.143^{**} $(1=Strong)$ (0.0500) (0.0530) (0.0472) (0.0541) (0.0504) Republican) -0.0176 0.248^{***} 0.335^{***} 0.335^{***} $(1=Very)$ (0.0560) (0.0616) (0.0546) (0.0575) (0.0575) Conservative) -0.0176 0.0419 0.0182 -0.00978 (0.0345) (0.0371) (0.0324) (0.0351) (0.0314) FIRE Index 0.521^{***} 0.353^{***} 0.569^{***} 0.555^{***} 0.349^{***} (0.0570) (0.0711) (0.0395) (0.0413) (0.0506) (0.0401) (0.0524) (0.0395) (0.0413) (0.0506) (0.0401) (0.524) (0.395) (0.0413) (0.0506) (0.0401) $(0.5$	White	-0.0111	-0.0390	-0.0407+	-0.0253	-0.0980***
Age 0.150^* 0.139^+ 0.0666 0.163^{**} 0.0316 (0.0595) (0.0713) (0.0563) (0.0626) (0.0696) Education -0.0427 -0.0639 -0.00659 $0.0782+$ -0.0239 (0.0411) (0.0431) (0.0365) (0.0412) (0.0421) Income -0.00187 -0.0195 $0.0873+$ 0.0733 -0.0788 (0.0552) (0.0610) (0.0508) (0.0579) (0.0539) Employed -0.0218 -0.0216 $-0.0475+$ -0.000422 (0.0237) (0.0275) (0.0216) (0.0253) (0.0242) Party ID 0.337^{***} 0.194^{***} 0.332^{***} 0.122^* 0.143^{**} $(1=Strong)$ (0.0500) (0.0530) (0.0472) (0.0541) (0.0504) Republican) 0.162^{**} 0.185^{**} 0.238^{***} 0.260^{***} 0.335^{***} $(1=Very)$ (0.0560) (0.0616) (0.0546) (0.0575) (0.0575) Conservative) 0.0325 -0.0176 0.0419 0.0182 -0.00978 (0.0345) (0.0371) (0.0324) (0.0351) (0.0314) FIRE Index 0.521^{***} 0.353^{***} 0.555^{***} 0.349^{***} (0.0570) (0.0711) (0.0564) (0.0654) (0.0527) Constant -0.0466 0.0685 -0.131^{***} -0.137^{***} 0.461^{***} Observations 725 703 741 732 72		(0.0235)	(0.0268)	(0.0225)	(0.0259)	(0.0261)
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Age	0.150*	0.139+	0.0666	0.163**	0.0316
Education -0.0427 -0.0639 -0.00659 $0.0782+$ -0.0239 (0.0411)(0.0431)(0.0365)(0.0412)(0.0421)Income -0.00187 -0.0195 $0.0873+$ 0.0733 -0.0788 (0.0552)(0.0610)(0.0508)(0.0579)(0.0539)Employed -0.0218 $-0.0513+$ -0.0256 $-0.0475+$ -0.000422 (0.0237)(0.0275)(0.0216)(0.0253)(0.0242)Party ID 0.337^{***} 0.194^{***} 0.332^{***} 0.122^* 0.143^{**} (1=Strong Republican)(0.0500)(0.0530)(0.0472)(0.0541)(0.0504)Ideology 0.162^{**} 0.185^{**} 0.238^{***} 0.260^{***} 0.335^{***} (1=Very (0.0560)(0.0616)(0.0546)(0.0575)(0.0575)Conservative) 0.0325 -0.0176 0.0419 0.0182 -0.00978 Religiosity 0.0325 -0.0176 0.0419 0.03511 (0.0314) FIRE Index 0.521^{***} 0.353^{***} 0.569^{***} 0.349^{***} (0.0570)(0.0711)(0.0564)(0.0654)(0.0527)Constant -0.0466 0.0685 -0.131^{***} 0.461^{***} (0.541)(0.0411)(0.0524)(0.0395)(0.0413)(0.0506)Costant 725 703 741 732 729 R-squared 0.514 0.304 0.588 0.432 0.387		(0.0595)	(0.0713)	(0.0563)	(0.0626)	(0.0696)
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Education	-0.0427	-0.0639	-0.00659	0.0782+	-0.0239
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		(0.0411)	(0.0431)	(0.0365)	(0.0412)	(0.0421)
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Income	-0.00187	-0.0195	0.0873+	0.0733	-0.0788
Employed -0.0218 $-0.0513+$ -0.0256 $-0.0475+$ -0.00422 Party ID $0.337**$ $0.194**$ $0.332***$ $0.122*$ $0.143**$ (1=Strong Republican) (0.0500) (0.0530) (0.0472) (0.0541) (0.0504) Ideology $0.162**$ $0.185**$ $0.238***$ $0.260***$ $0.335***$ (1=Very Conservative) (0.0560) (0.0616) (0.0546) (0.0575) (0.0575) Religiosity 0.0325 -0.0176 0.0419 0.0182 -0.00978 (0.0345) (0.0371) (0.0324) (0.0351) (0.0314) FIRE Index $0.521***$ $0.353**$ $0.569***$ $0.555***$ $0.349***$ (0.0570) (0.0711) (0.0564) (0.0577) (0.0577) Constant -0.0466 0.0685 $-0.131***$ $-0.137***$ $0.461***$ Observations 725 703 741 732 729 R-squared 0.514 0.304 0.588 0.432 0.387		(0.0552)	(0.0610)	(0.0508)	(0.0579)	(0.0539)
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Employed	-0.0218	-0.0513+	-0.0256	-0.0475+	-0.000422
Party ID 0.337^{***} 0.194^{***} 0.332^{***} 0.122^{*} 0.143^{**} $(1=Strong)$ (0.0500) (0.0530) (0.0472) (0.0541) (0.0504) Republican) 0.162^{**} 0.185^{**} 0.238^{***} 0.260^{***} 0.335^{***} Ideology 0.162^{**} 0.185^{**} 0.238^{***} 0.260^{***} 0.335^{***} $(1=Very)$ (0.0560) (0.0616) (0.0546) (0.0575) (0.0575) Conservative) 0.0325 -0.0176 0.0419 0.0182 -0.00978 Religiosity 0.0325 -0.0176 0.0419 0.0182 -0.00978 (0.0345) (0.0371) (0.0324) (0.0351) (0.0314) FIRE Index 0.521^{***} 0.353^{***} 0.569^{***} 0.555^{***} 0.349^{***} (0.0570) (0.0711) (0.0564) (0.0654) (0.0527) Constant -0.0466 0.0685 -0.131^{***} -0.137^{***} 0.461^{***} (0.0401) (0.0524) (0.0395) (0.0413) (0.0506) Deservations 725 703 741 732 729 R-squared 0.514 0.304 0.588 0.432 0.387		(0.0237)	(0.0275)	(0.0216)	(0.0253)	(0.0242)
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Party ID	0.337***	0.194***	0.332***	0.122*	0.143**
Republican) Ideology 0.162*** 0.185*** 0.238*** 0.260*** 0.335*** Ideology 0.162*** 0.185*** 0.238*** 0.260*** 0.335*** (1=Very (0.0560) (0.0616) (0.0546) (0.0575) (0.0575) Conservative) 0.0325 -0.0176 0.0419 0.0182 -0.00978 Religiosity 0.0345) (0.0371) (0.0324) (0.0351) (0.0314) FIRE Index 0.521*** 0.353*** 0.569*** 0.555*** 0.349*** (0.0570) (0.0711) (0.0564) (0.0654) (0.0527) Constant -0.0466 0.0685 -0.131*** -0.137*** 0.461*** (0.0401) (0.0524) (0.0395) (0.0413) (0.0506) Observations 725 703 741 732 729 R-squared 0.514 0.304 0.588 0.432 0.387	(1=Strong	(0.0500)	(0.0530)	(0.0472)	(0.0541)	(0.0504)
Ideology0.162**0.185**0.238***0.260***0.335***(1=Very Conservative)(0.0560)(0.0616)(0.0546)(0.0575)(0.0575)Religiosity0.0325-0.01760.04190.0182-0.00978(0.0345)(0.0371)(0.0324)(0.0351)(0.0314)FIRE Index0.521***0.353***0.569***0.555***0.349***(0.0570)(0.0711)(0.0564)(0.0654)(0.0527)Constant-0.04660.0685-0.131***-0.137***0.461***(0.0401)(0.0524)(0.0395)(0.0413)(0.0506)Dbservations725703741732729R-squared0.5140.3040.5880.4320.387	Republican)					
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Ideology	0.162**	0.185**	0.238***	0.260***	0.335***
Conservative)	(1=Very	(0.0560)	(0.0616)	(0.0546)	(0.0575)	(0.0575)
Religiosity0.0325-0.01760.04190.0182-0.00978(0.0345)(0.0371)(0.0324)(0.0351)(0.0314)FIRE Index 0.521***0.353***0.569***0.555***0.349*** (0.0570)(0.0711)(0.0564)(0.0654)(0.0527)Constant-0.04660.0685 -0.131***-0.137***0.461*** (0.0401)(0.0524)(0.0395)(0.0413)(0.0506)Observations725703741732729R-squared0.5140.3040.5880.4320.387	Conservative)					
(0.0345)(0.0371)(0.0324)(0.0351)(0.0314)FIRE Index 0.521***0.353***0.569***0.555***0.349*** (0.0570)(0.0711)(0.0564)(0.0654)(0.0527)Constant-0.04660.0685- 0.131*** - 0.137***0.461*** (0.0401)(0.0524)(0.0395)(0.0413)(0.0506)Observations725703741732729R-squared0.5140.3040.5880.4320.387	Religiosity	0.0325	-0.0176	0.0419	0.0182	-0.00978
FIRE Index0.521***0.353***0.569***0.555***0.349***(0.0570)(0.0711)(0.0564)(0.0654)(0.0527)Constant-0.04660.0685-0.131***-0.137***0.461***(0.0401)(0.0524)(0.0395)(0.0413)(0.0506)Observations725703741732729R-squared0.5140.3040.5880.4320.387		(0.0345)	(0.0371)	(0.0324)	(0.0351)	(0.0314)
(0.0570)(0.0711)(0.0564)(0.0654)(0.0527)Constant-0.04660.0685-0.131***-0.137***0.461***(0.0401)(0.0524)(0.0395)(0.0413)(0.0506)Observations725703741732729R-squared0.5140.3040.5880.4320.387	FIRE Index	0.521***	0.353***	0.569***	0.555***	0.349***
Constant-0.04660.0685-0.131***-0.137***0.461***(0.0401)(0.0524)(0.0395)(0.0413)(0.0506)Observations725703741732729R-squared0.5140.3040.5880.4320.387		(0.0570)	(0.0711)	(0.0564)	(0.0654)	(0.0527)
(0.0401) (0.0524) (0.0395) (0.0413) (0.0506) Observations 725 703 741 732 729 R-squared 0.514 0.304 0.588 0.432 0.387	Constant	-0.0466	0.0685	-0.131***	-0.137***	0.461***
Observations 725 703 741 732 729 R-squared 0.514 0.304 0.588 0.432 0.387		(0.0401)	(0.0524)	(0.0395)	(0.0413)	(0.0506)
Observations725703741732729R-squared0.5140.3040.5880.4320.387						
R-squared 0.514 0.304 0.588 0.432 0.387	Observations	725	703	741	732	729
	R-squared	0.514	0.304	0.588	0.432	0.387

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

As anticipated, individuals with more negative racial attitudes are more opposed to policies that make voting easier (and more supportive of policies that make voting more difficult), controlling for a wide array of factors.

These supplemental analyses examining the role of racial attitudes in other racialized domains implicitly reaffirm our main point about reparations policies: that, rather than being a distinctive,

or isolated, policy domain, reparations policies are a highly salient example of a broader set of policies relating to race that have been drawn into the nation's intensely racialized and polarized political environment. Therefore, just as negative racial attitudes play a central role in determining opposition to a variety of other policies relating to race, so should they also profoundly influence attitudes toward reparations.

Appendix 10: Religiosity and Support for Reparations

Given that religiosity is often presumed to be associated with conservative attitudes in contemporary American politics, it is somewhat unexpected that we find that increased religiosity is often associated with decreased opposition to reparations in our analyses.

A partial explanation for this pattern is that African Americans, who are especially supportive of reparations, are also among the most religious respondents in our sample, as we show in the table below (note that the proportions below exclude those who indicated "Don't know"). Latinx Americans are also at least as religious as (and possibly more religious than) whites, and are also somewhat more supportive of reparations (we focus on the attitudes of Whites, African Americans, and Latinx Americans because we have sufficient samples of these groups to provide reasonable estimates). Therefore, when we pool respondents of different races and ethnicities together, the strong positive relationships between religiosity and support for reparations among these particular racial and ethnic groups groups likely influences the aggregate relationship between religiosity and support for reparations.

		Never	Seldom	A few times a year	Once or twice a month	Once a week	More than once a week
April 2021 Survey	Whites	39%	21%	13%	6%	15%	6%
	African Americans	25%	22%	10%	12%	24%	8%
	Latinx Americans	42%	18%	18%	4%	15%	4%
December 2021 Survey	Whites	43%	21%	10%	5%	15%	6%

Frequency of Church Attendance among Whites, African Americans, and Latinx Americans in April 2021, December 2021, and January 2023 Surveys

	African Americans	25%	22%	9%	9%	27%	8%
	Latinx Americans	35%	24%	13%	4%	13%	12%
January 2023 Survey	Whites	39%	22%	9%	6%	17%	7%
	African Americans	20%	16%	11%	10%	28%	15%
	Latinx Americans	25%	26%	14%	10%	13%	10%

Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number.

However, this is not the entirety of the explanation because, as we show in Appendix 1, even when we limit the sample to white respondents religiosity is either associated with reduced opposition to reparations policies or has no statistically significant effect. One possible explanation for this pattern is that our measure of religiosity, frequency of church attendance, incorporates a very diverse array of experiences and identities among whites, from relatively progressive denominations such as mainline Protestant denominations, to very conservative denominations, such as Evangelical and conservative Catholic congregations. By consequence, the effect of our measure of religiosity captures patterns of behavior that may not carry a consistent ideologically conservative valence. It may be that, among whites, an alternative measure of religiosity that incorporated the ideological and doctrinal dimensions of the faith experience as well as the frequency of attendance would yield different conclusions.