Part IV: Supplement and Appendices

**Supplement on Control of Disorder**

**INTRODUCTION**

In this supplement we focus principally on controlling disorders that have escalated beyond immediate police capabilities and require a total community response to halt the violence. We also consider the rarer cases where state or Federal forces are necessary to achieve control.

**THE POLICE AND CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDERS**

The capability of a police department to control a civil disorder depends essentially on two factors: proper planning and competent performance. These depend in turn upon the quantity and quality of police manpower, the training of patrolmen and police commanders, and the effectiveness of their equipment.

This portion of the Supplement will review the adequacy of police planning, training, and equipment to deal with civil disorders, together with the Commission's recommendations for improvement.

When underlying tensions are present—and they exist in every American city with a large minority population—a minor incident can turn a crowd into a mob. Last summer an appreciable number of incidents were triggered by police actions—some serious, such as the shooting of a suspect, but usually by routine activities such as an arrest.

The way policemen approach an incident often determines whether it is contained or develops into a serious disorder. Experienced police administrators consulted by the Commission repeatedly stressed the need for good judgment and common sense among police officers called to the scene of an incident in a neighborhood where tensions exist. They warned against using sirens and flasher lights in situations that will attract crowds. They cautioned against over-responding to an incident with too much visible force—riot guns and helmets may only aggravate a tense situation. Yet they also pointed out that control has sometimes been lost because an insufficient number of police were on hand to control a disorder in its initial stages. A major lesson of the 1967 disorders was that it takes a seasoned senior officer to make the all-important initial assessments and decisions that will contain an incident.

If an incident develops, and a crowd begins to threaten lawlessness and acts of violence, the police must act promptly and with a sufficient display of force to make clear their intent and capacity to suppress disorder and insure the public safety.
PLANNING

Effective preparation for disorder requires careful planning. Large numbers of police officers must be mobilized, deployed, and directed by senior officers. They must have adequate logistical support, particularly if extended operations are necessary.

Mobilization planning. To mobilize enough policemen to handle a riot emergency is difficult, even in large cities. In one major city with a population of more than 1 million, an area of 140 square miles, and a police force of nearly 5,000 men, no more than 192 patrolmen were on duty when a major civil disorder erupted. Of these, only 44 were in the riot area. The difficulties in mobilizing additional men were described by the police commissioner:

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that mobilization is inherently a time consuming operation, no matter how efficient. After a man is notified, he must dress and travel to his reporting point. Once he has checked in and has been equipped, he must be turned around and transported to a command post or an assembly point. There he must be briefed on the situation that exists, the location of the riot area, his duties, and other details required to make him effective once he is deployed. He must then be actually committed to the area of involvement. The time lapse in this entire procedure ranges from 1½ to 2 hours.

By the time sufficient manpower was brought in, the disorder had developed beyond the control capability of the police department.

Adding to this difficulty is the fact that the standard training for police operations is basically different from that required for riot control. Traditional police training seeks to develop officers who can work independently and with little direct supervision. But the control of civil disturbances requires quite different performance—large numbers of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, organized and trained to work as members of a team under a highly unified command and control system. No matter how well-trained and skilled a police officer may be, he will be relatively ineffectual in dealing with civil disturbances so long as he functions as an individual. Thus, a major civil disturbance requires a police department to convert itself, suddenly, into a different type of organization with new operational procedures.

To cope with the difficulties of this transition, a police department needs a plan that can mobilize and deploy needed manpower with a minimum deviation from established operating procedures, and with minimum curtailment of essential police services.

A study conducted for the Commission by the International Association of Chiefs of Police of 30 major police departments found that, while all had some form of written mobilization plan, the quality of the plans varied greatly. Principal defects were in the following areas: procedures for implementing the plan; provision for relief of reserve forces after the plan has been activated; accounting for personnel dispatched to a disorder; predesignation of assembly areas or command posts in the various areas of the cities where trouble might be expected; logistical support of police and other law enforcement officers engaged in control activities; flexibility in planning to cope with disorders of varying natures and magnitudes; and unnecessarily complicated planning that deviated excessively from normal operations.

Because of these deficiencies in the mobilization plans of the leading police departments, and in response to many requests for assistance, the Commission has prepared a model plan, which can be adapted to local requirements. Currently used as training material in the Conferences on the Prevention and Control of Civil Disorders sponsored by the Department of Justice in response to Commission recommendations, the plan will be revised as additional information is developed by these conferences. The Commission recommends that the Department of Justice disseminate the revised plan to police departments across the country and make it available in federally sponsored training on riot control methods.

Operational planning. Operational planning is a necessary complement to mobilization planning. It provides guidance to the police command and the men of the steps necessary to control the disorder, and it includes command and control mechanisms, communication, intelligence, means to combat inflammatory rumors, and tactics.

(1) Command and control and communications.—Whether the shift from normal routine police operations to an emergency basis is smooth and effective depends upon the speed with which the police can provide unified command and control. Under ordinary conditions, a police dispatcher controls the movement of men and equipment from a central position to places where they are needed. In most police departments the system works well enough so long as the demands on the dispatcher are within the capabilities of the man and his equipment.

Many local police departments called upon to control civil disorders have had serious problems in commanding and controlling the large numbers of men required to work together as an effective, coordinated team. The problem has been compounded by the shortage of on-duty supervisors and staff at certain periods of the day. It is one thing to assemble a large force; it is quite another to provide appropriate direction and leadership.

Effective command and control in a civil disorder depends upon communications, and communications is a function both of planning and of equipment. Relatively few police departments have adequate communications equipment or frequencies. Forty-two percent of all police departments studied by the
The Commission had no special radio frequency for emergencies.

The lack of emergency frequencies overloads normal frequencies. This may not only preclude effective command and control of police in the area of a civil disorder but may also undermine the ability of the police to provide vital services to the remainder of the city.

The absence of adequate communication facilities is particularly acute with respect to outside police assistance. Approximately 50 percent of all police agencies surveyed had inadequate means to coordinate with neighboring jurisdictions. Incompatible radio frequencies were found to have handicapped the effective use of neighboring police departments. When local and state police must cooperate with National Guard units, the need for communications coordination is urgent.

We believe that the critical communications and control problems arising from the present shortage of frequencies available to police departments require immediate attention. Accordingly, we recommend that the Federal Communications Commission make sufficient frequencies available to police and related public safety services to meet the demonstrated need for riot control and other emergency use.

Miniaturized communications equipment for officers on foot is critically needed for command and control in civil disorders, particularly if the riot commanders are to exercise effective command and control over police units in control operations. At the present time police officers can generally communicate only to headquarters and only from a police vehicle. This Commission, therefore, endorses the recommendations made by the Crime Commission that the Federal Government assume the leadership in initiating and funding portable radio development programs for the police.

(2) Intelligeuce.—The absence of accurate information both before and during a disorder has created special control problems for police. Police departments must develop means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning purposes, as well as on-the-scene information for use in police operations during a disorder.

An intelligence unit staffed with full-time personnel should be established to gather, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate information on potential as well as actual civil disorders. It should provide police administrators and commanders with reliable information essential for assessment and decisionmaking. It should use un-

1 This recommendation was previously made to the FCC in a letter from the Commission, a copy of which is included in the appendix. The FCC has taken steps to make additional frequencies available.

2 This recommendation was previously made in a letter to the Department of Justice, a copy of which is included in the appendix.

dercover police personnel and informants, but it should also draw on community leaders, agencies, and organizations in the ghetto.

Planning is also necessary to cope with the ever present problem of rumors. A rumor collection center will enable police and other officials to counter false and inflammatory reports by giving accurate information rapidly to community leaders and others in troubled areas. Evaluation of rumors can also provide important information about potential disorders.

In one large city, for example, a “Rumor Central” unit established in the Commission on Human Relations has played an important role in averting trouble. When a Negro, after an argument, was shot to death by a white store owner who was placed in custody by the police, a rumor spread through the neighborhood that the white man would not be arrested. This false information was picked up by a radio station and broadcast. But Rumor Central, which received some 500 telephone calls about the incident, obtained the facts from the police and gave those facts to community leaders and news media. This appreciably assisted the police in alleviating tension.

(3) Tactics.—In dealing with disorders, police have traditionally relied principally on the use of various squad formations and tactics to disperse crowds. These tactics have been of little or no value in some recent disorders marked by roving bands of rioters engaged in window breaking, looting, and firebombing.

Studies made for the Commission indicate that the police are aware of the deficiency. Many police departments admitted that traditional riot control methods and squad tactics were wholly ineffective or only partially useful in the disorders. But no new and practical response to the recent types of disorders has emerged. Few departments have evolved new tactics against rioters. Even fewer have sent trained personnel to consult with officials in cities that have experienced civil disorders.

Tactics recommended for dealing with the type of disorders experienced last summer, as well as those that may develop in the future, are also presented in the model operations plan discussed below.

(4) Recommendations for operational planning.—The Commission believes that model operations plans are needed now to provide guidelines for police departments in coping with civil disorders, including types of disorders that may develop in the future.

Acting on these convictions, the Commission has developed a model operations plan after consultation with leading police officials. Like the mobilization plan, this plan is also being used in the Department of Justice training conferences and is now undergoing final revision. The Commission recommends that this plan be distributed to local and state police depart-
Yet once the decision has been made, proper advance planning will help speed assistance. Outside forces will need a relatively long lead time before response. A survey of National Guard capabilities, for example, shows that an average of 4 to 6 hours is required from the time of notification to the time of arrival of an effective complement of men.

Local authorities must not wait until the critical moment to alert a neighboring jurisdiction, the state police, or the National Guard. Outside control forces will then be unable to mobilize and respond on time. All agencies that may be asked to help control a civil disturbance must be alerted at an early stage and kept informed.

These problems will be further discussed in the section on the National Guard and state-local planning.

Logistical planning

Commission studies disclosed serious deficiencies in police plans for logistical support. Many of these plans appear to assume that supplies and equipment will be on hand or will be available in the amounts required. The moment of need is too late to find out whether they are.

Regular police vehicles are usually inadequate for transporting and supplying large numbers of police, particularly since the men should be moved in units. Furthermore, a disorder extending over a long period of time will require the resupply of expended items and probably food and shelter for police personnel. In one city, when the failure to plan for these contingencies kept an entire police force on 24-hour duty, physical exhaustion seriously impaired police effectiveness.

A major problem in certain of the 1967 disorders arose from the large number of persons arrested. Facilities to transport, detain, process, feed, and house them were totally inadequate and no emergency or contingency planning had been done. This logistical problem is discussed in Chapter 13, the Administration of Justice Under Emergency Conditions.

TRAINING

The Commission survey on the capabilities and preparedness of selected police departments showed that the most critical deficiency of all is in the area of training. Recruits receive an average of 18 hours of riot-control training; programs range from 62 hours to only 2. Little additional training is provided for supervisory and command officers.

Moreover, although riot control tactics require the work of highly disciplined and coordinated teams, almost all departments train policemen as individuals. Of the 19 departments reporting some post-recruit training for riot-control units, five limit training to the use of firearms and chemicals. In many cases, the training program is built around traditional military formations that have little applicability to the kinds of civil disorders experienced by our cities. Yet 50 percent of all the departments surveyed reported that they were generally satisfied with their training programs and planned no significant changes.

Basic riot control should be taught in recruit school, and intensive unit training should be conducted subsequently on a regular basis. Without this kind of training, police officers cannot be expected to perform effectively in controlling civil disturbances. Training supervisory and command personnel in the control of civil disorders must also be a continuing process.

Emergency plans and emergency operations must be reviewed in the classroom and practiced in the field. Yet few departments test their mobilization and operational plans. As a result, when carefully planned variations from the normal chain-of-command, communications systems, and unit assignments go into effect at a time of riot emergency, policemen are often unfamiliar with them. The most thoroughly developed emergency plan is useless unless all personnel fully understand it before it is put into operation.

Of the 30 police departments surveyed not a single one reported coordinated training with fire units. Yet recent experience shows a clear need for police-fire teamwork in riots. Even more revealing, only two of the departments surveyed have undertaken coordinated training with other community agencies required in a riot emergency. Only two departments reported coordinating their riot control training with the National Guard and state police.

In order to strengthen police training, the Commission recommends:

- Departments should immediately allocate whatever time is necessary to reach an effective level of riot control capability. The need for training in civil disorder prevention and control is urgent.
- Training must include all levels of personnel within the police agency, especially commanders. Post-recruit riot training must be a continuing process for all personnel which builds upon recruit training rather than duplicates it.
- Riot-control training must be provided to groups expected to function as teams during actual riot conditions. Required levels of teamwork can be achieved only through team training. All special riot-control units must receive additional and
intensive training in tactics and procedures, as well as in special equipment and weapons.

- Mobilization plans and emergency procedures must be reviewed in the classroom and practiced in the field. All members of the department must be familiar with riot plans at all times.
- Mayors and other civil officials must recognize the need and accept the responsibility for initiating regional training and coordination with military and state police personnel, as well as with other agencies of local government.
- Police agencies must review and become familiar with recent riot experience so that training programs can be realistically adjusted in the light of anticipated problems.
- In order to help law enforcement agencies improve their knowledge and strengthen their capabilities to prevent and control civil disorders, a national center and clearinghouse should be established to develop, evaluate, and disseminate riot prevention and control data and information. This center should be part of the proposed National Institute for Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended by the President and awaiting action by Congress.

A suggestion has been made that national observer teams be established and assigned to the scene of incipient or developing disorders. These teams would study the effectiveness of control techniques and organization, recommend improvements, and make this information available to public officials. The Commission endorses the recommendation and suggests further that the disorder observer teams be made an integral part of the proposed national center.

POLICE CONTROL EQUIPMENT

Personal equipment.—A serious hazard faced by police officers during disorders is injury from bottles, rocks, and other missiles thrown by rioters. Yet few police departments can furnish every man assigned to civil disturbance duty with the proper equipment to protect head, face, and eyes. The Commission has found that protective clothing, boots, and gloves are generally not available for the police, although most police administrators recommend their procurement and use. Police officers must have the proper personal equipment and clothing to safeguard them against the threat of bodily harm.

Police weapons.—On the basis of a survey made of 30 major police departments, the Commission found that many police forces are inadequately equipped or trained for use of even conventional riot control weapons and materiel. For example, although the police baton has proven to be a very effective weapon in situations where a low level of physical force will control a disorder, many police departments fail to instruct their men in the proper use of this control weapon. The value of the police baton should not be overlooked and police administrators should assure that proper training in its correct and most effective use is given to all police officers.

The only equipment found to be in adequate supply in police departments was hand guns. Experience has shown that these are relatively poor and ineffective weapons for dealing with a civil disorder.

The most serious deficiencies, however, are in advanced nonlethal weapons. Riot control authorities regard nonlethal chemical agents, such as tear gas, as the single most valuable and effective type of middle-range weapons in controlling civil disorders. In listing the priority of force to be applied in a disorder, the FBI manual on riot control, as well as Army and National Guard doctrine, prescribes the use of tear gas (CS and CN) before resorting to firearms. According to the FBI riot control manual: "They are the most effective and most humane means of achieving temporary neutralization of a mob with a minimum of personal injury."

While most of the police departments surveyed possessed some chemical weapons with varying degrees of supplies on hand, they lacked sufficient gas masks to equip even 30 percent of their personnel. The lack of gas masks restricts use of gas by many police forces.

Police and other civil officials have also been inhibited by the unfavorable psychological reaction to the use of any gas or chemical weapon. An additional restraint is created by the presence of large numbers of innocent people in the disorder area who would be affected by the traditional massive use of tear gas.

The recent development of new containers and projectile devices by the U.S. Army now makes it possible to use CS discriminatingly against small groups and even individuals. Police departments could use them to deal effectively and appropriately with looters and snipers.

Some police departments have recently been equipping police officers with a liquid tear gas device. Initial reports indicate that, though less effective than CS, it provides a useful method of dealing with unruly and dangerous individuals. Used properly, it renders offenders harmless for 10 to 15 minutes. Projectors now in production promise to give police a means of acting against lawless small groups or individuals up to a distance of 30 feet.

The use of distinctive colors and odors either added to a chemical agent or projected from a separate device may be an additional way to help police not only identify those engaged in vandalism and other illegal acts, but also deter others.

The exaggerated reports of sniping in many cities experiencing disorders created unwarranted apprehension among some police administrators. This concern has led to a belief in some communities that police officers should be armed with highly destructive implements of war.

The Commission believes that equipping civil police with automatic rifles, machine guns, and other weapons of massive and indiscriminate destructive force is not warranted by the evidence. Chemical agents provide police forces with an effective and more appropriate
weapon. If violence by rioters mounts beyond the control capability of the police, trained military forces should be called in. We should not attempt to convert our police into combat troops equipped for urban warfare.

The true source of police strength in maintaining order lies in the respect and good will of the public they serve. Great harm is likely to result from the use of military weapons of mass destruction by police forces which lack the command and control and firearms discipline of military units. Improper action could destroy the concept of civilian police as a public service agency dependent for effective operations on community cooperation and support.

Overall recommendations.—The development of modern, nonlethal control equipment has languished because police departments lack the resources for tests and evaluation. The decentralized nature of law enforcement and the absence of standard criteria have also limited market opportunities. As a result, private industry has been reluctant to invest in research and development of new police equipment.

Accordingly, the Commission recommends:

- The Federal Government should undertake an immediate program to test and evaluate available nonlethal weapons and related control equipment for use by police and control forces.
- Federal support should be provided to establish criteria and standard specifications which would stimulate and facilitate the production of such items at a reasonably low cost.
- Federal funds should be used to develop appropriate tools and materiel for local and state law enforcement agencies.

If these recommendations are adopted, the result will be better maintenance of law and order and better control of disorders with fewer risks to police and the public. Use should be made of the technology and resources of the Department of Defense and other appropriate Federal agencies.

FIRE DEPARTMENTS AND CIVIL DISORDERS

Of the 23 cities studied by the Commission, most reported arson and fires accompanying the disorders, ranging from the burning of police barricades in Jackson, Mississippi, to the 682 riot-connected fires listed by the Detroit Fire Department. Fire departments face problems equal in difficulty to the control problems of law enforcement agencies.

MAJOR FIRE DEPARTMENT PROBLEMS IN CIVIL DISORDERS

Abnormal number of fires.—The basic problem for fire departments during a civil disorder is lack of resources to cope with an abnormal number of fires in one area while maintaining some coverage for other areas. Detroit had as many fires in the 5 days of disorder as it usually has in a month. No other city approached this number of fires during a disorder, but fire problems were still critical. For example, during the 4 days of disorder in Newark, the fire department responded to 250 fire calls, plus 64 false alarms, and 50 emergencies where no fire existed. Of these 364 calls, 166 took place on the first day of the disorder.

Fire departments are not organized or equipped to cope with an abnormal number of fires on a sustained basis. There are more than 23,500 public fire departments in the United States, and only 285 have 100 or more employees. Only 19 cities have more than 1,000 paid employees, ranging from 13,917 in New York City to 1,061 in New Orleans. But total strength is far from the number of men available to fight a fire. Regular hours of duty mean that only 20 to 35 percent of personnel are on duty at any one time. The situation is even more critical in the suburban communities surrounding the core city, for many of these departments depend to a very large extent on volunteer firemen even for routine fires, and few have as many as 25 men normally on duty.

Shortages of equipment, particularly reserve equipment necessary for a full utilization of all available manpower, also inhibit efforts to combat widespread fires. During the Detroit disorder, 41 suburban communities furnished men and about 56 pieces of equipment to augment the 92 pieces of equipment of the city department. The danger in relying on mutual aid agreements comes from the possibility that adjoining communities may be simultaneously involved in a disorder and unable to release men or equipment.

Malicious or nuisance false alarms.—False alarms have often plagued fire departments during disorders. These alarms overload incoming communication systems and deplete manpower and equipment needed for actual fires.

Attacks on and harassment of firemen.—In many of the cities experiencing civil disorders, firemen have been harassed, and even attacked, primarily by thrown objects. These, plus fear of attack, have seriously interfered with the work of firemen. Firemen can no longer depend upon community assistance, but must be ready for open hostility.

Overtaxed communication facilities.—Fire department communication capabilities have been severely taxed during disorders. At headquarters, increased number of alarms overload incoming telephone lines, and impose heavy burdens on dispatchers. In the field, frequencies have been overloaded, while the use of different frequencies by fire units, law enforcement agencies and National Guard forces has created confusion.

The Commission has requested that the Federal Com-
communications Commission provide sufficient frequencies to permit communication during disorders among all agencies of government involved in control.

**Identification of a civil disorder fire problem.**—The fire problem in a civil disorder has usually developed after the initial disturbance. The time interval may be a matter of hours, as in Detroit, or a matter of days, as in Los Angeles in 1965. In order to insure efficient response, fire chiefs must identify the start of a problem as early as possible both to activate emergency plans and to avoid an initial overcommitment of resources.

**Water supply problems.**—Numerous fires reduce water pressure, and malicious openings of hydrants deplete water supplies.

**Logistical support.**—Extended firefighting operations by large numbers of personnel and equipment have created serious logistical problems. Sufficient manpower and equipment must be on hand not only to combat the fires but also to avert long hours of duty leading to exhaustion. Special feeding and rest facilities near the center of operations should be provided.

The availability and state of repair of reserve equipment creates additional difficulties when this equipment is pressed into service during an emergency.

Large scale glass breakage during disorders has damaged tires of firetrucks. Hose problems have been acute. Most fire departments lack the heavy stream equipment that is most efficient in handling riot-caused fires. Forced withdrawals because of attacks on firemen and rapid reassignment to new threatened areas have prevented recovery of hose. Damage from large scale operations, as well as from sabatoge, has further reduced hose inventories.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE**

**Planning.**—The Commission recommends that fire departments evaluate all existing resources, develop and test plans of response, and make every effort to strengthen the firefighting force within the limits of the community's financial base. Beyond this, detailed plans must be prepared to:

- Identify areas where disorders and fires are likely to occur.
- Compute the units needed to service critical areas, while maintaining minimum protection for the remainder of the community.
- Jointly evaluate total needs with cooperating agencies and schedule required assignments in advance.
- Select command-post sites, providing for a command room, adequate parking of apparatus, sufficient access and maneuver, communication facilities, and space for personnel for extended periods of time.
- Provide for coded signals to implement responses, to activate command posts, and to recall off-duty personnel.
- Choose special teams of men and equipment for commitment, including normally, one or two pumper truck, a chief officer, necessary heavy equipment, and communication facilities.
- Review the adequacy of the water supply and plan for foreseeable problems in advance.
- Develop plans for actual operations at the scene of fires.
- Provide a way to screen incoming alarms to avoid duplication of response and depletion of resources.

**Coordination and liaison with other units.**—Fire departments must be an integral part of the planning to coordinate all government agencies and private groups involved in control operations, in particular with law enforcement agencies and the National Guard. Effective liaison must be established well in advance of emergencies; lines of communication to the police will provide both information for the prompt recognition of special fire problems and police protection. Tests of all agreements are a necessity.

**Protection of firemen.**—A fireman is neither trained nor equipped to control rioters. To be effective, he must be able to devote his entire attention to fire control activities. Since firemen have a professional responsibility and duty to respond to all fires, protection furnished by outside sources may be necessary for the personal well-being of firemen, and for effective firefighting operations.

Thus, if firemen are attacked or severely harassed or interfered with in their operations, either police or National Guardsmen should be assigned to fire units to furnish effective protection. In order to ensure that proper protection will be immediately available if needed, advance commitments and assignments are necessary. Firemen must establish and maintain liaison with top police officials and National Guard officers.

Personal protective equipment for firemen and apparatus may also be necessary—covered cabs, eye shields, and crash helmets, as well as covering material for fire engines.

**Adequate communication equipment.**—Adequate communications between headquarters and field operations are essential—additional telephones to receive alarms; direct-line telephones to command posts and key officials; portable two-way radios; radio links to other agencies and cooperating fire departments; equipment for reserve units; and reliable means to direct fire-fighters to fire scenes. Periodic exercises and tests are necessary.

**Logistical support.**—To ensure adequate logistical support, fire departments must make an inventory of all equipment and supplies, repair or replace inoperative or defective equipment, and ensure adequate repair and maintenance facilities. Sufficient quantities of hose, particularly heavy stream and large diameter hose, are required.

**Training.**—Because operations during civil disorders differ substantially from normal operating procedures, training must be carried out at operational and command levels. Command level training is of special im-
Importance, for many fire department officials lack experience in wide-scale operations. Tactical exercises will help train senior staff officers and test communications and command capabilities.

Training and planning conferences.—The Commission recommends training conferences for the Nation's fire departments. Nationwide or areawide conferences among top fire department officials will promote exchanges of information relating to basic plans for responding to disorders and the preparation of training programs and materials for both operational and command levels. The Federal Government should assume the responsibility for instituting and funding such conferences.

Improved community relations.—Fire departments, like police departments, must improve their relations with the communities they serve in order to gain the community cooperation and assistance that are essential for effective firefighting. This requires getting out of the firehouse and becoming acquainted with the people in the neighborhood. Fire department officials have an obligation to develop programs to achieve these goals.

STATE RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISORDERS

A major civil disorder may require control forces beyond the personnel and equipment of a single city. When this occurs in an American city, the response will necessarily be far different than it would be in many foreign countries. The reported success of various foreign countries in rapidly suppressing civil disorders is due principally to their capability to rapidly deploy and command large numbers of specially trained and equipped riot-control personnel. This is possible because most foreign countries have large national police forces under centralized control.

Because a national police force is contrary to American tradition and because the use of Federal forces in domestic violence is limited by the Constitution, governing statutes, and precedent, in this country state forces alone will be available in the great majority of civil disorders in this country. The state forces presently available to assist local law enforcement agencies are the state police and the National Guard.

STATE POLICE FORCES

All states except Hawaii have a state police department, highway patrol, or department of public safety. Together they number approximately 32,500 sworn personnel. All but seven states have under 1,000 men. The great majority of them have only a few hundred. In most states, these officers are responsible for policing the entire highway system and must be generally dispersed over the entire state. Thus, state police departments find it difficult to mobilize sufficient numbers of men to be of appreciable help in assisting local police control a civil disorder.

In fact, traffic supervision rather than law enforcement is the chief function in more than half of the states. Twelve of the 49 departments lack full police powers. Only five spend less than half time on traffic; 27 spend three-quarters or more time on traffic. Only eight spend over 15 percent of their time on control of criminal activities.

In the comparatively few states where the departments spend appreciable time on crime control, they may be the principal law enforcement agency for many rural areas. To divert these forces to riot control activities would strip rural areas of police protection.

Although state police recruits in 44 states receive training in crowd and riot control tactics, the average number of hours for such training is approximately 10, as compared to 39 for the state traffic code and 38 for accident investigation.

Thus, most state police forces lack the necessary manpower, training, and operational structure to assist local police effectively in controlling civil disorders. In the great majority of states, only the National Guard can furnish effective assistance.

NATIONAL GUARD

During the period from the end of World War II through February of 1968, the National Guard has been summoned to aid in controlling civil disturbances approximately 100 times in 33 states. Eighteen took place during the summer of 1967 (June through August). The performance of Guard forces in certain recent disorders, particularly in Newark and Detroit, raised doubts regarding their capabilities for this type of mission.

Their performance also poses a serious challenge to the Nation. Because of the limitations of state police and the restrictions on the use of Federal forces, the National Guard is the only organization with sufficient manpower and appropriate organization and equipment which can materially assist local police departments in riot control operations.

After hearing testimony and reviewing evidence of the Guard's performance in riot-control operations in several cities, this Commission recommended immediate action to improve the Guard's effectiveness. These recommendations included: (1) increased riot control training; (2) review of the standards for National Guard officers; and (3) a substantial increase in Negro personnel in both Army and Air National Guard.

These recommendations provoked changes in the
Guard. Our evaluation will take these changes into account.

Background information on the Guard

Certain difficulties experienced by the Guard in responding to civil disorders result from the dual nature of its organization and mission. On one hand, it is a state militia organized, trained, and equipped to protect life and property and preserve order and public safety within the state it serves. On the other hand, it has a Federal mission to provide organized units of trained personnel with sufficient and suitable equipment to augment the Active Army and Air Force in time of war or national emergency.

National Guard officials maintain that their primary duty is to be ready to respond to the Federal mission. The Guard's force structure is tailored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enable its immediate integration into the Active Army and Air Force. The Army prescribes standards for enlisted, and for the appointment and promotion of officers; the Army directs training. A Federal order to duty has priority over a state call. The Federal Government pays for 90 percent of the operating costs, virtually all of the equipment, and nearly half the cost of the physical installations and facilities.

Yet members of the Guard take an oath of allegiance to the state. Unless called into Federal service, and except when on an annual 2 weeks' tour of active duty, the Guard is under the control of the Governor, who appoints officers. When on state duty, the Guard is paid by the state and is subject to state or local control. The concept of a state militia is enhanced by the hometown makeup and traditions of Guard units.

This dual nature of Guard makeup and mission must be taken into account when Guard capabilities for use in riot control operations are assessed, and when responsibility for improvements is fixed.

Here we consider the Guard's control capabilities in terms of personnel, organization, planning, training and equipment, as presently in being.

Personnel Resources

Sufficiency of manpower.—The total strength of the National Guard is determined by Congress in response to requirements set by the Department of Defense. The manpower level has varied little over the past several years.

Although the National Guard Bureau and the Adjutants General of the states participate in the process, establishing Guard strength in any state and allocating Guard units to a particular state are primarily Federal functions based upon the needs of the Active Army in the event of a national emergency. A Governor can refuse the total Guard manpower allocated to his state, in which case the excess manpower is assigned to other states. A Governor can also increase the total manpower assigned, but there would be no Federal recognition or support of the additional units.

In the recent past, no state has called its total Guard force to active duty to deal with civil disorders. Since 1957, the average proportion of the force employed has been 9 percent; in only two instances has a state employed more than 50 percent of Guard strength. California called out 60 percent for the Watts riot in 1965. Michigan called 85 percent for the Detroit disorder in 1967, but held 20 to 25 percent in reserve near Detroit. New Jersey employed 31 percent of its Guard in Newark, Wisconsin about 43 percent for Milwaukee. Even if civil disorders increase somewhat in frequency and magnitude, Guard strength appears generally adequate to assist local law enforcement units.

Other factors must, however, be considered. First, without the pressure of the accelerated draft in times of international crisis, the Guard usually has difficulty maintaining its strength. Second, no state has yet experienced more than one major civil disorder at any one time. Two or more major disturbances would probably necessitate outside help. Third, control of an extremely severe or prolonged disorder would undoubtedly be beyond the present capabilities of any state. And, fourth, repeated disorders in a state would create manpower problems since calling the same units to duty several times in a short period would cause severe dislocations for the men involved.

In summary, no state alone has the resources to support a Guard force capable of controlling all potential disorders, but no state can be expected to maintain a force of that strength. Elsewhere in this Report the Commission will consider the problem of obtaining outside aid.

Quality of Guard officers.—Total manpower is not the only factor in an evaluation of Guard capabilities for control purposes. Proper leadership at all levels is vital to prevent the indiscriminate riot control measures utilized by some Guard units in recent disorders.

Evidence presented to the Commission concerning Guard performance in recent control operations brought into question the caliber and competence of certain Guard officers. Some displayed inferior leadership below the level needed to handle the extremely sensitive operations of controlling disorder in an American city. As a result, the Commission recommended that the qualifications and performance of all Guard officers be reviewed. This recommendation was intended not as a reflection on the entire officer corps of the Guard, but rather to suggest that objective tests be used to replace or retrain officers who failed to meet minimum standards of leadership.

Prompt action was taken on the Commission's recommendations. A special board was formed to make a general assessment of the qualifications and performance of all Reserve Component officers. The Com-
mission assumes that the Department of the Army will continue these efforts and will work with the states to upgrade or eliminate officers who lack the necessary leadership attributes.

The responsibility to improve Guard leadership does not rest solely with the Federal Government. Governors appoint Guard officers, and they too must exercise responsibility to improve Guard leadership by selecting only the well qualified.

**Negro personnel in Guard units.**—Evidence from Detroit indicates that Active Army troops were more effective than National Guard units in controlling the disorder. According to many observers, the higher percentage of Negroes in the Active Army was a significant contributing factor. After reviewing this evidence and examining the percentage of Negroes in Guard units, this Commission recommended immediate efforts to increase substantially the number of Negroes in Army and Air National Guard units. (See letter to President Johnson, p. 318.)

The Department of Defense responded in two ways:

(a) On August 31, 1967, a special board was convened to study the extent of Negro participation in the Army National Guard and Reserve, to explore the reasons why Negroes were not fully participating, and to suggest a program to increase their participation substantially. On October 16, 1967, the board issued its report and recommended steps to recruit and retain additional Negro personnel.

(b) The New Jersey National Guard was authorized a temporary 5 percent overstrength—865 additional spaces—in its paid drill strength. The purpose was to test methods of increasing Negro participation in the Army and Air National Guard. An intensive recruiting program was immediately instituted to obtain qualified Negroes for the additional positions. By the end of December 1967, approximately 1,500 Negroes had expressed interest in the Guard. Of 723 whose applications were fully processed, 397 were actually enlisted into the Army and Air National Guard. Thus, approximately 46 percent of the overstrength positions have been filled, amounting to an increase of Negro participation in the New Jersey Guard from 1.7 percent on December 31, 1966, to 3.97 percent at the end of December 1967. The program is continuing.

The Commission commends these efforts. Although it is too early to determine whether the New Jersey program will be a complete success, preliminary results indicate that Negro participation in the Guard can be increased. **The Commission recommends** that the findings of the special board and the results of the New Jersey experiment be fully utilized to stimulate additional Negro participation. If necessary, overstrengths should be authorized.

Every effort must be made to ensure fair assignments and promotions for Negroes. Increased Negro participation in the Guard will have meaning only if there is a fair proportion of Negro officers in command of integrated units.

**Organization**

Unit organization in the Guard is identical to Active Army organization. Command and control arrangements are also identical, ensuring close supervision of troops and quick and flexible reaction to changing situations.

Command organization of the Guard is currently undergoing a modification which brings into a sharp focus potential conflicts between the state and Federal mission of the National Guard. In the opinion of experienced consultants, the basic military element that lends itself most effectively to riot control is the battalion. However, the current plan splits support-type battalions between various states with the resulting loss of at least one unified battalion in each state where divisions are split.

**The Commission recommends** that the Department of Defense reconsider alignment of units between the states in order to ensure that state needs for unified command and control in riot operations are fully taken into account.

**Planning**

The importance of planning in effective control operations cannot be overemphasized. Planning is particularly important for the National Guard because it needs to mobilize a large number of men from a variety of locations and occupations, be sure they are properly equipped, deploy them rapidly in effective units to the scene of the disorder, and provide adequate logistical support for expanded operations.

The Department of the Army in August 1967, instructed all National Guard commands to develop riot-control plans. A revised training schedule issued at the same time required an 8-hour command-post exercise to develop plans or exercise previously developed plans. All National Guard units have now met this requirement.

The commanding general of the U.S. Continental Army Command has dispatched liaison teams to review all state National Guard riot-control plans and to assure that they are coordinated with plans drawn by state and local civil officials.

The Army has also developed planning packets for certain cities. These include maps and other information necessary for control operations.

The Department of the Army and the National Guard Bureau have provided a basic framework which helps the states construct appropriate riot-control plans. The states now have a clear responsibility to develop them.

In order to help appropriate Federal and state offi-
The Commission recommends:

- The 8-hour command post exercise mentioned above is inadequate for proper drafting of control plans. The Commission believes that riot-control plans should be developed by the state Adjutant General working together with his full-time duty staff, rather than during a training exercise. The Commission also suggests that the Military Support of Civil Defense section be utilized to assist in the planning process. Only if the planning is carried out in this fashion by full-time personnel will there be adequate opportunity to develop a workable and comprehensive plan, and also to exploit fully the training exercises devoted to testing and revision of the plans. We are informed that the Department of the Army is presently taking steps that would substantially carry out this recommendation.

- The planning process must involve all state and local officials who will be involved in the control operations. It cannot be left solely to the Army and National Guard, nor to the National Guard and police departments.

- The lack of adequate communication between the Guard and local agencies has been a problem in nearly all instances where National Guard troops have been utilized to assist in controlling a disorder. Proper planning must insure effective communications among all Guard units involved, as well as among the Guard and appropriate local agencies, particularly the police and fire departments.

- Planning should take into account those National Guardsmen who are policemen, firemen, and other emergency workers. They must be released from active military duty on a case-by-case basis if they are needed in their civilian capacities.

- Plans must be constantly reviewed to ensure their applicability to changing conditions and new techniques and equipment.

- An officer should be on duty at the state Guard headquarters on a 24-hour basis to ensure proper contact with state and local civil officials and law enforcement agencies. Guard headquarters should maintain regular contacts with all major state and local law enforcement agencies in order to provide for an exchange of information, particularly intelligence.

- All states should plan to have Guard cadres, key personnel, and even some units, available for rapid call-up during the crucial warm-weather months. This will provide a minimum force for immediate aid to local law-enforcement agencies and will facilitate full mobilization and deployment if necessary. A force of this nature can be created by placing personnel on an alert status (subject to recall on short notice) on a rotating basis, or by scheduling weekend training for various Guard units. It is useful to recall that in 17 of the 24 disorders studied by the Commission, the disorders began during a weekend, or on a Friday or Monday.

**Weapons, Equipment, and Logistical Support**

The Guard is armed and equipped by Federal funds in order to fulfill its Federal role as a combat force. Experiences of this last summer reveal that much of this equipment is inappropriate for dealing with civil disorders in American cities. The Guard and Army units lack an adequate "middle ground" between a display of force and the use of lethal or indiscriminate force.

The Commission has recommended federally sponsored and financed research for developing nonlethal weapons. The Commission further recommends that the Department of Defense participate fully in such efforts to bring about full utilization of available resources. Suitable products of research and development should be used to the fullest extent possible by the National Guard and Army, as well as by local and state police.

In the foreseeable future, however, the National Guard has no alternative but to use existing equipment in control operations.

**Individual weapons.**—The rifle is the soldier's basic weapon. He has been trained with it and has developed a degree of confidence in it. This weapon has a psychological effect for a show of force that distinguishes military units from the police. Unfortunately, actual use of the rifle in riot control operations is generally inappropriate. It is a lethal weapon with ammunition designed to kill at great distances. Rifle bullets ricochet. They may kill or maim innocent people blocks away from the actual target.

Unless or until an effective nonlethal replacement for the rifle is developed, it will of necessity continue to be the basic arm for the individual Guardsman assigned to civil disorder duty. The Commission recommends that the Department of Defense immediately institute a research program that seeks to develop a new type of ammunition for use in civil disorders. It should be capable of striking with deterrent but not lethal force at reasonable range. British units in Hong Kong, for example, fire a wooden peg that incorporates these basic features and is reportedly highly effective.

**Bayonets.**—Considerable controversy developed around the use of bayonets by National Guard and Army troops in controlling riots. Proponents of this weapon argue that it has the strong psychological impact necessary for an effective show of force, and provides a means of self-defense for the individual Guardsman. Opponents point out that bayonets are likely to cause death or severe wounds and may inflame a crowd to greater disorder.

One commentator, after pointing out that successful modern armies have trained men to perform effectively in combat without bayonets, concludes:

In any case, the bayonet is completely useless as an instrument of riot control and the management of civil disorder. As a device for separating hostile groups or controlling mobs, it has some of the impact of a police dog, in that it produces counter-effects that are not desired. It is not a weapon which reassures soldiers, especially National Guardsmen; Federal troops tend to avoid its use. Even in most difficult riot control situations which faced British forces, as for example in Hong Kong, the bayonet was absent.\(^\text{2}\)

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\(^\text{2}\) "Social Control of Escalated Riots," by Morris Janowitz, professor and chairman of the department of sociology, at the University of Chicago. (Paper prepared for the University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, Conference on Short Term and Emergency Measures to Avoid Urban Violence.)
The Commission recommends that the Department of the Army and the National Guard Bureau reexamine their policy underlying the use of the bayonet for riot-control operations. At the very minimum, the Commission believes that nonlethal chemical agents should be utilized before bayonets are fixed.

Chemical agents.—The National Guard is equipped with CS, the standard Army chemical agent for riot control. The Army has recently developed a variety of dispensers that include small hand-thrown rubber grenades; grenade launchers accurate to a range of 200 meters and useful, for example, against a sniper firing through a window; and large devices that can be mounted on helicopters and disperse effective amounts of the agent over relatively large areas. These should be made available to Guard units as soon as possible. Despite the existence of some problems, previously discussed in the control chapter, the only present alternative to use of CS is the application of potentially lethal force. New delivery projectiles now enable CS to be used in a more discriminating manner against individuals or small groups, and they can provide more flexibility in the present range of coercive force. The Commission, therefore, believes that until more selective nonlethal weapons are available, CS should be utilized before rifles and bayonets. The Commission urges the Department of Defense to expedite the development and production of advanced delivery systems, which should also be made available to police departments.

It is important to avoid the indiscriminate use of chemical agents. Special care is required when used in densely populated areas. Whenever they are used, clear advance warning should be given to all who may be affected, and adequate escape routes should be opened to allow a crowd to disperse upon being so ordered.

All National Guard units should have on hand a sufficient number of gas masks to equip all guardsmen who may be used in riot control operations. Furthermore, each participating unit should have a supply of additional gas masks for police and other officials who may be attached to or involved with the National Guard in control operations. Utilization of chemical agents presents sufficiently difficult problems of judgment for a commander; the difficulties should not be enhanced by a lack of protective equipment.

Automatic and other weapons.—The Commission has heard from witnesses and its own investigators disturbing accounts of indiscriminate firing of machine guns during certain of the recent disorders.

Controlling a civil disorder is not warfare. The fundamental objective of National Guard forces in a civil disorder is to control the rioters, not to destroy them or any innocent bystander who may be present.

Brig. Gen. Harris W. Hollis, Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U.S. Army, testified before the Commission: Commanders and their personnel should do whatever is possible to avoid appearing as an alien, invading force rather than as a force which has the purpose of restoring order with minimum loss of life and property, and with due respect for the great number of citizens whose involvement in the area is purely coincidental.

A military machine gun—as well as similar types of automatic weapons—is constructed to fire bursts or continuous streams of deadly ammunition a great distance and over a relatively large area. A machine gun, unlike a standard rifle, cannot be fired at individuals with selectivity or accuracy. By design it is a weapon of mass destruction. Except in an extraordinary situation, where the Guard or the local community is endangered by the use of lethal weapons that can be neutralized only by mass fire, and only if there is no disproportionate danger to innocent persons, the Commission recommends that the use of machine guns be prohibited for National Guard forces assigned to riot control. Other mass destruction weapons of modern warfare—flame throwers, recoilless rifles, and artillery—have no conceivable place in riot-control operations in densely populated American cities.

Communication equipment.—The Commission recommends that the Department of Defense is now equipping National Guard forces with tactical communications equipment and that the Army is developing prepackaged communications systems prescribed for use in major civil disturbances, systems that can be moved to an affected area in a minimum amount of time.

The Commission has been informed that the Department of Defense is now equipping National Guard forces with tactical communications equipment and that the Army is developing prepackaged communications systems prescribed for use in major civil disturbances, systems that can be moved to an affected area in a minimum amount of time.

The Commission appreciates the importance of these preparations and recommends that these plans be fully executed immediately.

Miscellaneous equipment.—Several other items of equipment have proved useful in riot-control activities. Some are available from civilian sources, others only through military supply channels. In either case, these items should be immediately available if the need arises:

(a) Armored vehicles.—Both Army and National Guard units have found that armored personnel carriers are effective for moving troops through areas which may be subject to sniper fire or to approach buildings from which snipers may be firing. For National Guard units in states where such equipment is not available, armored trucks, such as the type used by banks, have been found effective. They have the added advantage of being less conspicuous than military armored vehicles. The use of tanks, however, is clearly
inappropriate because of their potential for mass destruction.

(b) Illumination equipment.—The Detroit experience demonstrated that it may be highly desirable to illuminate large areas. Powerful portable light sources have been developed and are available for mounting on helicopters or vehicles. Army searchlights are appropriate. Advertising and display companies in most major cities have lights, often obtained from Army surplus, that can be useful.

(c) Public address systems.—Loudspeaker systems, both hand-carried and larger, are essential for warning and directing crowds.

(d) Material for constructing roadblocks.—In the Watts riot, the Guard experienced major difficulties in constructing effective roadblocks. In many instances, when the troops lacked adequate materials, they resorted to gunfire to stop vehicles. Damage and loss of life resulted. All Guard units should make arrangements to obtain suitable materials for constructing effective roadblocks, which should be marked by signs to warn citizens.

Logistical support.—If logistical planning has been adequate, no serious deficiencies in equipment and supplies should hamper Guard units engaged in riot-control duty.

Training.

Before August 1967, Army regulations required National Guard units to conduct riot-control training, but specified no particular number of hours. Instruction, consequently, varied from a minimum of 6 hours in one state to a maximum of 32 hours in another. In addition, the general military training received by National Guard troops during their 6 months of active duty and on-going drills was also applicable to riot control.

In August 1967, the Army increased mandatory riot-control training to 32 hours of unit training, and 16 hours of command and staff training, for all Army National Guard units and certain designated Air National Guard units. By the end of October 1967, all state forces had completed this required training.

The Commission commends the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, and the National Guard Bureau for their prompt action in increasing the riot-control training of the National Guard. But in view of the reliance upon the National Guard as the main source of support for local police in controlling disorders, the Commission recommends that further steps be taken to improve training:

- The 16 hours allotted to command training are insufficient to complete the designated review of applicable military subjects and also the preparation and review of operational and mobilization plans. Therefore, the Commission earlier recommended that actual preparation of plans be left to the full-time staff. The 8 hours allocated to the command post exercise should be devoted fully to testing plans to determine their general adequacy. If such testing reveals defects, revisions should be made, and further training time made available to test the revised plans.

- Riot-control training for National Guard troops should be a continuing part of the regular training program, to ensure familiarity with established procedures and to train incoming recruits.

- Riot-control training, and all training materials, should be subject to periodic review in order to insure that they fully incorporate the latest techniques developed by the Army, the National Guard, and state and local law enforcement units. A special subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services (Special Subcommittee to Inquire into the Capability of the National Guard to Cope with Civil Disturbances) has recommended that the Department of the Army establish a permanent board of officials to supervise the development and testing of civil disturbance control measures and equipment, and to develop and periodically publish revised training directives. We believe that this recommendation is sound and we endorse it. Such a board could carry out our recommendation for periodic review of training materials.

- All Guard units should cooperate fully with efforts to integrate National Guard training with that of state and local police. If necessary, Guard commanders should take the initiative in proposing such training.

- Guard training for control activities should include provisions to insure that Guard officers and men are fully aware of the organization, procedures, and capabilities of other law enforcement and Government agencies that may also be involved in control activities.

- Guard training should include increased emphasis on the community relations aspects of control operations.

- Until all National Guard officers have received thorough training in riot-control activities, each state should designate appropriate senior officers for command of riot-control operations. The Department of the Army should establish a school to train these officers for command during riot situations, with special emphasis on the political, sociological, and legal problems that are involved in control operations. We have been informed that planning for such a course is currently under way.

- Top Federal, state, and Guard officials must make every effort to insure that training directives are fully carried out, and that every Guardsman is made aware of the importance of all aspects of riot-control training. In particular, emphasis should be placed on the importance of using only the minimum force necessary to achieve control.

ARMY RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISORDERS

The commitment of Federal troops to aid state and local forces in controlling a disorder is an extraordinary act. Only twice in the last 35 years have governors requested Federal troops to help quell civil disorders.
As pointed out elsewhere in this report, however, it is imperative that states have backup forces for controlling major disorders. This section considers the capabilities and preparedness of the Active Army to perform the backup function.

An Army staff task group has recently examined and reviewed a wide range of topics relating to military operations to control urban disorders: command and control, logistics, training, planning, doctrine, personnel, public information, intelligence, and legal aspects. The study also extracted lessons from recent disorders and sought to make them applicable to any possible future disturbances.

The Commission, in preparing this portion of the Report, has relied heavily upon information developed by the Army task group established in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and commands the Army for undertaking the overall review of the Army function. The Commission recommends that each state consider a similar review of its own control capabilities. It further recommends that the results of the Army review be made known to the National Guard and to top state and local civil and law enforcement officers in order to stimulate review at the state and local level.

MANPOWER

The Active Army has designated seven task forces, each of brigade size (approximately 2,000 men), to be immediately available for assignment to control civil disorders in the event Federal troops are needed. Additional Army, as well as Marine Corps forces, can be furnished if necessary.

In the opinion of the Army, these forces are an adequate supplement to the National Guard. The Commission concurs.

PLANNING

For some years, the Army conducted the military planning and coordination necessary to control civil disorders, including the preparation of a family of plans which were coordinated with appropriate headquarters and agencies. It is continuing this work to be certain that adequate Federal units can be rapidly and effectively deployed and redeployed.

The planning steps undertaken by the Army appear sufficient for the effective deployment of Active Army troops to the scene of a disorder.

The Commission believes it imperative that Army plans be fully coordinated with those of state and local governments. In particular, the Commission recommends that the Department of Justice, in cooperation with the Department of the Army, inform state and local officials and National Guard officers of the exact procedures that must be used to obtain Federal troops, the number of Federal troops that would be available, the response times for such troops, and the relationships to be established among Federal, state, and the local forces, particularly in the matter of command responsibilities.

The Commission further recommends that Federal-state planning should insure that Federal troops are prepared to provide aid to cities not presently covered by the Army’s “planning packet” effort.

TRAINING

The effectiveness of the Active Army units committed in Detroit was due in large part to the broad spectrum of training at individual and unit levels. Basic training produces well-conditioned and disciplined soldiers. Unit training molds them into teams and units, and develops further proficiency. Operational training for contingency missions stresses tactical techniques, as well as technical support to sustain large numbers of men in the field on extended duties. In sum, Army training in its totality produces the type of well-disciplined and self-supporting force essential for the control of a major disorder.

Under present plans, units assigned to riot control contingency missions conduct specialized training in accordance with the doctrine and techniques set out in the Army Field Manual on “Civil Disturbances and Disasters.” Special Army directives and the subject schedule recently prepared for National Guard units are also used to guide active Army training. Administrative and logistical units undergo specialized training in support of forces utilized for riot control.

Because riot-control duties are sometimes assigned to military police units, these units receive continual training in riot control, including apprehension, detention, and crowd control measures. Selected Army officers and non-commissioned officers receive riot-control training at the Military Police School.

The Army is making an overall review of riot-control training, including expansion and revision of field manuals and subject schedules; an examination of the feasibility of integrating National Guard and civilian authorities into command post and field training exercises; a revision of the course content of the Military Police School; updating riot-control training films with recent film footage; a revision of equipment allowances for training; and distribution to various Army commands of lessons learned in recent disorders.

The Commission commends the Army for the advanced status of its training, and for its current steps to strengthen that training. As suggestions for further improvement, the Commission recommends:

- All officers, and selected non-commissioned officers, of Army units designated for use in civil disorders should receive advanced command and staff training in riot control.
- Selected Military Police Corps officers should be given additional staff and command training in riot control and should
be assigned as staff advisors to commanders of all Army units to be deployed to civil disorders. Training of such officers should include emphasis on close coordination with police departments within their assigned areas. The training should familiarize them with the plans and operational procedures, as well as the command personnel of these departments.

The Army should investigate the possibility of utilizing psychological techniques to ventilate hostility and lessen tension in riot control, and incorporate feasible techniques in training the Army and National Guard units. The Hong Kong Police Department has successfully used a number of such techniques in controlling disorders. For example, when confronted by a mob of screaming rioters, a detachment of Hong Kong police used microphones and amplifiers to amplify and play back the mob noise on the mob itself. The noise confused and ultimately broke up the mob. The “singed chicken” episode described in the Profile in Chapter 1 of the Elizabeth, New Jersey disorder is an example—although not a planned one—of how humor can break tensions and dissipate a crowd.

All pertinent information and recommendations resulting from the review of training matters should be made available to the National Guard, and to public safety and other officials of states and local communities.

**COORDINATING THE CONTROL RESPONSE**

Prompt and effective response to a civil disorder requires full cooperation and coordination of all groups, public and private, that may be involved in overall control activities. Only proper planning can insure this response. The degree of coordination necessary and obtainable will vary with the type of agency or group involved, particularly private groups. But a basic requirement is an allocation of duties and responsibilities, plus an effective command structure.

The necessary planning is both "vertical" and "horizontal" in nature. Horizontal planning involves coordination among government agencies and private groups within a city or community (intracity planning); among neighboring jurisdictions, including city and counties (intercity planning); and among states (interstate planning). Vertical planning involves coordination at the state-local and Federal-state levels. The primary responsibility for coordinated planning rests with state and local government.

This portion of the Report considers areas where coordinated planning is necessary, and suggests guidelines for solutions.

**HORIZONTAL COORDINATION AND PLANNING**

Intracity Coordinated Planning

For effective control of civil disorder, planning must include at least the basic city agencies (police, fire, courts) involved in control activities. Enlightened planning will also use the personnel and resources of all government agencies, together with groups of private citizens, that may be helpful in restoring and maintaining order.

**Government agencies and private groups.** Commission studies reveal that most of the police departments surveyed have made some arrangements with other government agencies for a working relationship during a period of civil disorder. Nearly all of the departments have made arrangements with fire departments. Fewer, but still a clear majority, have made agreements with public transportation agencies; courts, detention personnel, probation and parole officers; human relations commissions; and departments controlling streets, lights, signs, and signals. Although these percentages indicate a degree of planning by most cities, there is little excuse for lack of coordinated planning among these basic agencies. More important, the true degree of coordination cannot be determined without evaluating the precise type of arrangements in use. Certain responses indicate "cooperative" arrangements; but to be effective, planning must involve firm coordination, not merely vague cooperation.

Our survey indicates that cities and police departments have not planned to make full use of the resources of various private groups and agencies that can contribute to both prevention and control of disorders. Of the 26 police departments reporting information in this area, 11 plan to use church groups, seven plan to use youth service agencies or groups, 10 have arrange-
ments to obtain food and shelter from private sources, three plan to use personnel resources of watch services and private guard services, 12 plan to utilize the services of social service agencies, and 15 contemplate the use of personnel resources of police-community relations councils.

The Commission recommends that all cities that have not already done so should devise plans that coordinate all government agencies involved in control activities. It is the responsibility of mayors and other elected officials to assume the initiative in instituting such planning, and carrying it to a satisfactory conclusion.

Such plans should also include to the fullest extent possible all private groups and agencies that may be directly affected by the disorder, or that can make a positive contribution to control. Naturally, such planning will be less formal, and it should be sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing leadership of these groups.

The government agencies and private groups to be covered by the planning include: Police departments (including police-community relations units), fire departments, ambulance services, detention facilities, courts, legal aid services, probation and parole services, city or county human relations commissions, public and private transportation systems, public and private utilities, public health departments, hospitals, sanitation departments, telephone companies, news media, municipal works, civil defense agencies, private guard services, youth service groups, service agencies, churches, social workers, community action agencies, poverty program workers, and others.

Coordinated planning should take into account the organization, manpower, and resources made available to state and local government for civil defense purposes under the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. Those resources include: Emergency control centers, communications equipment, emergency power sources, special rescue equipment, and various trained reserve personnel. The Office of Civil Defense (OCD) reports that more than 184,000 volunteer reserve police, 172,000 reserve firemen, and 176,000 rescue personnel have been trained through the civil defense program. Furthermore, at least 2,076 political jurisdictions have been established emergency operating centers, with an additional 574 in the process of construction or completion.

Although the Federal Government provides equipment and funds to develop these resources, they belong to the states and local jurisdictions. They must be integrated into planning on a state or local level.

Office of Civil Defense regulations authorize state and local governments to use such resources in time of an emergency whether caused by attack, a natural disaster, or a civil disorder. However, because of the need for police forces specially trained for riot-control operations, local officials should carefully evaluate the state of training of any civil-defense trained personnel to be used as police. If such training is inadequate for actual control operations, the men could be assigned to guard vital installations, or other positions, in order to release active-duty police for control operations.

In the past, it has not been clear whether equipment marked with civil defense insignia is available for use during a civil disorder. The Commission understands that the OCD is reviewing its regulations, and if necessary will revise them to insure that this equipment will be fully available. We recommend that the OCD ensure that the applicable rules and regulations are disseminated to all responsible State and local officials.

The Commission further recommends that not only should all concerned agencies and groups be integrated into disorder control plans, but they should be involved also to the fullest extent possible in the planning process itself. As Brig. Gen. Harris W. Hollis, Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, testified:

The very process of involving all responsible officials in this planning process creates an awareness of common problems, and assures that principal officials will know their counterparts in other Government agencies and permits major policy questions to be addressed and resolved without the air of crisis which prevails after a riot breaks out.

Effective control operations require a specific and well-defined chain of command. Planning must clearly set out this command structure, and provide adequate mechanism for communication of orders. In accordance with traditional concepts of government, the mayor or other top city official must be in overall command. Because of the need for clear command authority, existing organizations and procedures of participating agencies should be reviewed to identify command weakness and to pinpoint any defects in routine operations that could be disastrous during emergency conditions.

All plans should be tested in training exercises. At a minimum, exercises should include checks of the command structure and communications. Finally, provision should be made to update the plans periodically in order to take into account changed conditions, or to incorporate new control equipment and techniques into the procedures.

After a plan has been formulated and implemented, steps must be taken to assure that all participating units are aware of their responsibilities under the plan. The plan should be set out in manual form and made available to all participating agencies. Except for strictly confidential portions, the plan should also be made public. The public has a right to know what to expect from government during a disorder—as well as what the government expects from the public.

Major or prolonged disorders may cause severe shortages of food, medical supplies, and even housing in the areas directly affected. Local and state planning
must include means to supply on an emergency basis these basic human needs.

 Selected community and youth groups.—Two groups may be extremely useful in control activities, and in the prevention of civil disorders:

(a) Community groups already involved in government or police department activities through various police-community relations programs, as for example, the police-community relations councils set up in many cities.—The value of these groups was cited by one police chief who reported that during a disorder members of a neighborhood improvement group that had previously been meeting with police-community relations people, took to the streets and successfully persuaded parents to keep youths off the streets and in their homes. Improper planning led to an instance where an agency issued passes to certain persons who were to attempt to "cool a situation" and who were themselves arrested by the police for apparent involvement in the disorder.

All groups with the potential to help should be included in the planning process to ensure that their views and judgments are respected and used by the planning agencies to the fullest extent possible. They cannot be expected to participate effectively in control activities if they are called upon for help only after trouble has broken out.

(b) Youth groups.5—Evidence developed to date shows that youths are the main participants in a typical disorder, especially in the early stages, and are the principal source of "energy" for many of the disorders. In Detroit, for example, one survey shows that about 61 percent of the rioters were under 24 years of age. In the 1965 Watts riot, final records reveal that 45 percent of those arrested were under 25.

Several cities have urged groups of Negro youths to assist police and others in the control of civil disorders. In Tampa, Fla. and Dayton, Ohio, they were called "White Hats." Their use has generated widespread publicity, as well as debate, on their effectiveness.

The Tampa "White Hats" were organized during the Tampa disorder by several Negro adults, including the head of the Tampa Commission of Community Relations. The county sheriff gave the youths permission to patrol the riot area, and later furnished them with white helmets for identification. The youths, who were recruited from active participants in the riot, patrolled the riot area, particularly during a period when law enforcement officers were pulled out. This group has since been disbanded.

In Dayton the "Youth-Dayton Police," also referred to as the "White Hat Patrol," was organized by a Negro state legislator. Many of the youths involved had criminal records and, once again, were potential rioters. In the June 1967 disorder in Dayton, the White Hat Patrol helped persuade other youths to stop disorderly behavior, and was influential in getting them off the streets.

There are, however, conflicting reports on the effectiveness of these groups. The director of the Tampa Commission of Community Relations, an organizer of the Tampa "White Hats," claims that they were very effective in restoring law and order in Tampa. Extensive publicity in national media echoed this assessment. On the other hand, certain police officials from other cities have minimized the importance of the Tampa "White Hats." They claim that the youths were used only after the disorder had peaked and the riot was waning, or after police measures had taken effect. The same officials have said they would be reluctant to utilize such groups, primarily because of the "vigilante" aspect of their activities.

The Commission still lacks conclusive evidence on whether youth groups like the "White Hats" can be effectively utilized in all instances to help control disorders. Types of disorders and youths, as well as the quality of leadership, are hardly standardized. But the fact is they have been used with at least some degree of effectiveness. The Commission, therefore, recommends that intracity planning give attention to the possibility of using youth groups in control activities. This planning must be highly flexible to cope with the changing leadership of these groups.

A delicate balance must be struck between working with and against youth groups; both courses carry implicit dangers. Working too closely with them can ultimately reduce their effectiveness since they may become too closely identified with the "establishment." But placing the "establishment" in direct opposition to them may itself contribute to a disorder, or, at least, galvanize hostility during a disorder.

Intercity planning

Control of a major civil disorder will generally require resources beyond the capabilities of local government. One response to this problem is to seek state aid; the other is to obtain additional manpower, equipment and services from neighboring communities by means of preexisting plans or agreements, often referred to as mutual assistance pacts. We here explore the latter alternative.

A variety of mutual assistance pacts are already in existence, primarily in the fields of fire protection, water supply and sewage disposal. The agreements range from the simple exchange of information to elaborate procedures covering all municipal services.

Mutual assistance agreements for police services in emergency situations are less common, and are generally on an informal basis. A study of 26 major police departments revealed that 10 had no written mutual

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5 In preparing this section, the Commission has relied upon a study of youth groups prepared for the Commission by the Administration of Justice Unit of the University Research Corporation.
aid agreements for control of civil disorders, 12 had informal agreements, and only four had formal agreements. Some departments also said they had made arrangements to "borrow" various items of equipment from neighboring jurisdictions. If these figures are typical of the entire country, it is plain that many cities are either overlooking or rejecting a potentially useful source of additional manpower and resources for the control of disorders.

Mutual assistance pacts have these advantages over obtaining help from the state: help may arrive much more rapidly; repeated use of state police or National Guard forces may reduce or eliminate their "psychological" value; police officers from nearby communities may be more effective because they are familiar with local geographic and sociological patterns; agreements may lead to increased cooperation and coordination of activities in other fields; and the additional funds, personnel and equipment for riot control can be utilized by local police departments in both emergency and ordinary operations, rather than diverting these resources to state forces established solely or primarily for the control of disorders.

There are also certain disadvantages in mutual assistance agreements: Riot control requires unit operations much like those used by the military, not the individual approach characteristic of normal police work; police-community relations may be so bad in an area that only outsiders, not neighbors, can cool the situation; National Guard units may have an important psychological effect on rioters and may be more effective because of their training; police departments in adjoining communities may differ widely in quality of personnel, and the lower quality departments tend to dilute the effectiveness of the better ones; and in times of emergency, a police department in a neighboring city not experiencing a disorder may be reluctant to release its forces because of the possibility that the trouble may spread.

Although the Commission lacks sufficient data to weigh these conflicting factors, we believe, for several reasons, that mutual assistance agreements frequently offer a useful alternative to state aid. First, leading police officials have recommended them, particularly for supplying stop-gap aid until needed state forces can be mobilized. Second, there is evidence that these agreements work. Even in the aftermath of a major disorder in a nearby city, a community with a police department of 60 was able, through a mutual assistance agreement, to augment its own department and produce a total force of some 220 men drawn from the county and from 31 neighboring communities. Third, we believe basically that a community which demonstrates that it can maintain public order by means of its own resources, plus resources from neighboring communities, can in the long run more effectively earn the necessary respect from all elements of the community.

Although local considerations are paramount in formulating mutual aid agreements, certain basic factors must be taken into account:

**Proper planning**

Any effective response to a disorder demands full coordination and planning of all agencies that may be involved in control activities. In the preceding section, we outlined the necessary intrajurisdictional planning and coordination to deal with civil disorders; the same factors must be considered in drafting intercity agreements. Without proper planning and objective evaluation of the community resources available, mutual agreements are largely worthless.

**Legal problems**

Although we believe there are no insurmountable legal problems for putting into effect mutual aid agreements (with the possible exception of home-rule cities), state legislation may present unnecessary obstacles, for example, by restricting such agreements to adjoining communities.

The Commission recommends that each state not only undertake a review of existing legislation regarding mutual aid agreements for emergency services, but also provide any necessary legislation to permit these agreements to be fully implemented. Such legislation should assure that police officers serving in other jurisdictions have adequate authority to do their jobs and that police, firemen, and other government personnel are given protection against damage suits, loss of personal pension rights, and loss of disability benefits. In accord with the Supreme Court case of Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), intercity mutual aid agreements across state lines require only statutory authorization of both states; they do not require congressional approval.

**Financial arrangements**

Since the control of civil disorders may be extremely expensive, mutual assistance agreements must provide for payment of costs in a manner that will encourage rather than inhibit prompt and immediate response in time of emergency. Various methods of allocating costs include: apportionment of the cost of control activities among participating jurisdictions by a formula based upon either the location of the disorder or the relative size of the contracting cities; each jurisdiction bearing its own cost, with the mutual advantages of the agreement considered adequate compensation; or one jurisdiction offering its services to another jurisdiction on a fee basis.

**Basic operating procedures**

Any workable agreement must specifically delineate operational procedures, including: methods by which the agreement can be invoked or activated; command
arrangements for integrating the services of the calling and responding forces; the conditions under which a jurisdiction may decline to respond to a request for assistance (e.g., if it has a major fire or disorder within its own borders); a method for terminating the agreement; supporting steps to be taken by participating jurisdictions, such as imposition of curfews and ordinances in neighboring cities; a basis for allocating liability for compensation of injured personnel; arrangements for cooperative training in riot-control techniques; and training in joint operations pursuant to the agreement.

Whether or not adjoining jurisdictions implement formal mutual assistance agreements, they should, at the very minimum, coordinate operations in areas where there is adjoining or concurrent law enforcement jurisdiction. Failure to do so may have tragic consequences as, for example, when the county police broke up a meeting for lack of a park permit—after a city police department had authorized a grievance meeting with rioters in a public park.

State responsibility

Although responsibility for implementing intercity mutual aid pacts rests primarily with the cities involved, state government has a corresponding duty to aid the cities in formulating these agreements, and, furthermore, to integrate the agreements into state plans for controlling disorders. California, for example, has a master law enforcement mutual aid plan providing for extensive interjurisdictional support during a natural disaster or riot. A community's request for help in controlling a disorder is first referred to the county. If the county is unable to supply the necessary resources, application is then made to a regional coordinator who draws manpower from local governments within a particular geographical area under his control. If this aid is still inadequate, a request is made to the director of the state disaster office who can then transfer to the riot area resources from any jurisdiction in the state.

Other ways in which a state may promote intercity mutual aid agreements include: legislative reforms to remove legal impediments to mutual agreements; counseling local jurisdictions concerning such agreements; determining the appropriate role of state police or National Guard when mutual aid agreements are in force; and providing specialized resources and equipment to participating jurisdictions.

Interstate mutual assistance agreements

A major disturbance within a single city, or a series of disturbances in a number of cities, may require control resources beyond city and state capabilities. For example, the Watts riot in August 1965 required a commitment of over 13,400 National Guard troops, 62 percent of total strength; Newark needed over 4,000 National Guard troops, over 30 percent of total strength; in Detroit, 8,262 National Guardsmen, 85 percent of total strength, plus 2,137 Air National Guard troops, together with more than 4,500 Federal troops were deployed or in reserve nearby. If simultaneous major disturbances had broken out elsewhere in the states, resources far beyond state capabilities would have been necessary.

There are two major sources for additional aid:

1. Federal forces, as in Detroit in July 1967, or
2. State forces from adjoining or nearby states pursuant to interstate mutual assistance agreements.

Interstate agreements for the commitment of National Guard forces of more than one state, besides requiring congressional approval, present delicate and complex problems of Federal-state relations. Furthermore, utilization of federally financed and trained National Guard troops pursuant to such agreements also raises problems relating to the primary purpose and mission of the Guard.

Policy arguments against the use of such agreements focus on the established principle that military forces should not be used against civilian population except in circumstances of extreme necessity, and then only in the degree and for such duration as may be necessary to restore order. The use of Federal forces to assist a state in controlling a civil disorder is restricted by a system of checks and balances that divides both power and responsibility between an individual state and the Federal Government. This carefully balanced allocation of functions provides protection against premature or excessive use of military force to control civil disorder.

Under interstate agreements, a governor would be able to call upon one or more other states for military assistance, and would thus be able to concentrate military power without the restraints imposed by the Federal-state relationship. Such power could potentially lead to excessive or indiscriminate use of military force against the civilian population.

On more practical grounds, we have already noted that the dual Federal-state function and mission of the National Guard create difficulties in the use of the Guard for riot control purposes even within a single state. We also noted the difficulties and burdens imposed upon individual Guardsmen when one Guard unit is pressed into duty two or more times within a limited period of time. These difficulties would be greatly enlarged if Guard units were subjected to callup in more than one state pursuant to interstate agreements.

Furthermore, because special Army units are immediately available for riot control duty, and because the Army and Air Force can rapidly transport large numbers of troops, Federal troops could be dispatched to the scene of disorder in considerably less time than would be required for mobilizing and deploying Guard
forces from adjoining or nearby states pursuant to interstate agreements.

Finally, the discipline, military experience, and intensive training received by active Federal troops make them generally more effective than National Guard units in putting down violence with minimum force under the adverse conditions of working in a strange city and state.

Interstate mutual assistance agreements for non-military aid—firemen and firefighting equipment, food, emergency equipment, medical supplies and services—would not be subject to the difficulties summarized above, and could play a valuable role in augmenting state resources.

**VERTICAL PLANNING**

**Coordinated State-local planning**

We have previously noted that for most states the National Guard is the primary control force available to supplement police forces in a single city. Coordinated planning for state assistance must, therefore, center about the National Guard. To the extent that state police are available in sufficient numbers and with adequate training for control operations, planning should also encompass their use.

Most of the police departments surveyed have some plan or arrangement for obtaining state help. The Department of the Army has also established liaison with the adjutants general of all state National Guards in order to review or prepare riot-control plans for major cities within each state, and to coordinate Federal, state, and local plans. The Commission commends these actions. *It strongly recommends* that the appropriate state civil officials, heads of the state police departments, and top local civil and police officials of these cities be involved in the planning process. State officials must also assume the responsibility for establishing liaison with local officials in any city within the state that may experience a disorder, in order to review or prepare riot-control plans.

The Commission cannot deal with all aspects of state-local planning, but if all participating agencies are involved in the planning process, and if plans are tested in training exercises, most problem areas will be identified and suitable solutions found. However, evidence available to the Commission has demonstrated that three major problems must be resolved in order to formulate an effective state-local plan. These problems, and some suggested guidelines for solution, are as follows:

**Authority to request and order call-up of state forces.**—In the early stages of one of last summer's major disorders, the initial call for state police assistance came from an inspector of the local police department and was directed to the head of the state police. However, under state law only the mayor could ask for and only the governor could provide this assistance. Time was lost because of the failure to use proper channels.

Since most states have specific laws setting out who can call the National Guard or the state police, any plan must necessarily take into account the statutory procedures. Many states do not have laws specifying who has the authority to request state assistance, and some laws do not specify the conditions under which state assistance will be authorized, whether or not requested. These points should be covered in an effective plan, which should also provide for a proper delegation of authority if the primary official is unavailable.

As with all aspects of planning, it is imperative that the provisions for requesting and ordering state assistance be made known to all officials, including operating levels.

**Command and communication between state and local forces.**—Although most police departments surveyed understood how to request state help, the question of command, if the Guard or state police was called in, was largely unanswered. In some states, command responsibilities are spelled out in the state statutes: in others, it is left to agreements, formal or otherwise, or to executive directives. An effective state-local plan must specifically resolve this question.

The Commission heard conflicting testimony from National Guard officers and police officials on which agency should be in command. It is unnecessary for the Commission to make recommendations on this point since a specific answer is less important than making certain that the question is resolved, that it is resolved in advance of the emergency, and that to the fullest extent possible it is resolved in favor of a single commander. Adequate planning for coordinated acts, as well as physical proximity of command posts, should eliminate most command problems, regardless of who is in overall command. Such planning should also eliminate possibilities of different degrees of force by different law enforcement groups as, for example, when one group increases aggressive action while another is unloading weapons and attempting to reduce tensions.

Commitment of National Guard troops as individuals or in pairs destroys the basic value of the Guard as a disciplined force to be deployed as units and in strength appropriate to the emergency. Merely adding Guardsmen to police patrols, as was done in some cities that experienced disorders, is not effective, for the unit commander loses control and cannot readily assemble his unit to respond in force. It may, however, be desirable to assign some police officers to National Guard units, to serve in a liaison role or to make any necessary arrests and write charges. Thus, regardless of overall command, any plan must ensure that Guard units are utilized as such, and under control of a Guard officer.
Adequate command procedures require that the state and local forces be able to communicate with each other. Officials from two major cities pointed out the extreme difficulties encountered in communication between local police and National Guard. In one case, there was no direct communication between the National Guard troops on the street and the local police unless police officers were riding with the National Guard troops or utilizing the police walkie-talkie system. In the other instance, the state police radios were on a frequency different from that of the local police department and, according to one state official, the local police "did many things" that the state did not know about until much later.

Effective state-local planning must also take into account that state police and National Guard forces may be working with local agencies other than the police, particularly fire departments. Adequate command provisions, including communications, must take these additional agencies into account. Moreover, state-local planning should not neglect other state resources, such as state community-relations departments.

Training.—Planning is not enough; there must be some provision for testing any plan to discover weaknesses before a disorder, preferably by a command post exercise.

Some police chiefs have also suggested that in order for State and local forces to coordinate their activities correctly, each must have a full awareness of the organization, function, and capabilities of the other organizations. Both National Guard and police officials emphasize the desirability of joint training between National Guard troops and state and local law enforcement officers. The Commission recommends that each state thoroughly explore the possibility of undertaking such training, especially at the command level. These exercises not only enhance the capabilities of both the National Guard and the local police, but also provide the necessary testing of state, local, and state-local planning.

Federal-State coordination

Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution provides that the Federal Government shall protect each of the states against invasion, "and on the Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." To carry out this provision, as well as its authority with respect to the militia, the Congress in 1792 enacted the statutory provisions that now appear (with minor amendments) as sections 331 and 334 of Title 10 of the United States Code. These sections authorize the President, after a request of a state and after issuing an appropriate proclamation, to use such of the Federal Armed Forces as he considers necessary to suppress insurrection of domestic violence in that state.6

However, in accordance with both Constitutional policy and the legislative history of these statutes, no President since these provisions were first invoked in 1838 has ordered Federal troops into action until: (1) the actual request for Federal troops had been received from the state, and (2) it had become clear that the disorder was beyond the control capacities of state and local authorities. As a result, since 1932, Federal troops have been dispatched at state request to quell domestic violence only in 1943 and 1967, both times in Detroit. The most recent experience in Detroit demonstrated the kinds of problems which can develop in the callup of Federal troops to control civil disorders.

We firmly believe that primary responsibility for the control of civil disorders rests with the cities and that the states should provide the necessary reserve manpower and resources. We recognize, however, that in some instances no state will have adequate manpower or resources to deal with a major disorder, or to deal with disorders in a number of cities. Because of the problems that would be created by use of interstate agreements, the Federal Government will be the only source of the necessary additional assistance.

The adequacy of the existing statutory authority and administrative mechanism for call-up of Federal troops has been questioned as a result of the Detroit experience. Of particular concern are the implications of the use of the word "insurrection" in Section 331, and the requirement that Federal troops can be dispatched only if the violence cannot be brought under control by state and local resources.

The word "insurrection" creates fears because of the possibility of nullifying insurance policies which generally do not protect against damages caused by insurrection. However, the Constitution speaks only of "domestic violence" and "insurrection," and Federal troops have been dispatched at state request in various situations other than political uprisings. As a result, existing instructions to states for obtaining Federal troops require only a request based upon the existence of "serious domestic violence."

The second point—requiring exhaustion of state resources—presents a more serious question since it limits use of Federal troops to the most extreme situations. Here the requirement is based not upon specific 6

Sections 332 and 333 of title 10 provide for use of Federal troops to deal with violence, or the threat of violence, which primarily obstructs enforcement of Federal laws, or infringes on rights secured by the Constitution. Examples of such use include the Whiskey Rebellion in Washington's time, nullification and secession before the Civil War, opposition to reconstruction acts after the Civil War and, in the past decade, defiance of Federal court orders in civil rights matters (e.g., Little Rock, Ark., in 1957 and Oxford, Miss., in 1962). In instances of this sort, initiative for use of Federal troops rests with the President rather than with a state governor.
Constitutional or statutory language, but instead upon Constitutional policy, legislative history, and precedent established by a number of Presidents. Some claim this requirement should and could be eased by amendment of section 331. Others point to the wisdom of severe restrictions on use of Federal military forces against civilians, a concept that is inherent in the Constitutional separation of power and responsibility between the states and the Federal Government.

Although we express no opinion on the Constitutional aspects of the latter argument, we are in accord that it represents sound policy, and believe that the existing conditions for obtaining such help should be retained. We suggest, however, that in determining whether to commit Federal forces, the state of preparedness, training and availability of the state's National Guard troops be taken into consideration.

Although we agree with the policy underlying the use of troops pursuant to section 331, we suggest that the Section be amended to update it and ensure that the language reflects existing Presidential precedents. The amendments should:

(a) Change the word “insurrection” to “domestic violence” to eliminate any possible difficulties.

(b) Make clear that the President will honor a request from a governor, not only when the state legislature cannot be convened, but also when the legislature cannot act in time to meet an emergency situation.

(c) Make clear that the President will honor a request from a governor only when the state is unable to control the violence with its own resources, including its own National Guard.

(d) Correct the apparently unintended restriction that only the National Guard of "other states," not the state requesting help, can be called into Federal service.

(e) Generally modernize the language—e.g., change “militia” to “National Guard.”

Certain difficulties in obtaining Federal troops can be ameliorated if state and local officials are fully aware of the means by which Federal assistance may be granted, and the conditions that must be met. To this end, Attorney General Ramsey Clark wrote the governor of each state, in August 1967, and outlined the legal requirements for using Federal troops to quell domestic violence, and the means by which Federal assistance can be obtained. (A copy of this letter is annexed as exhibit A to this Supplement). To avoid any possible misunderstanding on the use of Federal troops, the Commission recommends that each state take the appropriate steps to have the information in this letter disseminated to all state and local officials, to the Adjutant General for dissemination to the National Guard, and to all heads of local law enforcement agencies.

CONCLUSION

The fully coordinated planning recommended in this portion of the Report will require the time, effort, and active support of government officials and community leaders. It would be tragic indeed if this time and effort were expended solely in planning for a paramilitary response to civil disorders.

The Commission, therefore, recommends that the government and community leaders involved in the planning should use the planning process as an opportunity to deal with other vital problems to assure that the resulting plans can serve additional valuable purposes. The same planning and resources needed to control a serious civil disorder are also essentially applicable to any major local disaster or emergency which requires a total community effort as well as outside help. Such emergencies and disasters include, for example, floods, hurricanes, explosions, and major fires. Even for individual agencies, portions of the civil disorder control plans can often prove useful in dealing with a variety of common and recurring problems. For example, local police departments, plus state police, are often required to work together and coordinate operations in order to control and regulate large groups of people who assemble for parades, visiting dignitaries, and sporting events. If these other purposes and uses are considered and acted upon during the planning process, the resulting plans will have utility far beyond riot control.

More important, the efforts spent in planning for control of disorders provide government and community leaders an important starting point for efforts toward the only ultimate and responsible solution to the problem of civil disorder: A fully coordinated government and private attack on the conditions that give rise to disorder.

LEGAL NEEDS FOR RIOT CONTROL

We emphasize that law, no less than the desire for order, must provide the framework for all control efforts.

Applicable laws relating to control efforts of Federal, state, and local governments fall into two general categories: (1) Laws permanently in effect, primarily the penal laws of a state, supplemented or augmented by municipal ordinances; and (2) special emergency

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1 The present text of section 331 is set forth in exhibit A.

8 In preparing this section we have relied upon a study prepared for the Commission by the National League of Cities.
laws put into effect only during a disorder as, for example, curfews, special emergency closing ordinances, and martial law. The Commission will also consider certain legal aspects of the use of state forces to aid local police.

**LAWS PERMANENTLY IN EFFECT**

Many of the acts committed by rioters are crimes, in violation of long-established penal laws. In the disorders of last summer, arrests were made for crimes ranging from homicide to curfew violations, including for example, robbery, burglary, assault, theft, arson, and disturbing the peace.

A Commission survey of selected police departments revealed no basic lack of legal tools available to control disorders, but the survey and other evidence have, however, indicated five other areas where further legislation may be necessary.

**Laws governing the manufacture and possession of incendiary devices.**—Watts, Detroit, Newark, and other major disorders have shown a disturbing increase in the possession and use by rioters of a variety of incendiary devices, primarily Molotov cocktails. Although the use of such a device is undoubtedly arson or attempted arson, some jurisdictions have no laws governing manufacture or possession; others seek control through use of inadequate fireworks ordinances.

**Forceful interference with the work of firemen and emergency workers.**—Firemen and emergency workers have been subjected to physical abuse, and harassed and interfered with in performing their duties. Obviously, violence against any of these persons is a crime, but the experience of some riot-affected communities indicates that additional laws prohibiting forceful interference with the work of firemen and emergency workers may be necessary.

**Restrictions on the sale of firearms.**—The Crime Commission studied the relationship between violent crime and the easy availability of firearms in the United States. In its report, the Commission pointed out that "During 1965, 5,600 murders, 34,700 aggravated assaults, and the vast majority of the 68,400 armed robberies were committed by means of firearms." The Crime Commission further stated that "All but 10 of the 278 law enforcement officers murdered during the period 1960-65 were killed with firearms."

The Crime Commission surveyed existing Federal, state, and local gun control legislation and concluded: "Since laws, as they now stand, do not accomplish the purposes of firearms control, the Commission believes that all states and the Federal Government should act to strengthen them." The Commission recommended specific Federal and state legislation reasonably regulating the purchase, transportation, sale, and possession of firearms.

The fact that firearms can readily be acquired is an obviously dangerous factor in dealing with civil disorders. It makes it easier for a serious incident to spark a riot and may increase the level of violence during disorders. It increases the dangers faced by police and others seeking to control riots.

**We recommend** that all state and local governments should enact gun control legislation of the type recommended by the Crime Commission.

We also believe that Federal legislation is essential in order to make state and local laws fully effective, and to regulate areas beyond the reach of state government. **We therefore support** the President's call for gun control legislation and urge its prompt enactment.

**Restricting possibilities of theft of firearms.**—Certain recent disorders were accompanied by a drastic increase in the theft of firearms from stores and manufacturers. The most serious incident reported took place in Plainfield, N.J., where, during the disorder, 46 carbines were stolen from a local manufacturer.

**The Commission recommends** that both state and local government should consider enactment of laws or ordinances controlling the storage of firearms and ammunition in order to diminish the possibilities of theft. Such laws could require, for example, that all firearms and ammunition be stored in heavily protected vaults or areas, or that essential parts of the firearms be so stored.

**Unlawful assembly, riot, inciting to riot and related legislation; Federal antiriot legislation.**—Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have statutes that either explicitly prohibit participation in or incitement of riots or provide more general control through prohibitions against unlawful assembly. Two other states rely on court decisions based on common law.

The Commission's police survey and other evidence disclosed that many of the statutes need review and revision. Some that deal with incitement to riot are so broad that they may improperly inhibit the constitutional right of free speech. Some that provide no definition of incitement or comparable terms are dangerously vague. Those that define a riot in terms of groups containing as few as three persons may be applied in situations where nothing even approaching truly riotous activity is taking place. These statutes should be revised. In addition, some older statutes require that police officers on the scene literally read the riot act before taking action against rioters. Such legislation should be amended to insure adequate notice without unnecessarily inhibiting police action.

An additional question is whether this network of state legislation should be supplemented by Federal antiriot legislation.

We recognize that criminal law enforcement is principally a matter of local responsibility and that crimes committed during disorders can generally be controlled and should be controlled at a local level.
Moreover, the investigations of the Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have so far revealed no national planning or conspiracy behind the disorders of 1967 and few instances of interstate travel which would be subject to Federal control. There is also a risk that too broad a bill would encroach on the right of free speech and peaceful assembly.

Although no criminal legislation, Federal or state, comes to grips with the underlying causes of disorder, the Commission feels that a tightly-drawn Federal control statute might play a limited, but important, role in dealing with disorders. Even if there are only a few persons traveling with the intent of precipitating disorders, these few can do great harm.

Federal legislation, if enacted, should be precisely drafted, with a clear definition of all operative terms, so as to preserve scrupulously the constitutional rights of all Americans. Such legislation should be combined, as the President recommended, with the Federal Firearms bill. Both are important means of restricting the interstate movement of forces of destruction.

Whether or not legislation is enacted to deter those who would incite disorders, Congress should affirm now that violence is not to be tolerated in any sphere of our society. The prompt enactment of the pending civil rights legislation—which would make it a Federal criminal offense to use force to prevent the exercise of civil rights—is important for this purpose. This legislation is also central to the long-range goal of ensuring that Americans in all parts of the country enjoy equal rights and opportunities.

LAWS APPLICABLE ONLY IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

Effective control of a civil disorder may require special laws in addition to the normal complement of penal statutes and ordinances. Such emergency laws range from street closings to restrictions on sales of certain items. Laws of this sort have been used in practically every control operation.

The Commission recognizes the utility and need for such laws, especially those which provide for a specific, limited response to a particular problem, rather than wide-ranging emergency powers. The Commission cannot consider all such laws, nor can it consider the constitutional restraints that may be involved in the application of particular laws, such as search and seizure in connection with curfew violations. It will instead point to a few instances where the need for special legislation is apparent.

Restricting access to defined geographic areas.—In the early stages of some disorders, failure to seal off some streets had tragic consequences. Unsuspecting motorists drove headlong into barrages of bricks, stones and bottles, cars were set afire, and occupants were beaten.

Restrictions on access may also be necessary to keep vigilante groups outside the riot area.

The Commission recommends legislation or ordinances to permit disorder areas to be sealed off immediately. Since speed may be necessary the laws should provide that the authority can be delegated to operational levels.

Restriction on sales of particular items.—Of the 26 police departments responding to the portion of the police survey concerning effectiveness of specified control techniques, all replied that closing stores selling firearms and ammunition was effective; 25 replied that closing liquor stores and bars was effective; and 22 favored restrictions on sale of gasoline. The Commission recommends that laws be enacted to permit closing of potentially dangerous businesses during riot situations. The authority to impose such restrictions would primarily rest with the mayor or city manager. Provisions should be made to ensure that, if necessary, similar restrictions can be imposed in adjoining jurisdictions. An ordinance restricting sale of ammunition in one city would have little effect if the stores in an adjoining city, a block away, remain open. As with the imposition of other emergency measures, notice of these restrictions is of paramount importance, and notification procedures must be integrated into any control plan.

Curfews.—The Commission police survey shows that 23 responding departments favored imposing curfews. The Commission recommends that states that have not already done so should provide explicit legislative means to enable mayors and other local officials to impose curfews.

The size of the areas covered by curfew restrictions has varied greatly. Milwaukee imposed a citywide curfew restricting all persons to their homes, closing all streets to vehicular and pedestrian traffic, and permitting no one in or out of the city. Other curfew areas have been less restrictive in time and area. Unless care is used, the curfew itself may enable criminal elements to close down a town with minimum effort.

In drafting curfew legislation there are at least two potential problems: (a) the need for provisions which enable curfews to be imposed in adjoining cities in order to insure coverage of the entire disorder area; (b) the need to insure that notice of the curfew is given to all who may be affected by its terms.

LEGAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING USE OF STATE FORCES

The relationship among the National Guard, state police, and local police in joint activities has been considered in the portions of the report concerning the National Guard and state-local planning. Although these questions relate primarily to planning, certain legal problems require attention by state and local governments.
Command and call-up procedures for state and National Guard forces.—Most states have laws identifying the state or local officials who have the authority to call up the National Guard; usually only the Governor has this authority, but in some states even a local sheriff may call in the Guard to aid local law enforcement. However, only 20 states have laws specifying the relationship between National Guard forces and the civil police. In other states, the crucial command problem is left to agreements or executive directives.

Although problems of call-up authority and command authority can in part be resolved by proper planning, the Commission recommends that each state review its laws concerning Guard call-up and command, and make any necessary changes to facilitate adequate planning.

Arrest powers of state police and National Guard forces.—In the absence of martial law, only seven states have laws granting National Guard troops the arrest powers of peace officers. This lack of authority is not critical if police officers have been designated to accompany Guard troops when arrests are to be made. The problem should be reviewed in the planning process, and, if arrest authority is given to National Guard troops, appropriate guidelines for the use of such authority must also be provided.

Responsibility for payment of the cost of using National Guard forces.—Use of National Guard forces to quell a civil disorder may be costly. Whether the state or the local community must bear these costs is a serious policy question.

On one hand, prevention and control of a civil disorder is part of the local responsibility to insure civil peace. If the state is to bear the cost of Guard forces, a local community may limit its efforts to prevent disorders (or its efforts to provide adequate control in the early stages) and rely instead on calling the Guard whenever there is danger that an incident may develop into a disorder. This attitude may also contribute to the dangers of overreaction.

If costs of using the National Guard are to be assessed against a local community, the mayor or other local officials may unnecessarily delay calling in the Guard. The Commission recommends that all states consider this problem in advance and pass necessary legislation providing either for the assessment of costs of National Guard forces, or otherwise insuring that the problem is resolved by agreement between the states and local communities.

Liability of Guard officers and men when aiding local law enforcement.—Questions have been raised regarding the legal liability of Guardsmen when assisting local law enforcement officers to control a disorder. The Commission recommends that each state review its laws on this subject, and make any necessary changes to insure that individual Guardsmen are protected against legal liability when acting pursuant to the valid orders of their superiors.

COMPILATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF LAWS RELATING TO DISORDERS

The people have a right to know precisely what the law requires of them during a disorder, and an equal right to know the legal limits of control activities by law enforcement officers. Certain cities, counties, and states have already prepared booklets containing this information, have distributed these booklets to all police departments and other law enforcement agencies, and have made the booklets available to the public at large. We recommend adoption of such a policy.
LETTER FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE GOVERNORS, AUGUST 7, 1967, WITH ATTACHMENTS

Office of the Attorney General, Washington, D.C.

Dear Governor: At the President's request, I am writing you regarding the legal requirements for the use of Federal troops in case of severe domestic violence within your state. The requirements are simple. They arise from the Constitution. So the principles will be clearly in mind, I will briefly outline here the basic considerations of Federal law applicable to such a situation.

The underlying constitutional authority is the duty of the United States under Article IV, Sec. 4, to protect each of the states "on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." This pledge is implemented by Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S.C. and particularly 10 U.S.C. 331, which derives from an act of Congress passed in 1792. The history of the use of Federal forces at the request of governors in varied circumstances of local violence over more than a century is also instructive.

There are three basic prerequisites to the use of Federal troops in a state in the event of domestic violence;

1. That a situation of serious "domestic Violence" exists within the state. While this conclusion should be supported with a statement of factual details to the extent feasible under the circumstances, there is no prescribed wording.
2. That such violence cannot be brought under control by the law enforcement resources available to the governor, including local and State police forces and the National Guard. The judgment required here is that there is a definite need for the assistance of Federal troops, taking into account the remaining time needed to move them into action at the scene of violence.
3. That the legislature or the governor requests the President to employ the armed forces to bring the violence under control. The element of request by the governor of a State is essential if the legislature cannot be convened. It may be difficult in the context of urban rioting, such as we have seen this summer, to convene the legislature.

These three elements should be expressed in a written communication to the President, which of course may be a telegram, to support his issuance of a proclamation under 10 U.S.C. 334 and commitment of troops to action. In case of extreme emergency, receipt of a written request will not be a prerequisite to Presidential action. However, since it takes several hours to alert and move Federal troops, the few minutes needed to write and dispatch a telegram are not likely to cause any delay.

Upon receiving the request from a governor, the President, under the terms of the statute and the historic practice, must exercise his own judgment as to whether Federal troops will be sent, and as to such questions as timing, size of the force, and federalization of the National Guard.

Preliminary steps, such as alerting the troops, can be taken by the Federal government upon oral communications and prior to the governor's determination that the violence cannot be brought under control without the aid of Federal forces. Even such preliminary steps, however, represent a most serious departure from our traditions of local responsibility for law enforcement. They should not be requested until there is a substantial likelihood that the Federal forces will be needed.

While the formal request must be addressed to the President, all preliminary communications should be with me. When advised by you that serious domestic violence is occurring, I will inform the President and alert the proper military authorities. You can reach me at my office, my home, or through the White House switchboard at any hour.

Enclosed are copies of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and a brief summary of past occasions on which a governor has requested Federal military assistance. Your legal counsel, I am sure, keeps you fully advised of requirements of state law as well.

If you have any questions or comments, please let me know.

Sincerely,

(signed) Ramsey Clark
Attorney General.

Enclosures.

THE CONSTITUTION

Article IV, Section 4

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

Chapter 15


Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, and of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.

§ 334. Proclamation to disperse.

Whenever the President deems it necessary to use the militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time.

STATE REQUESTS FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE IN SUPPRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

A Chronological List

1838—Buckshot War. The Pennsylvania Governor asked for Federal assistance (based on Const. Art. IV, sec. 4) in restoring order when violence resulted from a bitter political contest. President Van Buren refused on the ground that Federal interference is justified only where domestic violence is such that State authorities have proved inadequate.

1842—Dorr Rebellion. Rhode Island Governor King asked for assistance to stop the attempt of Dorr to claim the Governorship. President Tyler replied that the time for Federal interference had not arrived since there was no actual insurrection. Further requests were denied on the ground that the legislature was in session and the Governor therefore was not authorized to apply for aid. The President said he would issue a proclamation if a lawful request was made, but Dorr disbursed his troops and this was not done.

1856—San Francisco Vigilance Committee. California Governor requested Federal aid in stopping the Committee from usurping the authority of the State. The Attorney General advised President Pierce that the circumstances did not afford sufficient legal justification for Federal assistance since there was no "actual shock of arms" between insurgents and the State, and the State had not
exhausted its powers to deal with the situation. (8 Op. A.G. 8.) The President took no action.

1873—New Orleans unrest. Lawlessness due to racial problems and also political uncertainty as to proper occupants of political office resulted in violence. Louisiana Governor asked for Federal help. President Grant issued a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse. Failure to heed the proclamation and increased disturbance resulted in a further proclamation and dispatch of two regiments.

1876—South Carolina riots. Riots resulted from an altercation between the Ku Klux Klan and Negro state militia. The President issued a proclamation in response to a call for Federal intervention and troops were stationed at 70 places in the State to secure the peace during the election. (This action culminated in enactment of Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.)

1877—Railroad Strike riots. Upon request for Federal intervention, President Hayes issued proclamations with respect to West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Illinois to restore order. The Ohio Governor asked for and received Federal arms but did not request troops. Indiana asked the President to authorize the commandant at the U.S. arsenal to aid the state. On the ground that the request was incorrectly made, the Governor was informed that Federal troops would be used only to protect U.S. property. Michigan, Wisconsin and California also made requests for help but the situation in those states did not become critical.

1892—Idaho's Coeur d'Alene mining disturbances. During a seven year period, President Harrison, Cleveland and McKinley furnished Federal assistance which was requested by Idaho Governors.

1894—Coxey's Army of unemployed. President Cleveland instructed the army to assist Montana in handling violence of a Coxeyite contingent in Montana, at the Governor's request. However, the President did not issue a formal proclamation.

1903—Colorado mining strike disturbance. President Theodore Roosevelt denied assistance to the Colorado Governor who made two requests for “such aid as I may call for,” but promised that the Federal Government would act when a request was made in a manner “contemplated by law,” explaining that under H.R. 5297 there must be shown an insurrection against the State and inability of the State to control it.

1907—Nevada mining disturbance. In response to an urgent request from the Governor, President Roosevelt ordered troops to assist. Later, a President's investigating committee found there was no warrant for the assertion that the civil authority of the State had collapsed. After the President threatened withdrawal of the troops, the Governor convened the legislature, which asked that Federal troops remain for a short period until the State Police could be organized and equipped to handle the situation.

1874—Colorado coal strike. At the request of the Governor, President Wilson sent troops to stop rioting, but only after considerable negotiation and exploring of avenues of peaceful resolution by Government representatives failed.

1879—Race riots in Washington, D.C. and Omaha; Gary steel strike. On the theory that the service by the National Guard in the war left the States without adequate protection against internal disorders, the Secretary of War instructed commanders of the departments to respond to state requests for assistance. The use of Federal troops in 1919 was without a proclamation or other formalities.

1907—West Virginia coal mine warfare. President Harding was requested by the Governor to intervene. The President stated that he was not justified in using Federal military forces until he was assured the State had exhausted all its resources. A subsequent outburst of violence resulted in a Proclamation and order to dispatch Federal troops. The troops met no resistance and disarmed the miners.

1932—The Bonus Army. Needy veterans who came to Washington to seek veterans' bonus legislation were housed in tents, shacks, and government buildings which were being demolished. The Treasury Department attempted to repossess a government building in order to continue demolition, resulting in a clash between the veterans and police. The District Commissioners asked the President for assistance and the army moved in, cleared the buildings and destroyed the shacks. No proclamation was issued.

1943—Detroit race riots. The Governor advised that the State was unable to suppress domestic violence, the President issued a proclamation and Federal troops were dispatched.

1967—Detroit riots. The most recent incident, of course, was the dispatch of Federal troops to Detroit on July 24, 1967 at the request of the Governor. President Johnson issued a proclamation and Executive Order pursuant to Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S. Code.
Appendices

Appendix A

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11365, ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, JULY 29, 1967

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. Establishment of the Commission. (a) There is hereby established a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission").

(b) The Commission shall be composed of—

The Honorable Otto Kerner, Chairman
The Honorable John V. Lindsay, Vice Chairman
Senator Fred R. Harris
Senator Edward W. Brooke
Congressman James C. Corman
Congressman William M. McCulloch
I. W. Abel
Charles B. Thornton
Roy Wilkins
The Honorable Katherine Graham Peden
Herbert Jenkins

The President from time to time may appoint additional members to the Commission.

SECTION 2. Functions of the Commission. (a) The Commission shall investigate and make recommendations with respect to:

(1) The origins of the recent major civil disorders in our cities, including the basic causes and factors leading to such disorders and the influence, if any, of organizations or individuals dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of violence.

(2) The development of methods and techniques for averting or controlling such disorders, including the improvement of communications between local authorities and community groups, the training of state and local law enforcement and National Guard personnel in dealing with potential or actual riot situations, and the coordination of efforts of the various law enforcement and governmental units which may become involved in such situations;

(3) The appropriate role of the local, state, and Federal authorities in dealing with civil disorders; and

(4) Such other matters as the President may place before the Commission.

SECTION 3. Cooperation by Executive Departments and Agencies. The Commission is authorized to request, at the direction of the Chairman, from any executive department or agency any information and assistance deemed necessary to carry out its functions under this order. Each department or agency is authorized, to the extent permitted by law and within the limits of available funds, to furnish information and assistance to the Commission. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in particular, shall provide investigative information and assistance.

SECTION 4. Compensation, Personnel, and Finance. (a) Members of the Commission who are Members of Congress shall receive no additional compensation by virtue of mem-
bership on the Commission, but, as permitted by law, may be reimbursed for travel, subsistence and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of the duties vested in the Commission. Other members of the Commission shall receive $100 per day when engaged in the performance of duties pursuant to this order, and shall be allowed travel expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703) for persons intermittently employed.

(b) The Commission shall have an Executive Director who shall be designated by the President and shall receive such compensation as may hereafter be specified. The Commission is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such other personnel as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions, and is authorized to obtain services in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3109.

(c) All necessary expenses incurred in connection with the work of the Commission shall be paid from the "Emergency Fund for the President" or such other appropriated funds as may be available for the purposes of the Commission.

SECTION 6. Administrative Services. The General Services Administration shall provide administrative services for the Commission on a reimbursable basis.

SECTION 7. Reports and Termination. The Commission shall make an interim report as to its findings of fact not later than March 1, 1968, and shall present its final report and recommendations not later than one year from the date of this order. It shall terminate upon presenting its final report and recommendations.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

Appendix B

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT UPON ISSUING AN EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, JULY 29, 1967

This morning I have welcomed the members of the Commission on Civil Disorders to the White House for its first meeting. The Commission is chaired by Governor Kerner of Illinois. The Vice Chairman is Mayor Lindsay of New York. They are both here with me.

I have commended these 11 citizens for what they have agreed to do for this Nation. They are undertaking a responsibility as great as any in our society.

The civil peace has been shattered in a number of cities. The American people are deeply disturbed. They are baffled and dismayed by the wholesale looting and violence that has occurred both in small towns and great metropolitan centers.

No society can tolerate massive violence, any more than a body can tolerate massive disease. And we in America shall not tolerate it.

But just saying that does not solve the problem. We need to know the answers, I think, to three basic questions about these riots:

—What happened?
—Why did it happen?
—What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?

Beyond these basic questions there are others—the answers to which can help our Governors and our mayors, our chiefs of police and our citizens all over the country to cope with their immediate and their long-range problems of maintaining order:

—Why do riots occur in some cities and not in others?
—Why one man breaks the law, while another, living in the same circumstances, does not?
—To what extent, if any, has there been planning and organization in any of the riots?
—Why have some riots been contained before they got out of hand and others have not?
—How well equipped and trained are the local and State police, and the State guard units, to handle riots?
—How do police-community relationships affect the likelihood of a riot—or the ability to keep one from spreading once it has started?
—Who took part in the riots? What about their age, their level of education, their job history, their origins, and their roots in the community?

—Who suffered most at the hands of the rioters?
—What can be done to help innocent people and vital institutions escape serious injury?
—How can groups of lawful citizens be encouraged, groups that can help to cool the situations?
—What is the relative impact of the depressed conditions in the ghetto—joblessness, family instability, poor education, lack of motivation, poor health care—in stimulating people to riot?
—What Federal, State and local programs have been most helpful in relieving those depressed conditions?
—What is the proper public role in helping cities repair the damage that has been done?
—What effect do the mass media have on the riots?

What we are really asking for is a profile of the riots—of the rioters, of their environment, of their victims, of their causes and effects.

We are asking for advice on
—short-term measures that can prevent riots,
—better measures to contain riots once they begin,
—and long-term measures that will make them only a sordid page in our history.

I know this is a tall order.

One thing should be absolutely clear: this matter is far, far too important for politics. It goes to the health and safety of all American citizens—Republicans and Democrats. It goes to the proper responsibilities of officials in both of our Parties. It goes to the heart of our society in a time of swift change and of great stress. I think the composition of this Commission is proof against any narrowness of partisanship.

You will have all the support and cooperation you need from the Federal government, as the Chairman and the Vice Chairman lead this Commission in this study.

Sometimes various Administrations have set up commissions that were expected to put the stamp of approval on what the Administration believed.

This is not such a commission. We are looking to you, not to approve our own notions, but to guide us and to guide the country through a thicket of tension, conflicting evidence and extreme opinion.

So, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, let your search be free. Let it be untrammeled by what has been called the
"conventional wisdom." As best you can, find the truth, the whole truth, and express it in your report.

I hope you will be inspired by a sense of urgency, but also conscious of the danger that lies always in hasty conclusions.

The work that you do ought to help guide us not just this summer, but for many summers to come and for many years to come.

Thank you.

Appendix C

EXCERPTS FROM PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, JULY 27, 1967

My fellow Americans:
We have endured a week such as no Nation should live through: a time of violence and tragedy.

For a few minutes tonight, I want to talk about that tragedy—and I want to talk about the deeper questions it raises for us all.

I am tonight appointing a special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

Governor Otto Kerner, of Illinois, has agreed to serve as Chairman.

Mayors John Lindsay, of New York will serve as Vice Chairman.

Fred R. Harris, Senator from Oklahoma; Edward B. Brooke, United States Senator from Massachusetts; James C. Corman, U.S. Representative from California, 22d District, Los Angeles; William M. McCulloch, the U.S. Representative from the State of Ohio, the 4th District; I. W. Abel, the President of the United Steel Workers; Charles B. Thornton, the President, Director and Chairman of the Board of Litton Industries, Inc.; Roy Wilkins, the Executive Director of the NAACP; Katherine Graham Peden, the Commissioner of Commerce of the State of Kentucky; Herbert Jenkins, the Chief of Police, Atlanta, Georgia.

The Commission will investigate the origins of the recent disorders in our cities. It will make recommendations—to me, to the Congress, to the State Governors, and to the Mayors—for measures to prevent or contain such disasters in the future.

In their work, the Commission members will have access to the facts that are gathered by Director Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI will continue to exercise its full authority to investigate these riots, in accordance with my standing instructions, and continue to search for evidence of conspiracy.

But even before the Commission begins its work; and even before all the evidence is in, there are some things that we can tell about the outbreaks of this summer.

First—let there be no mistake about it—the looting, arson, plunder and pillage which have occurred are not part of a civil rights protest. There is no American right to loot stores, or to burn buildings, or to fire rifles from the rooftops. That is crime—and crime must be dealt with forcefully, and swiftly, and certainly—under law.

Innocent people, Negro and white, have been killed. Damage to property—owned by Negroes and whites—is calamitous. Worst of all, fear and bitterness which have been loosed will take long months to erase.

The criminals who committed these acts of violence against the people deserve to be punished—and they must be punished. Explanations may be offered, but nothing can excuse what they have done.

There will be attempts to interpret the events of the past few days. But when violence strikes, those in public responsibility have an immediate and a very different job: not to analyze, but to end disorder.

That they must seek to do with every means at their command: through local police, state officials, and—in extraordinary circumstances where local authorities have stated that they cannot maintain order with their own resources—then through Federal power that we have limited authority to use.

I have directed the Secretary of Defense to issue new training standards for riot control procedures immediately to National Guard units across the country. Through the Continental Army Command, this expanded training will begin immediately. The National Guard must have the ability to respond effectively, quickly, and appropriately, in conditions of disorder and violence.

Those charged with the responsibility of law enforcement should, and must, be respected by all of our people. The violence must be stopped: quickly, finally, and permanently.

It would compound the tragedy, however, if we should settle for order that is imposed by the muzzle of a gun.

In America, we seek more than the uneasy calm of martial law. We seek peace based on one man's respect for another man—and upon mutual respect for law. We seek a public order that is built on steady progress in meeting the needs of all of our people.

Not even the sternest police action, nor the most effective Federal troops, can ever create lasting peace in our cities.

The only genuine, long-range solution for what has happened lies in an attack—mounted at every level—upon the conditions that breed despair and violence. All of us know what those conditions are: ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough jobs. We should attack these conditions—not because we are frightened by conflict, but because we are fired by conscience. We should attack them because there is simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly society in America. . .

This is not a time for angry reaction. It is a time for action: starting with legislative action to improve the life in our cities. The strength and promise of the law are the surest remedies for tragedy in the street.

But laws are only one answer. Another answer lies in the way our people will respond to these disturbances.

There is a danger that the worst toll of this tragedy will be counted in the hearts of Americans; in hatred, in insecurity, in fear, in heated words which will not end the conflict, but prolong it.

So let us acknowledge the tragedy; but let us not exaggerate it.

Let us look about tonight. Let us look at ourselves. We will see these things:

Most Americans, Negro and white, are leading decent responsible and productive lives.

Most Americans, Negro and white, seek safety in their neighborhoods and harmony with their neighbors.

Nothing can destroy good will more than a period of needless strife and suspicion between the races.

Let us condemn the violent few. But let us remember that it is law-abiding Negro families who have really suffered most at the hands of the rioters. It is responsible Negro citizens who hope most fervently—and need most urgently—to share in America's growth and prosperity.

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This is not the time to turn away from that goal. To reach it will require more than laws; more than dollars. It will take renewed dedication and understanding in the heart of every citizen.

I know there are millions of men and women tonight who are eager to heal the wounds that we have suffered: who want to get on with the job of teaching and working and building America. . . .

. . . I call upon every American to search his own heart.

To those who are tempted by violence, I would say this: Think again. Who is really the loser when violence comes? Whose neighborhood is made a shambles? Whose life is threatened most?

If you choose to tear down what other hands have built, —You will not succeed;
—You will suffer most from your own crimes;
—You will learn that there are no victors in the aftermath of violence.

The apostles of violence, with their ugly drumbeat of hatred, must know that they are now heading for disaster. And every man who really wants progress or justice or equality must stand against them and their miserable virus of hate.

For other Americans, especially those in positions of public trust, I have this message:

Yours is the duty to bring about a peaceful change in America. If your response to these tragic events is only "business as usual"—you invite not only disaster, but dishonor.

My fellow citizens, let us go about our work. Let us clear the streets of rubble and quench the fires that hatred set. Let us feed and care for those who have suffered at the rioter's hands—but let there be no bonus or reward or salutes for those who have inflicted that suffering.

Let us resolve that this violence is going to stop and there will be no bonus to flow from it. We can stop it. We must stop it. We will stop it.

And let us build something much more lasting: faith between man and man, faith between race and race. Faith in each other—and faith in the promise of beautiful America.

Let us pray for the day when "mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other."

Let us pray—and let us work for better jobs and better housing and better education that so many millions of our own fellow Americans need so much tonight.

Let us then act in the Congress, in the city halls, and in every community, so that this great land of ours may truly be "one Nation under God—with liberty and justice for all."

Appendix D

BIOPGRAPHICAL MATERIALS ON COMMISSIONERS

OTTO KERNER, CHAIRMAN

Governor of Illinois, 1961—; Springfield, III. Born August 15, 1908, Chicago, Ill. A.B., Brown University, 1930; Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1930-31; J.D., Northwestern University, 1934. Attorney, Chicago, 1934-47; U.S. District Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, 1947-54; County Judge, Cook County, 1954-61. Illinois National Guard, 1934-41; 1946-54, advancing from Private to Captain, 9th Infantry Division, European Theater of Operations; Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and 32nd Infantry Division, Pacific Theater of Operations, 1941-46, retiring as Major General; Soldier's Medal, Bronze Star, Army Commendation Ribbon, Presidential Unit Citation (34th Field Artillery Battalion).

JOHN V. LINDSAY, VICE CHAIRMAN


I. W. ABEL


EDWARD W. BROOKE

JAMES C. CORMAN

U.S. Representative from California, 22nd District, 1960–; Van Nuys, Calif. Born October 20, 1920, Galena, Kansas. B.A., University of California at Los Angeles, 1942; LL.B., University of Southern California, 1948. Attorney, Los Angeles, 1948–50 and 1952–57; Member of the Los Angeles City Council, 1957–60; elected November 8, 1960 to the 87th Congress; reelected to the 88th, 89th, and 90th Congresses. Democrat. U.S. Marine Corps, 3rd Marine Division, at Bougainville, Guam, and Iwo Jima, 1942–46; subsequent service 1950–52. Member of the Methodist Church, Lions International, American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Elks; the American, California, Los Angeles and San Fernando Valley Bar Associations, Los Angeles Community Relations Conference. Awards from the Jewish Federation, Council of Greater Los Angeles, for “outstanding service in fostering good will and understanding among religious and racial groups,” and from the California Congressional Recognition Plan, Claremont College for “exemplary service” on the House Judiciary Committee.

FRED R. HARRIS


HERBERT JENKINS

Chief of Police, Atlanta, Ga., 1947–. Born 1907, Lithonia, Ga. Atlanta public schools and Atlanta Law School. Joined Atlanta Police Department, 1931; elected Chief of Atlanta Police Department, 1947. President, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1965; Member, Attorney General’s Advisory Panel on Grants, 1964; Baptist Church; Past Worshipful Master of Atlanta Masonic Lodge; charter member of Northside Atlanta Kiwanis Club; Board of Directors of the Atlanta Boys Club and other civic organizations. Awards include: 1962 Outstanding Citizen Award by Jewish War Veterans of United States of America, Atlanta Post 112; Atlanta Jaycee Good Government Award, 1962; Alpha Chapter of Delta Kappa Gamma Society award for leadership in maintaining public education, 1962; Silk Hat Award by Northside Atlanta Kiwanis Club, 1962; Boys Club Bronze Keystone for Long and Devoted Service to Boys by the Boys Clubs of America, 1963.

WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH

U.S. Representative from the State of Ohio, 4th District, 1947–; Piqua, Ohio. Born November 24, 1901, Holmes County Ohio. LL.B. Ohio State University, 1925; Honorary L.L.D., Ohio Northern University. Member, Ohio House of Representatives six terms, serving as Republican leader 1936–39, and as Speaker for three terms; Elected to 80th Congress, November 4, 1947, reelected to each succeeding Congress. Republican. Veteran, World War II. Member, American Political Science Association; Recipient, Congressional Distinguished Service Award, APSA, and the Distinguished Alumni Award, College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio.

KATHERINE GRAHAM PEDEN

Commissioner of Commerce, State of Kentucky, 1963–67; Hopkinsville, Ky. Born January 2, 1926, Hopkinsville, Ky. Traffic Department, Radio Station WHOP, Hopkinsville, 1944–49; Vice President and Director, WHOP, 1949–; Owner-President, Radio Station WNVL, Nicholasville. President, National Federation of Business and Professional Women, 1961–62; Member, the Defense Advisory Committee of Women in the Service (DACOWITS); the National Advisory Council of the Small Business Administration; the Governor’s Commission on the Status of Women, Kentucky; Board of Directors, Kentucky Chamber of Commerce; the American Industrial Development Council; the Southern Industrial Development Council; President, Kentucky Federation of Business and Professional Women, 1955–56; Director, Mental Health Association, and Co-Chairman, Western State Hospital Chapel Fund, 1956–; Trustee, Business and Professional Women’s Foundation, 1956–; Member, Kentucky Federation of Business and Professional Women, Kentucky Broadcasters Association, First Christian Church of Hopkinsville, and Hopkinsville Chamber of Commerce, 1951–; Recipient, Woman of the Year Award, Hopkinsville, 1951.

CHARLES B. THORNTON

Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Litton Industries, Inc., 1953–; Los Angeles, Calif. Born July 22, 1913, Knox County, Texas. B.C.S., Columbus University, 1937; Honorary D.C.S., The George Washington University, 1964; Honorary Jur.D., Texas Technological College, 1957. Director of Planning, Ford Motor Co., 1946–48; Vice President and Assistant General Manager, Hughes Aircraft Co., Culver City, Calif., 1948–53; Vice President, Hughes Tool Co., 1948–53; President, Litton Industries, 1953–61. Colonel, USAF, World War II; Consultant to Commanding General, 1946; Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Commendation Ribbon with two oakleaf clusters. Director and member of the executive committee: United California Bank, Western Bancorporation, Times Mirror Company (1959–67); Director: Union Oil Company of California, Lehman Corporation, General Mills, Inc. (1963–67); Director and Executive Committee Member, Cyprus Mines, Inc.; Director, MGA, Inc.; Director and Finance Committee Member, Trans World Airlines, Inc.; Trustee, University of Southern California; Trustee, Harvey Mudd College of Science and Engineering; Member, California Institute Associates; Member, University of Southern California Associates; Member, The Visiting Committee, Harvard Business School; Board of Governors, Welfare Federation of Los Angeles (1960–63); National Professional and Civic Organizations: Member, The Business Council; Defense Industry Advisory Council to the Department of Defense; Air Force Academy Advisory Council; Director, National Committee for International Development; Trustee, Committee for Economic Development; Trustee, National Security Industrial Association; Member, West Coast Advisory Group of American Management Association; prior affiliation with numerous other local and national civic and governmental bodies.

ROY WILKINS

Executive Director, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 1955–; New York, New York. Born August 30, 1901, St. Louis, Mo., A.B., University of Minnesota, 1923. Managing Editor, Kansas City Call, 1925–26; Assistant Secretary, NAACP, 1931–49; Acting Secretary, NAACP, 1949–50; Administrator, NAACP, 1950; Editor, Crisis, 1934–49. Recipient, the Spingarn Medal, NAACP, 1964.
Appendix E

WITNESSES APPEARING AT HEARINGS OF THE COMMISSION, AUGUST 1–NOVEMBER 7, 1967

ADAMY, CLARENCE G., President, National Association of Food Chains.

ADDONIZIO, HUGH J., Mayor, Newark, N.J.

ATKINSON, LEON, Administrative Assistant to Congressman John Conyers, Jr.

BACHRACH, W. H., Mayor, Cincinnati, Ohio.

BAILEY, SAMUEL, Vice President, Mississippi State Conference of Branches, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

BAKER, JOHN A., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture; accompanied by Lynn Daft.

BATTLE, MARK, Administrator, Bureau of Works program, Department of Labor.

BENNETT, LEROE, historian, Senior Editor, Ebony Magazine.

BERK, THEODORE M., Director, Community Action Program, Office of Economic Opportunity; accompanied by Ben Zimmerman, William C. Lawrence, Donald K. Hess, and James H. Miller.

BONE, RICHARD W., Executive Director, Citizens Crusade Against Poverty.

BROGGS, PAUL W., Superintendent of Schools, Cleveland, Ohio.

BULLOCK, PAUL, Associate Research Economist, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California at Los Angeles.


BURRELL, BERKELEY, President, National Business League; accompanied by Matthew Clark and Henry Miller.

CAMPELL, R. J., Assistant to the City Manager, City of Cincinnati, Ohio.

CARLTON, J., Ad Hoc Committee of Black Militants.


CASSIDY, FRANK H., Assistant to the Administrative Vice President, Inland Steel Corp.

CAVANAUGH, JEROME P., Mayor, Detroit, Mich.; accompanied by Robert P. Roselle, Richard Strichartz, Herbert Loche, John Nichols, Anthony Ripley, Fred J. Romanoff, Ron Hewitt, Mallett, Assistant to the Mayor; Bernard Winckoski, Richard Macks, Norman Drachler, Superintendent of Schools; Ray Girardin, Police Commissioner; Alvin Harrison, Citizen Representative, Neighborhood Legal Services; Thomas Angott, member, Fire Commission; Rev. Robert Potts, Grace Episcopal Church; and Philip Rutledge, Director, Mayor's Committee on Resources.

CEVANTES, ALFONSO J., Mayor, St. Louis; accompanied by Rev. Lucius Cervantes, S.J.

CHAMBERS, ERNEST W., Negro community leader, Omaha, Nebr.

CHRISTENSEN, GERALD W., Executive Director, President's Council on Youth Opportunity; accompanied by E. Lester Levine, Bruce Tress, and John Stewart.

CHRISTOPHER, WARREN M., Deputy Attorney General; Vice Chairman of the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots.

CLARK, KENNETH, psychologist and social scientist; President, Metropolitan Applied Research Center, Inc., New York.

COLEMAN, RICHARD G., Director, Better Housing League of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.

COX, CARLTON, Ad Hoc Committee of Black Militants.

DANZIG, LOUIS, Housing and Urban Renewal Director, City of Newark, N.J.

DODSON, DAN W., Director, Center for Human Relations and Community Studies, New York University.

DONALDSON, IVANHOE, Ad Hoc Committee of Black Militants.

DRACHLER, NORMAN, Superintendent of Schools, Detroit, Mich.

EMERY, JOHN C., Judge, Recorder's Court, Detroit; Legal Aid and Defender Association, Detroit.

ENOLE, BYRON, Director, Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development, Department of State.

EVERS, CHARLES, Field Director, Mississippi State Conference of Branches, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

FANTINI, MARIO D., Program Officer, Division of Public Education, Ford Foundation.

FULLER, DEWEY C., Director, Economic Development and Employment, Urban League of Greater Cincinnati, Ohio.


GARDNER, JOHN W., former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

GARRETT, ERNEST, member, Board of Education, Newark, N.J.

GELSTON, GEORGE, Adjutant General, Maryland National Guard.

GIACCHINO, ALDO, Planning Officer, City of Newark, N.J.

GINSBERG, MITCHELL I., Commissioner of Social Services, New York City.

GINZBERG, ELI, Hepburn Professor of Economics, Columbia University; member, National Manpower Policy Task Force, 1962.

GIRARDIN, RAY, Police Commissioner, Detroit, Mich.

GOLDFARB, RONALD, consultant to the Commission.

GREEN, ALFRED L., Executive Director, New York State Division of Employment.

GREGORY, DICK, comedian, lecturer.

GROUP, JAMES, Milwaukee, Wis.; accompanied by: Father Patrick Flood, Dwight Benning, and James Pierce.

GUROK, LAWRENCE, Chairman, Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

HALL, WILLIAM, Ad Hoc Committee of Black Militants.

HANSAN, JOHN E., Director, Community Action Commission, Cincinnati, Ohio.


HATCHER, RICHARD, Mayor, Gary, Ind.

HENDERSON, VIVIAN, economist; President, Clark College, Atlanta, Ga.

HILL, NORMAN, Associate Director, A. Philip Randolph Institute.

HILL, RODERICK L., Former Adjutant General, State of California.

HOLLIS, HARRIS W., Director of Operations, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of Army, Washington, D.C.

HOLMAN, CARL M., Deputy Staff Director, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

1 Witnesses at special hearings.
HOOVER, J. EDOAR, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
H owe, Harold, II, U.S. Commissioner of Education; accompanied by Charles H. Smith.
JACQUES, TRUMAN, Manager, Management Service Center, Watts section of Los Angeles, Calif.
JOHNSON, EARL, Jr., Director, Legal Services Program, Office of Economic Opportunity.
JORDAN, VERNON, Director, Voter Education Project, Southern Regional Council, Inc.
KAIN, JOHN F., Professor of Economics, Harvard University.
KABIN, ROY, Chairman, U.S. King, MARTIN LUTHER, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
LEARY, HOWARD, R., Police Commissioner, New York.
LEARS, HOWARD, R., Police Commissioner, New York.
LIEBOW, ELLIOT, Acting Chief, Special Projects Section, Metropolitan Applied Center, Inc., New York.
LIEBOW, ELLIOT, Field Representative, Southern Regional Council, Inc.
LIEBER, CHARLES, B., Executive Director, New York Urban League.
LEWIS, JOHN, Field Representative, Southern Regional Council, Inc.
LEWIS, JOHN, Jr., Chairman, Governor's Commission on Civil Rights.
LEWIS, JOHN, Jr., Director, Community Relations Service.
LEWIS, JAMES, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor.
LEWIS, JOHN, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Manpower, U.S. Department of Labor.
LEWIS, JOHN, Jr., Director of Summer Projects, Westchester Neighborhood Association, Watts, Los Angeles, Calif.
LEWIS, JOHN, Jr., Mayor, Westville Neighborhood Association, Watts, Los Angeles, Calif.
LEWIS, JOHN, Jr., Assistant Attorney General.
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LEWIS, JOHN, Jr., Assistant Attorney General.
Appendix F

CONSULTANTS, CONTRACTORS, AND ADVISERS

ADLER, JAMES, Attorney, Los Angeles, Calif.
AILSES, STEPHEN, Attorney, former Secretary of the Army.
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, New York, N.Y.
AMSTERDAM, ANTHONY G., University of Pennsylvania Law School.
ASTOR, GERALD M., Look magazine
BAKERIAN, BEN H., Rand Corp.
BAILEY, DOUGLAS, Washington, D.C.
BAAT, JOHN, College of Law, University of Kentucky
BAZELON, DAVID T., Attorney, New York, N.Y.
BELLOW, GARY, Executive Director, Citizens' Crusade Against Poverty, Washington, D.C.
BENNETT, LERONE, Jr., Ebony magazine.
BIBBING, LEONARD, Milwaukee, Wis.
BLAKEY, G. ROBERT, Law School, University of Notre Dame.
BLUMBERG, ABRAHAM, Attorney, Los Angeles, Calif.
BLUMENTHAL, ANTHONY G., University of Pennsylvania Law School.
BLUMENTHAL, MARTIN, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
BORDUA, DAVID J., Department of Sociology, University of Illinois.
BRADLEY, THOMAS, Councilman, Los Angeles, Calif.
BRANDSTATTER, ARTHUR F., Director, School of Police Administration and Public Safety, Michigan State University.
BUREAU OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH, New York, N.Y.
CAHILL, THOMAS J., Chief of Police, San Francisco, Calif.
CAMPBELL, ANGUS, Director, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.
CAPLAN, NATHAN, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
CARR, MILTON M., Attorney, New York, N.Y.
CATTON, BRUCE, American Heritage Publishing Co.
CENTER FOR COMMUNITY STUDIES, Nashville, Tenn.
CHAMPION, HALE, Director, Boston Redevelopment Agency.
CHAYES, ABRAM, Harvard Law School.
CHAYES, ANTONIA, Consultant, Action for Boston Development, Inc.
COLEMAN, JAMES, Department of Social Relations, Johns Hopkins University.
COLM, GERHARD, National Planning Association, Washington, D.C.
CONWAY, JACK, Executive Director, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO.
CRISCI, RALPH F., Project Director, the Legal Aid Society, Cincinnati, Ohio.
DAHL, RAYMOND A., Former Inspector, Milwaukee Police Department Staff, Southern Police Institute, Louisville, Ky.
DEITCHMAN, SEYMOUR J., Chevy Chase, Md.
DELO, DAVID, Washington, D.C.
DOWNS, ANTHONY, Chicago, Ill.
DUHL, LEONARD, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C.
DUMONT, MATTHEW, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Md.
ECKER-RACE, LASZLO L., Washington, D.C.
ECKSTEIN, OTTO, Department of Economics, Harvard University.
EGORY, FRED, Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Calif.
ENGLE, ByRON, Director, Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development.
ESTAVER, PAUL E., Assistant Program Director, Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, Department of Justice.
FAIN, JIM, Editor, the Dayton Daily News.
FEININGER, NATHAN, School of Law, University of Wisconsin.
FITZPATRICK, JAMES F., Attorney, Washington, D.C.
FLAMING, KARL, Director, Milwaukee Urban League Study.
FLEMING, HAROLD C., President, Potomac Institute, Washington, D.C.
FOODSON, ROBERT, Department of History, Columbia University.
FRANKLIN, JOHN HOPE, Chairman, Department of History, University of Chicago.
FULLER, HILTON M., Jr., Executive Director, Police-Community Relations Committee, Atlanta Bar Association.
GAIN, CHARLES, Chief of Police, Oakland, Calif.
GANS, HERBERT, Center for Study for Urban Education, New York.
GARMIRE, BERNARD L., Chief of Police, Tucson, Ariz.
GATES, DARYL F., Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Police Department.
GIACCHINO, ALDO, Newark City Planner.
GIBSON, WILLIAM M., Director, Law and Poverty Project, Boston University School of Law.
GILMORE, JOHN, New York City Police Department.
GINSBERG, MITCHELL I., Human Resources Administrator, New York, N.Y.
GERARD, RAY, Former Commissioner, Detroit Police Department.
GOLDFARB, RONALD L., Attorney, Washington, D.C.
GOLDSTEIN, HERMAN, University of Wisconsin Law School.
GORDON, KERMIT, President, the Brookings Institution.
GRIMSHAW, ALLEN D., Department of Sociology, Indiana University.
GROSS, MARTIN L. (Col., retired), Former Public Safety Advisor, Agency for International Development.
GUNTER, JOHN J., U.S. Conference of Mayors, Washington, D.C.
HARRIS, LOUIS, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin.
HARE, NATHAN, Washington, D.C.
HARRIS, LOUIS, Louis Harris Associates, New York, N.Y.
HILL, RODERIC (Maj. Gen., retired), Former Adjutant General, State of California.
HINE, RICHARD P., Reporter, the Dayton Daily News.
HIRSCH, WERNER, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles.
HOLTZMAN, JAMES C., Director, Department of Public Safety, Multnomah County, Ore.
INDIK, BERNARD P., Department of Psychology, Rutgers University.
INGERSOLL, JOHN, Chief of Police, Charlotte, N.C.
INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, Ann Arbor, Mich.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, Washington, D.C.
ISAACS, HAROLD, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
JAFFE, SANFORD, Executive Director, Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorders, State of New Jersey.
JANOWITZ, MORRIS, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago.
JOHNSON, JAMES, Department of Political Science, Princeton University.
JONES, J. PAUL, Grand Rapids City Planner.
JONES, KENNETH, Consultant in Community Relations, Washington, D.C.
KAGEL, DAVID, Director, Department of Policy and Management, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California, Berkeley.
KAMISAR, YALE, Department of Politics, University of California, Berkeley.
KELLEY, CLARENCE M., Chief of Police, Kansas City, Mo.
KIMBALL, WARREN Y., Manager, National Fire Protection Association.
KOTCHE, EDWIN J., Circuit Court Judge, Rockford, Ill.
LA PAVE, WAYNE R., School of Law, University of Illinois.
LANGE, KURT, Department of Sociology, New York University at Stoneybrook.
LEYBA, HOWARD R., Police Commissioner, New York, N.Y.
LEE, EUGENE C., Director, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
LEFCOWITZ, MYRON, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin.
LOHMANN, JOSEPH, Dean, School of Criminology, University of California, Berkeley.
LEWIS, WILFRED, The Brookings Institution.
LIEBOW, ELLIS, Special Projects Section, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Md.
LOFTON, OLIVER, Administrative Director, Newark Legal Services Project.
LOFTUS, ROBERT, Helm-Loftus, Washington, D.C.
LOMBARD, WILLIAM M., Chief of Police, Rochester, N.Y.
LONGAN, JOHN, Chief Public Safety Adviser, Agency for International Development.
LOWE, JOHN, Detroit City Planning Commission.
LOWRY, ROY L., Bureau of the Budget.
LYNCH, JOHN P., Investment Executive, Pittsburgh, Pa.
MADE, JOHN D., Deputy Superintendent of Police, Chicago, Ill.
MALONEY, JOHN C., Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University.
MANGUM, GARTH, Codirector, Center for Manpower Policy Studies, George Washington University.
MARGOLIS, HOWARD, Institute for Defense Analysis, Washington, D.C.
MARSHALL, KENNETH, Metropolitan Applied Research Corporation, New York, N.Y.
MARTYN, KENNETH, Vice President for Academic Affairs, California State College at Los Angeles.
MARK, GARY T., Department of Social Relations, Harvard University.
MASON, JOHN D., Department of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.
MATCH INSTITUTION, New York, N.Y.
MATTICK, HANS W., Associate Director, Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of Chicago Law School.
McCORD, WILLIAM, Department of Sociology, Rice University.
McDONALD, ROBERT, Grand Rapids United Community Services.
MCNAMARA, EDMUND L., Commissioner of Police, Boston, Mass.
MEIER, AUGUST, Department of History, Kent State University.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, Ann Arbor, Mich.
MORSELL, JOHN, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
MOYNIHAN, DANIEL P., Director, Joint Center for Urban Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology-Harvard University.
MURPHY, PATRICK V., Director of Public Safety, Washington, D.C.
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, Washington, D.C.
NEMORE, ARNOLD, Executive Director, National Manpower Policy Task Force.
NETSCH, DAWN CLARK, School of Law, Northwestern University.
NEUSTADT, RICHARD C., Director, Kennedy Institute of Politics, Harvard University.
NEWMAN, JASON T., Washington, D.C.
NICKUM, HELEN, & Associates, Washington, D.C.
OAKS, DALLIN, University of Chicago Law School.
O'HAGAN, JOHN T., Chief, Fire Department, New York, N.Y.
PAJE, JEFFERY, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan.
PALMERI, BENEDICT, Police Department, Rockford, Ill.
PATRICELLI, ROBERT, Minority Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty.
R. E. POLK & CO., Detroit, Mich.
POLLIET, DANIEL H., School of Law, University of North Carolina.
PORTER, DOROTHY B., Librarian, Moorland Collection, Howard University.
PRICE, DON K., Dean, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
PRIEST, H. SAMUEL, Former President, Board of Police Commissioners, St. Louis, Mo.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERVICE, Chicago, Ill.
PURDY, WILSON E., Director of Public Safety, Dade County, Fla.
PYE, KENNETH A., School of Law, Duke University.
QUAST, CARL, Milwaukee City Planner.
RAMON, F. C., Chief of Police, Seattle, Wash.
RADELET, LOUIS, School of Police Administration and Public Safety, Michigan State University.
REDWIN, THOMAS, Chief of Police, Los Angeles, Calif.
REISS, ALBERT J., Director, Center for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan.
REMINGTON, FRANK J., School of Law, University of Wisconsin.
ROCHFORD, JAMES, Deputy Superintendent, Chicago Police Department.
RODMAN, H. MAN, the Merrill Palmer Institute.
ROE, ELEANOR J., Law School, University of Wisconsin.
ROEMER, DEBORAH, Project Director, Special Projects Section, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Md.
ROSE, ELIZABETH, New Haven, Conn.
Rossi, Peter, Chairman, Department of Social Relations, Johns Hopkins University.
Rubin, Irving J., Director, Detroit Transportation and Land Use Study.
Rudwick, Elliott, Department of Sociology, Southern Illinois University.
Ruth, Henry S., Jr., Law School, University of Pennsylvania.
Sandman, Henry J., Director of Public Safety, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Scammon, Richard M., Director, Elections Research Center, Governmental Affairs Institute.
Sealy, Lloyd, Assistant Chief Inspector, New York City Police Department.
Sears, David, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University.
Schiff, Arthur, Community Action Agency New York, N.Y.
Schuman, Howard, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan.
Schwartz, Herman, School of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
Sheldon, Richard, Ford Foundation.
Simulantics Corp., The, New York, N.Y.
Skolnick, Jerome H., Senior Social Scientist, American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Ill.
Smelser, Neil, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley.
Spiegel, John P., Director, Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis University.
Stein, John, University Research Corporation, Washington, D.C.
Steiner, Gilbert Y., The Brookings Institution.
Sternlieb, George, Department of Business Administration, Rutgers University.
Strecher, Victor, Director, Law Enforcement Study Center, Washington University, St. Louis.
Stutz, Herbert J., Director, Vera Institute of Criminal Justice.
Sviridoff, Mitchell, Ford Foundation.
Sweetser, Roland, Inspector, Maryland Police Department.
Taylor, Corneff R., Director, Department of Research, Milwaukee Urban League.
Threatt, James, Director, Newark Human Relations Commission.
Thurrow, Lester, Department of Education, Harvard University.
Tobin, James, Department of Economics, Yale University.
TransCentury Corporation, Washington, D.C.
Turner, Ralph, Chairman, Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles.
University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
University Research Corp., Washington, D.C.
Vorenberg, James, Harvard Law School.
Wade, Richard, Department of History, University of Chicago.
Wald, Patricia, Attorney, Washington, D.C.
Wald, Robert, Attorney, Washington, D.C.
Walker, Douglas, City Editor, the Dayton Daily News.
Walker, Rev. Lucius, Milwaukee, Wis.
Wasserman, Robert, Staff Assistant, School of Police Administration and Public Safety, Michigan State University.
Weisman, Lawrence I., Attorney, New York, N.Y.
Weiss, Jonathan, Mobilization for Youth, Inc.
White, Richard S., Jr., University Research Corp.
Willis, Charles R., Jr., New York, N.Y.
Wilson, James Q., Department of Government, Harvard University.
Wilson, Orlando W., Former Superintendent of Police, Chicago Police Department.
Winnick, Louis, Ford Foundation.
Woodward, C. Vann, Department of History, Yale University.
Yang, Paul, City Planner, Plainfield, N.J.
Yarmolinsky, Adam, Harvard Law School.
Ylvisaker, Paul, Commissioner, Department of Community Affairs, New Jersey.
Young, Arthur F., Chief, Housing Division, Bureau of the Census.
Younger, Irving, School of Law, New York University.

Appendix G

STAFF ASSISTANTS, SECRETARIES, AND SUPPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kathleen M. Alder</th>
<th>Larry G. Green</th>
<th>Barbara A. Kirk</th>
<th>Carrie R. Scott</th>
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<td>Audree S. Alexander</td>
<td>Carolyn P. Greene</td>
<td>E. Roberta Lesh</td>
<td>Marie Shoupe</td>
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<td>Lucille Alston</td>
<td>Clarence C. Griffin</td>
<td>Thomasenia C. Love</td>
<td>Ironia M. Smith</td>
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<td>Deloris Ann Artis</td>
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<td>Helen A. Lusk</td>
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<td>Bamba G. Benham</td>
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<td>Amanda McDuffie</td>
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<td>Steven Lee Carson</td>
<td>Josephine Hawkins</td>
<td>Anita J. McIlwain</td>
<td>Richard L. Thomas</td>
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<td>Doris N. Chandler</td>
<td>Sara A. Himes</td>
<td>John F. McLawhorn</td>
<td>Lois V. Toliver</td>
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<td>Annie M. Clay</td>
<td>Marianne K. Holifield</td>
<td>Sylvia R. Miller</td>
<td>Margaret E. Trippel</td>
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<td>Florence M. Coffey</td>
<td>Patricia Horan</td>
<td>Orinda R. Nelson</td>
<td>Garnette M. Turner</td>
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<td>Catherine Cyrus</td>
<td>Julia E. Hughes</td>
<td>Mary T. O'Keefe</td>
<td>Sandra Turner</td>
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<td>Patricia J. Daniels</td>
<td>Clinton Jackson</td>
<td>Christine M. O'Malley</td>
<td>Vivian E. Tyler</td>
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<td>Betty Y. Diggs</td>
<td>Jerome Jackson</td>
<td>Nema J. Parker</td>
<td>Gretel L. Uhl</td>
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<td>Muriel L. Edwards</td>
<td>Ronald F. Jeffries</td>
<td>Wendell Parker</td>
<td>Doris C. Warf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camille P. Elias</td>
<td>Gail M. Johnson</td>
<td>Hazel C. Pitt</td>
<td>Deloris L. West</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annie Y. Ephraim</td>
<td>RoseAnn Johnson</td>
<td>Carolyn E. Pleasant</td>
<td>Frances D. Williams</td>
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Appendix H

BASIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS

THE INSURANCE PROBLEM

There is a serious lack of property insurance in the core areas of our Nation's cities. For a number of years, many urban residents and businessmen have been unable to purchase the insurance protection they need. Now, riots and the threat of riots are aggravating the problem to an intolerable degree. Immediate steps must be taken to make insurance available to responsible persons in all areas of our cities.

Insurance: A Necessity for Homeowners and Businessmen

Insurance is a basic necessity for a property owner. By paying a premium that represents a relatively small amount compared to the value of his home or business, an owner acquires protection against the possibility that his property may be damaged or destroyed. The opportunity for every responsible individual to obtain security for his savings and investments is vital in a free society. This requires fair access to insurance.

Without insurance, the savings of millions of individual citizens are exposed to the risk of loss from natural and man-made hazards they cannot control.

Society cannot erase the suffering of the innocent victims of fire, windstorm, theft, or riot. But it can at least provide the opportunity to obtain insurance to safeguard their capital, and thereby prevent a disastrous occurrence from becoming a permanent tragedy.

Insurance: An Essential Force in Revitalizing Our Cities

Insurance is essential to revitalize our cities. It is a cornerstone of credit. Without insurance, banks and other financial institutions will not—and cannot—make loans. New housing cannot be constructed, and existing housing cannot be repaired. New businesses cannot be opened, and existing businesses cannot expand or even survive.

Without insurance, buildings are left to deteriorate; services, goods, and jobs diminish. Efforts to rebuild our Nation's inner cities cannot move forward. Communities without insurance are communities without hope.

The Urban Core Insurance Crisis

Unavailability and High Cost.—A great deal of evidence confirms that there is a serious lack of property insurance in our Nation's inner cities. Residents and businessmen from urban core areas throughout the Nation have stated that they cannot purchase the property insurance they need. Some say they cannot find insurance at all. Others say that they cannot obtain insurance at prices they are able to afford. Some who now have insurance are afraid that their insurance will be cancelled in the near future or not renewed. Many do not make legitimate claims for fear of losing the insurance they have.

In Newark, N.J., when a butcher was asked whether he had any insurance, he answered: "No, sir. Nobody wants to insure us. No insurance—everyone I see. I [would] give my right hand [for it]."

A Detroit, Mich., homeowner told us:

"I was paying $85 previously for three years' coverage, and now they told me [it would cost] the same amount of money for one year."

The owner of a shoe repair store in Omaha, Nebr., was asked whether he had insurance on his merchandise, and responded:

"No sir, not a penny * * *. [T]en days after the riot, automatically all insurance was dropped out."

These are not isolated voices. Insurance problems have affected whole communities. At our hearings, the president of a leading savings and loan association in the Watts area of Los Angeles testified:

"Real estate activity is practically at a standstill. Residents in this curfew area, wanting to purchase property outside the area, find it almost impossible because of their inability to sell the property they presently occupy. The sale of these properties is dependent upon financing through reputable financial institutions, which are reluctant to do so because adequate fire insurance coverage is not available. * * *

"The problems now being faced by residents of ghettos in this country are the result of long periods of discrimination, and we should not permit the results of discrimination to be used as an excuse for doing nothing. The problems of the ghetto must be solved, and we submit that a lack of adequate insurance coverage adversely affects the economy of a community."

Adequate insurance is unavailable not only in our major cities but in other areas as well. One insurance company executive said:

"[W]e emphasize that the problem is not alone that of the core areas of a limited number of metropolitan centers, but also that of hundreds of towns and cities of every size throughout America."

In order to determine the intensity of the problem, we conducted a systematic survey including personal
The survey disclosed that over 40 percent of businessmen and close to 30 percent of homeowners had serious property insurance problems.

Over 20 percent of the businessmen and 6 percent of the homeowners surveyed did not have basic fire insurance coverage. In Boston, over 35 percent of the businessmen surveyed had no fire insurance, and in Detroit over 12 percent of the homeowners were without it.

Of those who were uninsured, 35 percent of the businessmen and over 50 percent of the homeowners said that insurance was unavailable. Close to 30 percent of the uninsured businessmen and homeowners said that insurance cost too much.

Nearly 50 percent of the businessmen surveyed had no burglary and theft insurance. In Boston the figure was 74 percent.

Of those businessmen without burglary and theft insurance, nearly 30 percent said they wanted it but it cost too much; nearly 25 percent said they wanted it but could not get it at any price.

**Impact of the Riot Peril.**—Recent riot losses have further constricted the supply of insurance in our inner cities. Regardless of whether the management of the insurance industry anticipates rioting in the future, it feels that it must—in the interest of its policyholders and stockholders—prepare for even the remote possibility of extraordinary losses from civil disorders.

This theme has been repeatedly emphasized by a broad spectrum of insurance company spokesmen. The president of the American Insurance Association, an organization representing 170 companies, testified at our hearings:

"It is not enough merely to hope that riots will not recur and that, if they do, the damage will not be beyond the capacity of insurers to absorb in their normal operations. Watts served notice on all of us, and still the public and insurers were largely unprepared for what happened in 1967. The lesson is all too clear. I hope that we will profit by this costly experience and not be lulled into complacency and nonaction by wishful thinking that losses cannot reach catastrophic proportions."

The general manager of the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, an organization of 122 companies, told the Panel:

"Some companies are especially concerned over their exposure to the continuing threat of sporadic civil disorders. These companies are being asked to maintain existing insurance in urban areas, and so far they are doing so. But they may not be able to continue doing so, out of concern for their solvency, unless some method can be found to neutralize this excessive riot exposure. * * *"

"[W]e have to recognize the possibility, however remote, that future disorders could develop large enough dimensions to threaten the future ability of insurers to meet their obligations to policyholders."

The president of the National Association of Independent Insurers, an organization representing 350 companies, testified:

"Our industry does not possess either the power to forestall future riots or the ability to predict the scope and severity of any which may occur. We must therefore reckon with the possibility—whether imminent or remote—that more riots may occur, and that they might conceivably produce insurance losses far surpassing the financial capacity of the companies involved to absorb."

The industry is not the only knowledgeable group that sees in recent riots a formidable threat to the supply of insurance and the solvency of the insurance business. Thus, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners—an organization of the insurance commissioners of the 50 states—on the basis of the studies of a select committee on the insurance problems of civil disorders has recently reported:

"The hazard of loss from riot or civil disorders viewed in the context of recent events poses grave underwriting, rating and capacity problems for the private property and casualty insurance industry. Civil unrest has manifest itself throughout many parts of our nation. Its future course is uncertain. This fact has apparently led major insurer managements and underwriters to conclude that they must either be individually relieved, in whole or in part, from exposure to these perils or guard themselves by careful control on writings in areas regarded as vulnerable. These conditions and attitudes constitute not only a deterrent to the development of programs designed to expand the availability of fire and extended coverage insurance in most cities, but threaten to result in even more serious constriction of such markets."

Insured property losses from riots in the summer of 1967 were under $75 million, far less than the $715 million loss caused by Hurricane Betsy in 1965 and less than 3 percent of the total property losses that will be paid for 1967. Nevertheless, the sum approximated 13 percent of the entire underwriting profit of the insurance industry in 1966.

Riot losses have further burdened those lines of insurance already relatively unprofitable and those segments of the industry already the most heavily committed to writing urban core business. Thus, even though the Panel has no doubt that the insurance industry has the financial strength to absorb losses even greater than those sustained in the summer of 1967, we believe that the industry is justifiably concerned about the threat—no matter how unlikely—of future riot losses.

Another aspect of the industry's concern, in view of the civil disorders, is uncertainty about whether it can obtain enough reinsurance—insurance purchased by insurance companies to protect themselves against excessive loss. One of the largest reinsurers in the world has informed the Panel that reinsurance will continue to be available, but at higher rates and on
more restrictive terms. The insurance executive wants security against catastrophic loss just like any other businessman. As one insurance executive described the situation at our hearings:

"Still another threat to the solvency of our companies is the probability * * * that reinsurers in our country and other countries—particularly in England and the Continent—will restrict or withdraw their riot coverage. If this happens, it will mean that primary underwriters will not be able to spread their catastrophic losses for the riot peril. Such an event is in contradiction to our basic operating procedures and would further expose the solvency of the primary insurers. * * *

"It is an inescapable fact, gentlemen, that a direct relationship exists between insurance market inadequacies and the financial capacities of our insurance companies. Our industry just does not have, nor can it be expected to have, the financial structure to cope with widespread civil disorder. It cannot continue to expose its very solvency no matter how remote the recurrence of widespread rioting may be."

Executives of our Nation's most respected insurance companies have stated that without some financial assistance from government to protect them against catastrophic riot losses, they will be unable to continue offering property insurance in the center city. They stress that this is a matter of urgency. As one said at our hearings:

"[W]e believe that the best and only way to induce insurance companies to provide coverage on all otherwise insurable risks is to relieve them of the exposure to catastrophic riot loss * * *. In other words, in the absence of such governmental backup, the Urban Areas Plan could result in risks which are found on inspection to be "insurable" still not finding a market because of the magnitude of the riot exposure alone."

The insurance problems created by riots cannot be allowed to jeopardize the availability of property insurance in center city areas. But the problem of providing adequate and reasonable insurance in the urban core cannot be solved merely by supplying financial assistance to protect insurance companies against catastrophic riot losses. It is clear that adequate insurance was unavailable in the urban core even before the riots. Our survey indicates that property insurance problems are severe in St. Louis—where there were no riots—as well as in Detroit; in Oakland—where riots were minor—as well as in Newark. We are dealing with an inner city insurance problem that is broad in scope and complicated in origin, and riots are only one aspect of it.

Factors Underlying the Crisis.—For a variety of reasons explained in detail in Chapter II, the insurance industry believes that providing insurance to homeowners and businessmen in the urban core is generally unprofitable. As a result, the insurance enterprise does not function well to meet insurance needs in these areas.

The number of insurance agents and brokers selling insurance to residents and businessmen in urban core areas is relatively small. The effort to place the busi-
underwriters are given incentives for choosing the least hazardous risks in relation to the amount of premium charged. Thus, in attempting to select only better risks, they find it easier to block out areas considered to be blighted than to evaluate properties individually.

In considering center city properties to be relatively poor risks, insurance companies may have in mind that buildings in these areas may be older and less fire resistant than new buildings in other areas or the suburbs. They may have defective heating and electrical systems. Narrow and congested streets may hamper firemen. The density of construction and the closeness of properties may invite the spread of individual fires into conflagrations. Damage from heat, smoke, and water may be widespread.

Companies may also feel that environmental hazards generally exist. Property in excellent condition may be exposed to nearby fire risks. It may be vulnerable to unusual crime hazards. Newly arrived residents from rural areas may be unaccustomed to the requirements of urban living. Overcrowding increases tension and antisocial behavior.

The added risk of riots, even though regarded as a remote possibility, has now prompted some companies to state that continued deterioration of the present situation would make them positively unwilling to provide any insurance in urban core areas. Yet none of these factors may be of significance with respect to any individual property. What could be regarded as generally reasonable procedures may be arbitrary and discriminatory when applied in any particular case. Applications for insurance must be considered on their individual merits if everyone is to have fair access to insurance.

Yet any workable program must take other realities into account. Insurance companies are legitimately interested in profits and in maintaining their financial safety and stability. They therefore seek to avoid high risks. The states are already burdened with urgent demands on their resources. The Federal Government's responsibilities already more than match its tax revenues.

We believe that a successful program can be designed to operate within the context of the existing structure of the insurance industry and the exist-
ing pattern of state regulation and taxation of the insurance industry.

We believe also that Federal measures should support rather than supplant local efforts. Action by the Federal Government should encourage and assist those with front-line responsibilities.

We are convinced that the solution of the insurance problem of the center cities lies in the cooperative efforts of all who are involved. No single interested segment—the insurance industry, local, state, and Federal Governments, or the residents and businessmen of the urban core—can, acting alone, ameliorate the complex and interdependent conditions that cause this problem.

All must accept a measure of responsibility. By doing so, the insurance crisis can be met.

The principal alternative to this approach is for government itself to provide insurance directly. We believe that so marked a departure from the free enterprise insurance system is unjustified at this time. We have confidence in the strength of the insurance industry and the abilities of the state insurance departments. We feel that they can, with limited Federal assistance, meet the challenge posed by the critical insurance needs of our center cities.

**SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

We propose a five-part program of mutually supporting actions to be undertaken immediately by all who have a responsibility for solving the problem:

- We call upon the insurance industry to take the lead in establishing voluntary plans in all states to assure all property owners fair access to property insurance.
- We look to the states to cooperate with the industry in establishing these plans, and to supplement the plans, to whatever extent may be necessary, by organizing insurance pools and taking other steps to facilitate the insuring of urban core properties.
- We urge that the Federal Government enact legislation creating a National Insurance Development Corporation (NIDC) to assist the insurance industry and the states in achieving the important goal of providing adequate insurance for inner cities. Through the NIDC, the state and Federal Governments can provide backup for the remote contingency of very large riot losses.
- We recommend that the Federal Government enact tax deferral measures to increase the capacity of the insurance industry to absorb the financial costs of the program.
- We suggest a series of other necessary steps to meet the special needs of the inner city insurance market—for example, programs to train agents and brokers from the core areas; to assure the absence of discrimination in insurance company employment on racial or other grounds; and to seek out better methods of preventing losses and of marketing insurance in low-income areas.

The fundamental thrust of our program is cooperative action. Thus, only those companies that participate in plans and pools at the local level, and only those states that take action to implement the program, will be eligible to receive the benefits provided by the National Insurance Development Corp. and by the Federal tax-deferral measures. We firmly believe that all concerned must work together to meet the urban insurance crisis. Everyone must contribute; no one should escape responsibility.

Our specific recommendations for a five-part program are:

**FAIR Plans**

We recommend that the insurance industry, in cooperation with the states, institute in all States plans establishing fair access to insurance requirements (FAIR plans).

A FAIR plan assures every property owner in a State:

- Inspection of his property;
- Written notice of any improvements or loss prevention measures that may be required to make his property insurable; and
- Insurance if the property is adequately maintained according to reasonable insurance standards.

FAIR plans make these assurances applicable to:

- All dwellings and commercial risks, including buildings and contents;
- and for these basic lines of insurance:
  - Fire and extended coverage (damages from wind, hail, explosion, riot, civil commotion, aircraft, vehicle, and smoke);
  - Vandalism and malicious mischief; and
  - Burglary and theft.

**FAIR plans envision a substantial expansion of Urban Area Plans that have been in operation on a limited scale since 1960. Urban Area Plans generally cover only residential properties in limited geographical areas, offer only fire and extended coverage insurance, and have procedural inadequacies. Experience with Urban Area Plans demonstrates their promise, but also exposes their limitations. FAIR plans will fulfill that promise.**

One of the most notable extensions FAIR plans will make over Urban Area Plans is to provide burglary and theft insurance as well as fire and extended coverage. What is commonly termed “burglary and theft insurance” encompasses a multitude of different coverages, each presenting difficult underwriting problems. This line of insurance has been a very minor part of total industry writings. It has been much more expensive to market, and increasing crime rates are making it even more expensive. The problems of burglary and theft insurance have received relatively little study, and the potential for improvement is great.
While the ultimate answer to the problem lies in the reduction of crime and in loss prevention, FAIR plans can provide the incentive to insurance companies to develop innovations in the burglary and theft line that will make the basic coverages more available to the public.

The major differences between Urban Area Plans and FAIR plans have led us to formulate the new name, which has the added merit of conveying to the public the overriding purpose of the plans.

We believe that FAIR plans will:

- End the practice of "red-lining" neighborhoods and eliminate other restrictive activities;
- Secure for all property owners equitable access to all basic lines of property insurance; and
- Encourage property improvement and loss prevention by responsible owners.

FAIR plans will also furnish accurate information to local and state governments on neighborhoods and on the condition of individual properties in poverty areas. We strongly urge forceful action at local levels to remedy the known environmental hazards of these areas. Action should include the development and enforcement of effective building and fire codes, the provision of more adequate police and fire protection, and the improvement of health, safety and related local services.

If the information produced by FAIR plans leads to constructive governmental action, environmental hazards, which generate many of the insurance problems that make the FAIR plans necessary, will be removed. Thus, FAIR plans contain, in themselves, a broader implication. They serve as a stimulus to cure the basic conditions which have created the need for FAIR plans at this time.

We recognize that the successful operation of FAIR plans depends to a large extent on a sincere effort on the part of each insurance company to accept center city insurance risks.

We are confident that the insurance industry will take the steps required to help solve what is not only a complex and troublesome insurance problem, but a profound social problem.

FAIR plans establish minimum standards that are essential to overcome center city insurance problems. Every state will develop and implement a plan in conformance with its own local institutions, and every state may, indeed, establish criteria beyond those suggested by the Panel.

The rates for insuring properties are an important aspect of FAIR plans. Since the regulation of insurance rates is a state function, the States will bear the responsibility for the rates payable for properties insured under FAIR plans.

We urge that, insofar as possible, the level of rates generally applicable in a state also apply to properties insured under FAIR plans. Surcharges, if needed, should be permitted only for demonstrable hazards of the property itself. Wherever possible, there should be no additional rate for environmental hazards.

We recognize the need for flexible and adequate rates. A risk must bear an appropriate rate; if a property is significantly more hazardous than average, it must yield a commensurately higher premium. Nevertheless, we hope that the states will consider placing a maximum limit on surcharges. Excessive or discriminatory rates must not be permitted to undermine the goals of the FAIR plan.

State Pools or Other Facilities

We recommend that states, in cooperation with the insurance industry, form pools of insurance companies (or other facilities) to make insurance available for insurable properties that do not receive coverage under the FAIR plans.

State pools will supplement FAIR plans. Some owners of well-maintained property will be unable to obtain insurance even after an inspection under the FAIR plan. Although the property itself is in good condition, it may be adjacent to an extremely high fire risk, exposed to unusual crime hazards, or subject to other environmental hazards which presently make property uninsurable.

Owners of these properties, usually declined by individual insurance companies, must have fair access to insurance. The responsible owner who cares for his property must not be penalized because of his neighborhood. He must not be denied insurance for reasons beyond his control. To do so not only treats him unfairly, but encourages the spread of urban blight.

It is important to recognize the distinction between this property and uninsurable property that itself is in hazardous condition and cannot or will not be repaired by the owner. Uninsurable property of this latter sort should not be insured, but should, instead, be the object of renewal programs designed to revitalize blighted areas.

We recommend that state insurance pools be formed where necessary to insure well-maintained property, regardless of its location. A pool is an association of insurance companies that agree to share income, expenses, and losses according to a predetermined arrangement. A pool may be voluntary if all but an insignificant part of the industry participates. In some states it may have to be mandatory to obtain the broad industry participation that is necessary.

State pools will:

- Guarantee to the property owner insurance if his property meets insurable standards, even when his property is subject to environmental hazards;
- Provide a method of spreading equitably throughout the insurance industry the risks from environmental hazards unacceptable to a single company;
- Create a convenient facility for Government financial assistance if it is needed to provide insurance for these risks.

Some states may well choose a different method to
achieve the same results expected from pools. They may elect some other arrangement more suitable to their own local institutions—for example, a state insurance company to underwrite the properties directly or a state insurance fund to provide reinsurance for these risks. The point is, state pools or some other facility may be needed to achieve the goals of the FAIR plans.

In some states, properties adversely affected by environmental hazards may be insignificant in number. They may be insured without the necessity of organizing a state pool. Diligent effort exercised by property owners and social responsibility exercised by state officials and the insurance industry—for example, by modifying underwriting standards—may succeed in providing adequate insurance through the FAIR plans alone.

States that are uncertain whether a pool is necessary may wish to wait a year or two until they evaluate the data developed under their FAIR plan. In this case, they would have the benefit of the experience of those states that have moved forward more rapidly with pool arrangements.

We recognize that very little is known about insuring core area risks under a pool arrangement. The experience of the Watts Pool is helpful but since that pool is restricted to fire insurance at highly surcharged rates for commercial properties in a limited geographic area, it is not necessarily a model that can be used generally. Pooling, however, is a standard insurance arrangement, and there is every reason to expect that it can function effectively to handle center city insurance problems.

The underwriting standards of the pool should be set by the state insurance department after consulting with the insurance industry. All properties meeting reasonable standards of insurability should be accepted regardless of environmental hazards.

It is recognized that deductibles and other limits on liability may be needed in making insurance available through a pool.

Rates for property insured in the pool will be regulated by the states. Each state will determine its own appropriate pattern of rates. We recognize that flexible rates may be necessary. But we urge that the pool charge no additional rate for environmental hazards, and that, if surcharges are needed, they be subjected to a maximum limit in order to keep the premium costs within the means of the urban core resident.

It may well be that intensive loss prevention and educational campaigns, deductibles and other similar insurance devices, as well as prudent pool management, can make the pool profitable over a reasonable period of time.

We recognize, however, that the rates charged for pool risks and the type of risks undertaken by the pool may make recurring losses inevitable. Handling these losses might be resolved in a number of ways. If rates are adequate throughout a state to permit substantial profits by companies generally, companies might be assessed some portion of their underwriting income on nonpool property. Or, a state might itself provide funds from premium taxes or general revenues and subsidize to a certain extent the risks in the pool. Just as a State provides funds for other programs designed to revitalize core areas, it could consider its insurance pool as a related undertaking.

Another alternative for covering pool losses is for the State pool to apply to the National Insurance Development Corporation for financial backing against losses. In this event, Federal as well as State funds would be available to spread the cost of subsidization.

National Insurance Development Corporation

We recommend that the Federal Government charter a National Insurance Development Corporation (NIDC) to undertake responsibility for a variety of vital but unfulfilled functions in support of the actions of private industry and States in the operations of FAIR plans and State pools.

The National Insurance Development Corporation would have no shareholders, but rather directors appointed by the President and representing all the parties vitally interested in the inner city insurance problem—residents of urban cores, insurance industry representatives, State officials (including State regulators), Federal officials, and members of the public. It would not seek to make a profit but to discharge important functions in making insurance more widely available to the public.

The Corporation would discharge these functions:

- Provide reinsurance against the risk of extraordinary loss from civil disorders, and thereby remove the burden from a single group of persons or segment of the insurance industry;
- Provide a source of reinsurance for State pools;
- Assess the performance of FAIR plans, State pools, and other insurance programs designed to deal with the problems of the inner cities, by gathering information, analyzing data, and preparing studies for the benefit of the public, the industry, and government.

At the present time, standard insurance policies in many lines of insurance include coverage against loss from riots. We strongly believe that the insurance industry should continue to include this riot coverage in all lines of insurance in which it presently exists.

We believe that the riot risk should, however, be neutralized as a factor hampering the underwriting of insurance in center cities and the placement of private reinsurance. Accordingly, the NIDC would issue riot reinsurance to member companies which are participating fully in FAIR plans and, where they exist, in State pools.

Any company desiring this riot reinsurance would
pay a premium to the NIDC. The premiums paid in will provide a fund from which to pay losses should they occur. The companies would retain the primary coverage of riot damage. The NIDC reinsurance would cover only the contingency of very large losses.

Maintaining law and order is primarily a State and local responsibility. Thus, any State desiring reinsurance for riot risks located in that State would be required to accept a State layer of financial backup of some kind in the event that disorders actually take place in that State.

To the extent that losses on reinsured policies exceed the fund accumulated by company premiums and State contributions, the NIDC would have authority to borrow from the Federal Treasury amounts needed to pay for losses in excess of its assets up to whatever limit may be prescribed by Congress. The borrowings would be repaid by subsequent accumulations of premiums or by congressional appropriations.

In addition, we recognize that there is great uncertainty as to how State pools will function, and how their financial aspects will be handled. We feel strongly, however, that pools should be undertaken now where they are required to meet urban core insurance problems. To aid the operation of State pools, the NIDC could receive direct appropriations for the purpose of helping the pools achieve their important objectives.

Finally, we recognize that our proposed program, like all new measures, will not be put into operation without difficulties. The program needs to be monitored to see that it is accomplishing its objectives, and this might best be undertaken by the NIDC.

The monitoring function includes:

- Collecting statistics on the operation of FAIR plans and the State pools.
- Conducting surveys and studies in cooperation with State insurance departments and the insurance industry to assure that the program is achieving its objectives.
- Gathering statistics and preparing studies of reinsurance—especially alien reinsurance—and of direct insurance placed abroad.
- Publishing the results of studies and surveys and providing information and analysis to the public, the insurance industry, and State and Federal Governments.
- Making recommendations for any changes needed in the program to achieve its purposes.

Tax Deferral Measures

We recommend Federal legislation authorizing tax deferral measures to permit insurance companies participating in FAIR plans and, where they exist, in State pools, to accumulate, as quickly as possible, more adequate reserves for catastrophe losses.

Federal tax measures would operate as follows:

- The Federal Government would defer tax on any amount placed by insurance companies in special reserves to meet catastrophe losses. Any company desiring tax deferral must participate in FAIR plans and, where they exist, in State pools.
- That portion of the special reserve that would otherwise have been paid in taxes to the Federal Government would instead be invested in interest-free, nontransferable U.S. Treasury securities. Should the companies incur catastrophe losses, these securities could be redeemed for cash, which would then be available to pay the losses.
- Limits would be placed on the amount of funds that could be accumulated in the tax-deferred reserves. Funds set aside in pools and in special reserves which are later returned to the companies for general use would become taxable at the time of the return.

The States would authorize, within these limits, whatever reserves and premiums they determined to be desirable and appropriate. This action would trigger the Federal tax deferral.

The Panel believes that when sufficient reserves are accumulated, the financial backup of government against catastrophe losses may no longer be necessary. Tax deferral measures therefore contain the promise of phasing out governmental support and restoring the entire enterprise to private hands.

Other Necessary Steps

We recommend other measures to meet special problems of the urban core insurance market, specifically:

- **Manpower Training Programs** to be sponsored by government to train residents of blighted areas as agents and brokers with special competence to handle the insurance needs of center-city areas.

- **Recruitment and Training Programs** to be expanded by insurance companies in order to attract residents of center city areas to fill personnel needs at all levels of the business.

- **More Economical Methods of Marketing Insurance** to be studied by the insurance industry; for example, new forms of contracts, as well as new marketing and underwriting techniques designed to improve the insurance market in center cities.

- **Better Procedures to Handle Policyholder Complaints** to be developed by State insurance departments in order to have better records of complaints, cancellations, nonrenewals, and other statistics that measure insurance company performance.

- **Research Programs** to be established by the insurance industry in cooperation with State pools and government to develop new loss prevention techniques and other methods of improving the insurance market in center city areas.

- **More Refined Statistics** to be compiled by rating bureaus and insurance companies on loss experience in order to facilitate rate regulation and loss prevention.

- **Lending Programs** to be accelerated in the urban core with particular attention to providing needed funds to small businessmen and other property owners for removal and control of fire and crime hazards.

- **Contractors' Bid and Performance Bonds for Urban Core Businessmen** to be made more readily available to encourage construction work in these areas.
At the request of the Commission, we have considered the appropriate role of the profitmaking free enterprise system in helping to alleviate the causes of civil disorders, which are the subject of the Commission's work. In our meetings and deliberations during the past 2 months we have taken as our starting point the evidence presented to the Commission on the causes of the disorders and the alternative courses of action which might be pursued to deal with those causes. We have also sought the advice of representative members of the business community and others both within and outside of government.

We conclude that maximum utilization of the tremendous capability of the American free enterprise system is a crucial element in any program for improving conditions, in both our urban centers and our rural poverty areas, which have brought us to the present crisis.

The maintenance of public order is primarily the responsibility of the public sector, but the private sector is the main-spring of the national economy and consequently of the economic well-being of our citizens. Free enterprise, with its system of incentives and rewards for hard work, ability, ingenuity and creativity, has made this nation strong and produced the highest standard of living the world has ever known. Under the spur of competition, the discipline of business management produces maximum benefit from the funds and other resources available.

More than 85 percent of the current annual gross national product of over $800 billion is attributable to the private business sector. Eighty-four percent of the Nation's 73 million civilian workers are employed by 11.5 million separate private, profitmaking employers, of which more than 1.3 million are corporations. Even 5 percent of the total number of private employers would represent more than 500,000 enterprises. The involvement of even that number would constitute a massive, pluralistic and truly national approach to the national problem of civil disorder and the closely related problems of chronic unemployment and underemployment, particularly among Negroes.

For similar reasons the Nation in the past has repeatedly relied upon the private sector to assist in solving complex national problems. In the field of defense, contracts with private companies for materiel, supplies and services amounted to $34 billion in fiscal year 1966. In the exploration of outer space, contracts with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with private companies amounted to more than $4 billion in fiscal year 1966.

The concept that the private sector must also be involved in overcoming the challenge of racial ghettos in urban areas and poverty in rural areas is now widely accepted, both within and outside the government. In his State of the Union Message on January 17, 1968, the President called for "a new partnership between government and private industry to train and to hire the hard-core unemployed persons." The Congress has made similar declarations in a number of acts, including the Economic Opportunity Act, the basic charter of the War on Poverty.

Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, the eminent Negro psychologist and educator who testified before the Commission, stated in a recent article in answer to the question: "What role can business play in finding answers to rioting?"

"Business and industry are our last hope. They are the most realistic elements of our society. Other areas in our society—government, education, churches, labor—have defaulted in dealing with Negro problems."

No fewer than 30 of the witnesses who have appeared before the Commission referred to a role for the private sector in meeting those urban problems which contribute to civil disorder.

We believe that these widely-shared sentiments about the role of the business community are more than mere rhetoric. The private sector has shown its concern and capacity for making a contribution in the fields relevant to the urban crisis. In many cases it has done so in collaboration with government, and in many cases it has done so entirely independently of government. A partnership of profit-making businesses and local governments, organized labor, and religious groups has recently been organized in the Urban Coalition, and there are numerous examples of involvement by individual companies in useful projects of various types.

Some of the areas in which there is evidence that the private sector could make a contribution are:

**Job Training and Employment.**—The on-the-job training program under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 has involved more than 2,000 private employers. The Job Corps has involved more than 20 private companies as managers of urban training centers. Numerous similar undertakings by private companies have been cataloged by the National Association of Manufacturers as part of its STEP (Solutions to Employment Problems) program, a national clearinghouse for such endeavors; and by the National Industrial Conference Board in the proceedings of its conference on "Corporate Urban Programs—An Investment in Economic Progress and Social Order," held on January 10, 1968, in New York City.

**Housing.**—Joint ventures with public housing authorities to reconstruct low-income apartments, housing development corporations to receive industrial and banking investments, and "instant renewal," utilizing prefabricated units, have been pioneered by a number of companies.

**Economic Development.**—A consortium of seven of the largest life insurance companies has been created to extend loans in ghetto areas where investment risks were previously considered too great. Several companies have established plants in various poverty areas to employ and train local residents. "Operation Bootstrap," through tax and other incentives, has drawn some 600 companies into investments in new plants in Puerto Rico since 1942, has resulted in the rapid development of the Puerto Rican economy and a dramatic increase in the standard of living, and now serves as a model for the development of other areas of the Western Hemisphere. As a byproduct, "Operation Bootstrap" has also reversed the net in-migration of Puerto Ricans to the continental United States, which was an in-migration from a rural poverty area to urban centers much like the massive outflow of the rural poor to American cities in recent decades.

**Negro Entrepreneurship.**—In order to support and develop needed managerial capabilities in the Negro community, a number of small business programs have relied upon the private sector. The Small Business Administration made almost 3,500 loans during fiscal year 1967 under its economic opportunity loan program, many in participation with private lending institutions and many as guarantor of private loans. A privately-sponsored nonprofit group, the Interracial Council for Business Opportunities, has utilized volunteer executives...
of successful businesses to provide managerial assistance to small businesses. The ICBO has assisted approximately 1,000 businessmen since 1965 and has created a private, bank-guaranteed loan fund. A Department of Commerce program has so far stimulated creation of four trade associations for counseling and other assistance to Negro small businessmen. Some companies have created private community development corporations which provide managerial assistance to Negro entrepreneurs.

**Education.**—A number of companies have provided basic literacy and mathematical skill training to their own disadvantaged employees and in some cases to those of other companies, under contract. A number of profitmaking Job Corps contractors have pioneered rapid literacy techniques.

**Attitudinal Change.**—Inclusion of Negroes in national advertising has been spurred by the Advertising Council, and many companies are taking affirmative steps to improve the attitudes of their employees and customers through in-plant literature as well as through advertising policy.

**While business and industry are making substantial efforts in these and other fields, we believe that much more can and should be done.** Many more companies will undoubtedly enter these fields on a volunteer basis, in some cases because they recognize that the price of inaction may well be continued tension and disorder and the ultimate breakdown of the tranquility which underlies our entire social fabric and economic growth. And this process might, and should, be accelerated by exhortation from government and business leadership.

**But we believe that a truly massive number of companies could be induced to participate only if appropriate monetary incentives are provided by the Federal government to defray the unusual costs of participation.** We also believe that opportunities for business improvement, on a substantially broader scale than at present, exist primarily in the areas of employment and job training and in economic development, in the sense of the establishment of plants and other facilities in poverty areas, both urban and rural. Housing, Negro entrepreneurship, education, and attitudinal changes are also important areas in which the private sector might well make significantly greater contributions, but in the time available to us we have attempted to deal only with the highest priority areas and urge that further study be given to these additional subjects.

It should be noted that our optimism about potential business involvement, in both jobs for the unemployed and economic development, is grounded upon continuation of essentially the same level of economic growth the Nation has experienced in the past 18 months. Business interest is, obviously, affected by general economic conditions as well as by a specific monetary incentive.

The Commission has received ample testimony that unemployment and underemployment are among the most persistent and serious grievances among many Negroes in the central cities which have experienced disorders in recent years. At the same time, job training and job development are the daily concern of profitmaking enterprises and consequently are areas to which private companies can bring the greatest skill and ingenuity.

It is estimated that some 500,000 unemployed persons may be characterized as hard core in the sense that they lack eighth grade literacy and mathematical skills, have only intermittent work histories at most, and often lack motivation to hold and perform a job. A substantial proportion of this group is Negro, male, and between the ages of approximately 18 and 25. The evidence before the Commission suggests that it is this group of late teenagers and young adults who are often the initial participants in civil disorders. A slum employment study by the Department of Labor in 1966 indicated that, as compared with an overall unemployment rate in the United States of 3.8 percent, the unemployment rate among nonwhite 16- to 19-year-old males was 26.5 percent, and among non-white 16- to 24-year-old males was 15.9 percent. Data collected by the Commission in 20 cities which experienced racial disorders in 1967, including the most serious disorders, indicate that Negro males between the ages of 15 and 25 predominated among the rioters, that more than 20 percent of the rioters were unemployed, and that when they were employed, they tended to be underemployed in the sense that their employment was intermittent and in low status, unskilled jobs.

Experience over recent years with various experimental public and private employment techniques demonstrates to our satisfaction that on-the-job training by private employers offers a highly successful method of insuring ultimate placement of trainees, as compared with vocational school programs. The latter often fail to attract the hard-core unemployed person, who is likely to have been a dropout from public school and is generally poorly motivated toward public educational institutions of any type. Institutional programs also leave unresolved the difficult problem of matching the trainee to the subsequent job. Public employment programs often tend to provide unsatisfying, dead-end jobs.

In our recommendations we propose to deal primarily with the 500,000 hard-core unemployed who have not yet been reached or placed in permanent employment by existing programs. By so zeroing-in, we do not intend to ignore the remaining approximately million and a half jobless whom the U.S. Department of Labor estimates also need help with regard to employment. Nor do we intend to ignore the approximately 10 million underemployed, 6.5 million of whom work full time and earn less than $3,000 annually, which is the federally defined poverty level.

Many members of these latter two groups, the unemployed who are not hard core in the sense of extreme disadvantage, and the underemployed, would undoubtedly also benefit from the kind of training which our recommendations would encourage for the hard core. We would urge continuation and expansion of existing programs which are designed to reach these other two groups. In addition, we recommend consideration of extension to these two groups of the program we recommend for the hard core, perhaps with modifications.

We do not intend with our program for the hard-core disadvantaged to stimulate the leapfrogging, by the hard-core unemployed, of the other two groups. Certainly the already employed must not lose their jobs in order to make room for the hard-core unemployed. Only a program which both upgrades the already employed and thereby creates openings for the hard core, or which creates new openings for the hard core, can satisfy this need.

The other two groups are often disadvantaged by the interrelated problems of outright racial discrimination against those who are nonwhite, and unrealistic and unnecessarily high minimum qualifications for employment or promotion, which often have the effect of discriminating. For these groups, as for the hard core, business must consider whether a criminal record should be a bar to the particular job, whether a high school diploma is an inflexibly necessary requirement, or whether a written examination is appropriate. During World War II, industry successfully employed large numbers of the previously unemployed who were disadvantaged, by lowering standards such as these and by restructuring work patterns so that the job fit the level of available skill, not vice versa.

That experience, and many others as well, amply demonstrate that racial and other stereotypes are false. The usual educational and other measures used for the population as a whole, when applied to the disadvantaged often ignore considerable intelligence and skill which are utilized instead in
activity, often illegal, in the complex system of the ghetto streets. The existing Federal, state, and local laws against discrimination in employment should be observed and effectively but reasonably enforced.

We are realistic about the problems involved in motivating and training these hard-core youngsters and young adults. Experience with a number of programs, such as the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and several Manpower Development and Training projects, demonstrates clearly that training and motivating this group is considerably more costly than in the case of either the labor force with which private enterprise normally operates or the trainees whom current federally assisted on-the-job training programs have generally tended to reach. Accordingly, we are convinced that the incentibe necessary to induce a broad base of the free enterprise system to hire and train the hard-core unemployed will have to be increased correspondingly.

Almost by definition, the new employee recruited from the hard core will require substantially more basic job training than is provided today for unskilled workers who are not disadvantaged. Although this is a function and a source of cost which employers have generally undertaken themselves, under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 the Federal Government has created an incentive for training by defraying a portion of such costs.

Far more serious for the employer are the many supportive services which the hard core require in order to make them amenable to employment and job training and the discipline of the work experience. In many cases the new employee recruited from the hard core will require basic educational training, which employers have rarely been required to provide under normal labor market circumstances. In addition, the new employee will usually require counseling in regard to his willingness to work and in regard to aspects of his work habits which the employer normally takes for granted: for example, in dress, appearance, social relationships, money management, transportation, hygiene and health. These supportive services will therefore constitute a source of special cost to the employer.

Tardiness and absenteeism are major problems for this group, who have previously found little social or economic benefit from conformity with the usual standards of commercial life. A number of experiments, including the substantial experience of the Job Corps training centers, indicates that it is difficult to motivate hard-core youths to remain on the job for more than a few weeks. The productivity of trainees at any level is often minimal, but at this level, and with considerable disruption through tardiness, absenteeism and turnover, the cost to the employer can, again, be especially burdensome.

These special costs, of supportive services and loss of productivity, will have to be adequately reimbursed by government in order to permit and stimulate business and industry of all types and sizes to hire and train members of the hard-core unemployed. Estimates of the total annual cost of the incentive to the employer per hard-core trainee vary from $3,000 to $5,000, including $3,000 or more in wages at the higher of the minimum wage or the prevailing wage, training costs, and supportive service costs, and assuming that marginal productivity is achieved during the training period in return for the employer’s payment of wages.

It must be recognized that a sure method for motivating the hard-core unemployed has yet to be devised. One basic minimum is already apparent from experimental programs: The job must not appear to the hard-core person to be a dead-end job. Since by definition he would not be eligible for even an entry-level job, he must be given job training. It must be made clear to him from the outset that his satisfactory performance at the entry level will result not only in continued employment after the training period but also in an opportunity for advancement, ideally through a clearly defined job ladder with step increases in both pay and responsibility. The fastest growing area of private sector labor demand is in the service industries, rather than in manufacturing; yet the problem of giving a sense of dignity to entry-level jobs is greatest in the service industries.

We believe that, spurred by an adequate monetary incentive, many private employers can and will utilize sufficient ingenuity to meet these and other difficulties of motivating, training and retaining the hard core in useful and productive jobs. The task is by no means an easy one, but we believe the private sector is capable of devising individual solutions adapted to the individual employee and company. A truly effective program has not yet been made to induce business to try this approach to the unemployment problem. We believe that it offers a realistic possibility of success.

Even with an adequate monetary incentive to the employer, it must also be recognized that many of the hard core may never be employable by private enterprise, either because they are not reached by the normal processes of the labor market or even stepped-up recruitment techniques, because once reached they are reluctant to accept employment, because the cost of training them exceeds even the most liberal reimbursement, or because they are unable to achieve an adequate level of productivity. For this most severely disadvantaged group, other alternatives will have to be considered.

Effective administration of a monetary incentive to the employer may be almost as important in attracting widespread business interest as the amount of the incentive itself. Monetary incentives to business might be provided in a number of ways. The Government could guarantee business against various unusually high risks from investment in ghetto areas or, as has been attempted by the Office of Economic Opportunity in a few experimental cases, against the higher turnover and other loss resulting from employment of the hard core. The most direct technique for compensating business is a contract mechanism, under which reimbursement for costs in the particular case is made by a governmental agency to the private contractor. An indirect incentive can be provided through the tax system, either by way of a credit against net tax or through an additional expense deduction for a particular cost or through accelerated depreciation for particular investments or some combination of these three.

We are convinced that large numbers and many different types of business and industrial companies will participate in hiring and training the hard-core unemployed only if an incentive technique is devised which is as simple and automatic as possible.

Experience since 1962 in the on-the-job training program under the Manpower Development and Training Act indicates that the Government contract mechanism, in advance of employment and training, is slow in attracting business interest. In part this is due to the need in a contracting system for a substantial promotional effort to bring the program to the attention of a large number of employers. In part it is due to the reluctance of many employers, once they learn of the program, to engage in protracted negotiations with a many-layered structure of local, state, and Federal authorities, all of whom must approve the contractual arrangements. Employers are also extremely reluctant to assume the burdensome paperwork requirements and corresponding additional overhead costs of any Federal contracting procedure. Executives are often apprehensive that a Government contract will necessarily involve some loss of management prerogatives over the productive process, especially because Government may seek to dictate in detail the content of the training to be given to employees. These factors appear to discourage even the largest industrial firms, but their negative impact is, naturally, magnified manifold for medium- and small-sized em-

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ployers, who might otherwise absorb, in the aggregate, large numbers of the hard-core unemployed. It is possible that a simplified direct compensation technique could be devised which would minimize the negative features of contracting, but it is likely that most businessmen would still avoid this type of involvement with Government.

We believe that the single most powerful inducement for broad involvement of private enterprise in job training and job development lies in the use of a tax incentive. Neither a guarantee technique nor a contracting mechanism offers the same appeal to businessmen in enterprises of all sizes as does a tax incentive. Businessmen are convinced from past experience that tax incentives will be relatively simple, automatic, and as self-enforcing as a Government program can be, even as compared with a simplified direct compensation method. Accordingly, we recommend the following program of incentives to business and industry:

1. Tax Incentive for Hard-Core Employment

First, the hard-core unemployed should be defined and identified by a Government agency, either the Federal-State Employment Services or other local agencies, such as the community action agencies, whichever may in particular localities develop the capacity to reach out effectively to the hard-core unemployed. We do not believe that business can generally be expected to perform this recruitment function efficiently within the ghetto.

Second, an unemployed person once certified as hard core should be issued a green card or other similar identifying document which he would present to an employer.

Third, for each new employee furnishing a green card added to his payroll, the employer would in turn receive a substantial credit against his corporate income tax for the year in which the employee was employed. The sole limitation upon the employer would be that he not dismiss existing employees in order to hire green card employees.

In order to stimulate efforts by the employer to devise techniques for motivating green card employees to remain on the job, the tax credit would not be allowed to the employer unless the employee were retained for at least 6 months. If he remained for 6 months, the employer would be entitled to a tax credit in the amount of 75 percent of the wages and fringe benefits paid to the employee during that period. From the outset, the employer would be required to pay the higher of the minimum wage or the prevailing wage for the occupation in question.

To encourage continued retention of the employee, the employer would be entitled to a credit against tax in the amount of 50 percent of the wages and fringe benefits paid to the employee during the second 6 months of employment, and 25 percent of the wages and fringe benefits paid during the second year of employment. For example, an employer paying the minimum wage of $1.60 per hour, or $3,328 per year to a full-time employee, and no fringe benefits, would receive a tax credit for the first 6 months of employment $1,248 in credit against his net corporate income tax. If the employee were retained for the second 6 months, the employer would receive an additional $832 or a total of $2,080 as a credit against tax for the first year. If the employee remained for the entire 2-year period, the employer would receive an additional $832 in credit against his corporate tax for the second year. The employer’s total credit for the employee over a 2-year period would thus amount to $2,912. Of course, over the 2-year period the employer will incur the cost of training and other supportive services and the cost of wages and fringe benefits paid and would therefore also receive the usual deduction from gross income for these costs as business expenses.

The premise of the plan is that, given the tax benefit only if the employee is motivated to remain on the job, the employer will attempt to create the conditions necessary to keep the employee motivated, through the provision of training, job ladders, and the supportive services which have been described above as so necessary to motivation and retention of the hard-core unemployed. In order to avoid abuse of the premium which the green card confers upon the job applicant, no green card holder would be entitled to use the card for more than 2 years of cumulative employment and in no event for a series of less-than-6-month periods with different employers. Should an employee leave an employer voluntarily for the second time, the Employment Service or other referring agencies would be required to place him at the bottom of their referral file.

As in the case of the existing 7 percent tax credit for investment in new equipment, the maximum credit allowable against the corporate employer's tax arising from employment of the hard-core unemployed would be limited to $25,000 plus 50 percent of the amount of the company's tax exceeding $25,000. So that no employer would receive a competitive advantage, credit would be allowable only for a limited percentage of the total number of the company's employees, on a sliding scale. An employer of 10 or fewer employees could receive a tax credit for no more than 50 percent of his employees as green card holders; employers of 10 to 100 employees could receive credit for no more than 25 percent; and those employing over 100 no more than 15 percent.

An advantage of the tax credit route is that only companies which are profitable and therefore owe Federal income tax are eligible for the incentive credit. Profitable companies are in the best position to provide meaningful and continuing employment.

Provision should be made for exemption of green card holders from mandatory labor union membership until they have become permanent, full-time employees.

2. Tax Incentives for Investment in Poverty Areas, Both Urban and Rural

We recommend a parallel tax credit, in addition, for the location and renovation of plants and other business facilities in urban and rural poverty areas, as already defined jointly by several Federal departments and agencies. The new investment credit would be available for investments in rural as well as urban poverty areas in order to begin a national effort to improve rural economic conditions and thereby attempt to stem the massive migration from such areas to the urban centers which has been so marked in recent decades.

The existing incentive tax credit for investment in new equipment, first enacted in 1962, applies regardless of the area in which the investment is made. But the existing credit does not apply to investment in real property or in plant. We recommend that, for investment in poverty areas, the existing credit be increased substantially enough to achieve this purpose and extended to investments in real property and plant, whether for acquisition or construction of new property or the renovation of existing property. We also recommend that plant and equipment in such areas be eligible for rapid amortization, within as little as 5 years. These incentives would be designed to attract to the poverty areas the type of industrial and commercial development which would create new jobs and also stimulate further economic benefit within the disadvantaged community surrounding the enterprises.

The incentives would assist existing businesses in poverty areas, including Negro-owned businesses, as well as new businesses. By stimulating new jobs in urban poverty areas the incentives would also help to overcome the often severe difficulties residents of those areas now experience in obtaining transportation to suburban commercial and industrial plants. The credit for poverty area investment would not, how-
ever, be dependent upon employment of the hard-core unemployed. An employer eligible for the credit for poverty area investment would also be eligible, if he employed green card holders, for the credit for hard-core employment. The two credits are designed to meet separate needs and different costs to investors and employers and therefore should be cumulative. Like the credit for employment of the hard-core, the investment credit should be limited to $25,000 of tax and 50 percent of the tax exceeding $25,000.

Protections would have to be provided against subsidizing "run-away" plants from urban areas, although large companies should not be discouraged from expanding their operations into rural areas. Protections would also be necessary to avoid abuse of the credit by automated operations which involve few employees.

3. Local Joint Clearinghouse Groups

We recommend that industry, organized labor, and various civic organizations be encouraged to create joint local clearinghouse groups to exchange experience gained with employment of the hard-core unemployed and with investment in poverty areas. A major benefit of utilizing the tax incentive technique is permitting each enterprise to adapt its program to the particular conditions of its business and location and the particular problems and strengths of the labor market in that location. However, there is much to be gained from the cross-fertilization of the many experimental programs now being carried on by business and industry and the many additional experiments which would be stimulated by the tax incentives we have outlined. Mixed local groups would facilitate a useful interchange of experience and know-how. In any event, these local groups would have no authority to approve or disapprove programs for tax credit purposes.

In our deliberations we have considered carefully the arguments which have repeatedly been made in some tax circles against the use of tax incentives for social purposes such as those we recommend. Two such arguments have been made most strenuously and merit thoughtful answers:

(1) Backdoor financing.—It is often contended that tax incentives, once enacted as a part of the Internal Revenue Code, become entrenched and immune from the kind of public scrutiny which more direct incentives, through appropriated funds, receive annually in the Congress. The recent history of the existing 7-percent investment credit for new equipment, which is the most direct analogy to the investment credits proposed here, belies this argument. A fixed time limitation may be placed upon a provision of the tax law, just as in the case of authorizing legislation for a direct incentive. Although this was not done in the case of the 7-percent equipment investment credit, the Administration recommended a suspension of the credit for a period of time in 1966 and 1967, because the demonstrated success of the tax credit as a spur to new investment was thought to increase the danger of inflation. The Congress accepted this conclusion, after giving it the same consideration it would have given had the question instead arisen in regard to the extension of an authorized direct incentive or in regard to an appropriation for a program of direct incentive enacted under a multi-year authorization. The public policy which dictates that an incentive be a permanent part of the law is the same whether the law involved is the Internal Revenue Code or some other statute.

The tax incentives we recommend should be limited in time and reappraised every 2 years. If, in addition, some further control on the cost to the Treasury is necessary, the Government would retain authority to regulate the flow of green cards in the case of the credit for hard-core employment.

(2) Foreclosing other, more creative avenues of assistance.—It is contended that tax incentives tend to obscure the search for more effective techniques to achieve common social goals. This may be an effective argument in regard to other uses of tax incentives, but it is inapplicable to the use we recommend. We arrived at the tax approach only after carefully appraising the various other available means of governmental assistance, several of which have been tried. After weighing these alternatives, we have come to the firm conclusion that the tax technique is indeed the most effective for the particular social goal. We have sought a means of motivating the widest possible spectrum of American business in alleviating joblessness in our urban and rural poverty areas, and we find that no other technique is as likely to move the American business community into action for this purpose as is the tax-incentive device.

The public policy goal here is the employment and training of hundreds of thousands of persons by, hopefully, thousands of business enterprises. The existing investment tax credit was taken on 1,239,000 corporate tax returns and 6,904,000 individual tax returns during the period of 1962-65, representing new investments in the amount of approximately $75 billion and $17.5 billion respectively. It is precisely because of the need for a similarly pluralistic and large-scale answer to the problem of joblessness in the ghetto that we have turned to the most pluralistic technique for channelling governmental assistance: the individual decisions of thousands of businesses to utilize the tax credit in making their daily employment and plant location decisions. Other incentive techniques may be better for the solution of other major social problems, but we are convinced that the tax incentive method is the most appropriate and most hopeful solution to this particular problem.

Commissioneer Charles B. Thornton, Chairman, Chairman of the Board, Litton Industries, Inc.
John Leland Atwood, President and Chief Executive Officer, North American Rockwell Corp.
Martin R. Gainsbrugh, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, National Industrial Conference Board.
Walter E. Hoadley, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Bank of America.
Louis F. Polk, Jr., Vice President, Finance, International and Development, General Mills, Inc.
Lawrence M. Stone, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
January 29, 1967
Appendix J

SPECIAL INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION

August 10, 1967.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

The testimony to date convinces the Commission that a substantial body of knowledge now exists in the fields of prevention and control of civil disorders that could profitably be communicated through training conferences under the auspices of the Department of Justice. Of course, we are aware that a number of valuable meetings and programs for local law enforcement officials are under way. But these meetings we believe can be significantly supplemented by a conference of broader scope and longer duration such as that we here propose.

The precise format of this conference and the cities to be involved would, of course, be determined by the Justice Department. The conference could be conducted here in Washington or on a regional basis, perhaps in cooperation with colleges or universities. A short program might be appropriate for key state and municipal officials, a slightly longer one for police chiefs, and a more extensive one for other public safety and government personnel. Subjects to be covered presumably would include advance planning; control techniques; communications systems; decision making during disorders; joint operations with neighboring police, State police, the National Guard, and Army; community relations and effective means of dealing with citizens' grievances.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) OTTO KERNER,
Chairman.

(Signed) JOHN V. LINDSAY,
Vice Chairman.

February 7, 1968.

Hon. RAMSEY CLARK,
Attorney General,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL:

More effective means of communication among police officers in a disorder area and between police in the area and officers at control headquarters are essential. Difficulties in communication impair day-to-day enforcement efforts, but become particularly acute during a disorder when there is urgent need for departments to act as coordinated units.

One important way to alleviate this problem is to provide miniaturized two-way radio equipment for all officers on patrol. Accordingly, the Commission's Report will include the following paragraph strongly endorsing the recommendation of the President's Crime Commission:

Miniaturized communications equipment for officers on foot is critically needed for command and control in civil disorders. This Commission, therefore, endorses the recommendations made by the Crime Commission that the Federal Government assume the leadership in initiating and funding portable radio development programs for the police.

The Commission believes that the Department of Justice should move forward now to develop such a program. We urge immediate action and we would appreciate learning of steps being taken in this direction.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) OTTO KERNER,
Chairman.

(Signed) JOHN V. LINDSAY,
Vice Chairman.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

Hon. HYDE,

ing has been to provide sufficient radio frequencies to insure communication among control officers on a daily basis and especially during a disorder. Police officers in the disorder area have frequently found it difficult or impossible to reach other officers or other agencies of local or state government. State and local police are sometimes unable to use the same frequency.

The following paragraph, which will be included in the Commission's report, sets forth the Commission's strong recommendation on the basis of its study:

WE BELIEVE THAT THE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE PRESENT SHORTAGE OF FREQUENCIES AVAILABLE TO POLICE DEPARTMENTS REQUIRE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. ACCORDINGLY, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION MAKE SUFFICIENT FREQUENCIES AVAILABLE TO POLICE AND RELATED PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES TO MEET THE DEMONSTRATED NEED FOR RIOT CONTROL AND OTHER EMERGENCY USE.

Sincerely,

(Signed) OTTO KERNER,
Chairman,

(Signed) JOHN V. LINDSAY,
Vice Chairman.

Appendix K

A STATEMENT ON METHODOLOGY

Two prime factors shaped the character and direction of the Commission's work. The first was time; the second, the scope of the task.

The Commission was established by the President on July 29, 1967. Under the terms of the Executive order, it was directed to make an interim report not later than March 1, 1968, and a final report not later than July 29, 1968.

From the start, a sense of urgency dominated the Commission's work. This grew from month to month until, in December, the decision was made to issue both the interim and final reports as a single document before March 1, 1968.

Basic to this decision was the conviction that to present our major conclusions and recommendations in midsummer would be to forfeit whatever opportunity might exist for the report to affect this year the dangerous climate of tension and apprehension that pervades our cities.

At the same time, the Commission was faced with the task of analyzing a series of essentially local events, reporting what happened and why it happened in terms that would provide a national perspective. It also had responsibility to formulate a series of recommendations to answer the question: "What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?"

The Work of the Commissioners

To accomplish these tasks within the stringent time limits indicated above, the Commissioners divided their work into two basic phases.

During the first phase, closed hearings were held in Washington, D.C., in order to bring before the Commission a full spectrum of witnesses whose testimony would aid the Commission in considering the issues raised by the President's charge.

In the initial hearings, the Commission sought information to determine as accurately as possible what happened during several major disorders. The Commission heard testimony from mayors and their top assistants, from police and fire department officials, from officers and workers of human relations commissions, and from a variety of other local officials who either played a role in controlling the disorders or had knowledge of the events that took place. For some major disorders, the Commission also heard testimony from Federal officials, from governors, from other state officials, and from state law enforcement officers.

This testimony was not confined solely to what happened. In prepared statements and during questioning by the Commission, these officials also explained their understanding of the basic causes of the disorders and their recommendations for future action.

In attempting to gain an understanding of the forces that gave rise to the disorders, the Commission heard testimony from ghetto residents, from civil rights leaders, from noted authors, from reporters, from sociologists, historians, psychologists, economists, and from a wide range of Federal, state, and local officials involved in the problems of our cities, our poor, and our minority groups.

Because of the extreme importance of measures relating to the prevention and control of disorders, the Commission heard testimony from officials of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, from army officers with responsibility for riot control operations, from National Guard officers who commanded control forces, and from a wide variety of police officials and academic experts in police-community relations.

The Commission heard extensive testimony to provide the background for its program recommendations. In these various fields—employment, education, housing, welfare, youth programs, urban problems—the Commission heard testimony from Cabinet officials, from other Federal officials, from business and labor leaders, from ghetto residents, from state and local officials, from civil rights leaders, and from university experts.

In total, during 20 days of hearings from August to November, over 130 persons appeared as witnesses before the Commission. The transcript of these hearings—which totaled over 3,900 pages—was digested and fully indexed so that it could serve as a continuing source of information for the Commission, staff, consultants, and advisers.

A list of the witnesses appearing before the Commission is found in Appendix E.

In addition to the hearings, the Commissioners themselves visited some eight cities that had suffered serious disorders. During these visits the Commissioners met with and interviewed ghetto residents and black militants, as well as public officials. Tours were conducted of areas that had experienced disorders.

The second phase of the Commission's work consisted of...
a series of meetings held from December through February of 1968 for the purpose of discussing the results of the field surveys and other investigations, reviewing preliminary drafts of sections of the report, and discussing and formulating proposed recommendations.

In addition to these general meetings attended by the Commission and key staff members, individual Commissioners participated in preparation of the report by exchanging information with the staff, by furnishing data on particular subjects under review, and by generally furnishing advice and guidance to the staff effort.

In sum, during the period from July 29, 1967, to March 1, 1968, the Commission met for a total of 44 days, not including the trips taken to the riot cities.

The Staff
The pressures of time and the need to study a representative sample of the riot cities led the Commission to recruit rapidly a staff of over 90 professionals, including qualified personnel, both professional and clerical, detailed to the Commission by Federal agencies.

As the Commission's work shifted into its second phase, as the investigative and analytical work neared completion, the staff was reduced in number to approximately 45 professionals.

Shortly after the appointment of the Commission, the President appointed David Ginsburg, a Washington attorney, as Executive Director, to direct the staff effort. He was assisted by the Deputy Executive Director, Victor H. Palmieri, a Los Angeles attorney and businessman.

Merle M. McCurdy, on leave of absence as U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio, served as the General Counsel for the Commission. He and his staff furnished legal advice to the Commission, arranged for and conducted the Commission hearings, and conducted depositions as part of the investigative efforts.

Stephen Kurzman, a Washington attorney, supervised the field surveys conducted by the Commission, and the analysis of the data collected by these surveys.

Staff efforts in the various substantive and analytical areas of the Commission's work were directed by a number of experts. Dr. Robert Shellow, a social psychologist with the National Institute of Mental Health, directed portions of the analytical effort conducted by the staff. The staff work concerning police and public safety was the responsibility of Arnold Sagalyn, former Director of the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination for the Treasury Department, on leave of absence as Advisor on Public Safety for the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Robert Conot, author and Journalist, directed the work of the staff in preparing the riot profiles. Milan C. Miskovsky, on leave as Assistant General Counsel of the Department of Treasury, served as Director of Investigations. Staff work in the development of social and economic program recommendations was directed by Dr. Richard Nathan, an economist and associate of the Brookings Institution, and Dr. Anthony Downs, economist.

The Commission also relied heavily on the talents of the consultants and advisers named in appendix F. They included experts on all facets of the problems studied by the Commission including leading scholars, police and other law enforcement officials, a variety of experts from local, state, and Federal Government agencies, and specialists from private research firms. Some of these experts prepared drafts of chapters of the report, submitted papers, or conducted studies especially for the Commission.

Commission Investigative Efforts
The Commission undertook three major field research programs.

The primary investigative effort consisted of field surveys conducted in 23 cities. After consultation with staff researchers, the Commission concluded that within the short time period available, a national perspective could best be obtained by an intensive study of a representative group of cities that experienced some sort of disorder in 1967. Disruptions that took place in over 150 cities were initially ranked on the basis of the degree of violence and damage, the duration of the violent action, the number of active participants, and the level of law enforcement response. From this list, Commission researchers selected for field investigation:

- Nine cities experiencing serious destruction.
- Three cities where the disorders occurred in university settings.
- A chain of six New Jersey cities surrounding Newark.
- Five cities which experienced lesser degrees of violence.

For each of the 23 cities, the staff first collected and reviewed existing written material on the disorders—FBI and Department of Justice reports, reports prepared by other Government agencies, and newspaper accounts. This review was supplemented by oral briefings from those with special knowledge of one or more of the 23 cities.

Over a period of several months, investigative teams of six staff members were dispatched to 20 of the 23 cities. (Investigation of the three university disturbances was conducted to a nonprofit corporation.) In each city, subteams of two staff members interviewed persons from the official sector (mayors, city officials, policemen and police officials, judges, and others), the disorder area (residents, leaders of community groups), and the private sector (businessmen, labor, and community leaders). In order to increase uniformity of the investigative effort, each six-man team was dispatched to a number of cities.

During the city visits, team members interviewed over 1,200 persons. All interviews followed, to the fullest extent possible, questionnaires developed by staff members working in the various substantive areas studied by the Commission.

After completion of interviews in a city, team members returned to Washington to dictate reports of their interviews. Team members were also fully debriefed by oral questioning by staff members.

A draft report was prepared synthesizing the team interviews for each city. Followup visits to a number of cities were conducted to obtain additional information.

The field investigative effort thus produced information in two areas: first, chronology of each disorder, beginning with the events leading to the outbreak, through the development in its various stages, to the resolution and aftermath; second, the factors responsible for the tension leading to disorder, including grievances in the Negro community, and the responses of officials. A national perspective, as well as evidence of specific events, was obtained.

The second major investigative effort went into the development of the riot profiles, a detailed study of 10 disorders. This study focused on an identification and classification of the key actors and critical points in the disorders. It took advantage of all the material developed by the field surveys, but also conducted independent investigations.

To insure absolute accuracy each riot profile was thoroughly reviewed by the General Counsel and his staff. All statements that were not substantiated by sworn testimony, or by well-known facts, were isolated, and potential verifying witnesses identified.

Attorneys from the General Counsel's staff subpoenaed these witnesses for depositions and, in a series of city visits, obtained nearly 1,500 pages of sworn testimony from 90 witnesses to validate all material assertions in the Riot Profiles.

The third major investigative effort sought to determine to
what extent, if any, there was planning or organization in the riots. The methodology of this investigation is set out in the chapter on organized activity. Depositions and interviews conducted in connection with the General Counsel's office augmented this investigation.

A number of other specialized studies were conducted during preparation of the Report or have been contracted to outside consultants for later completion. These studies include, for example, an analysis of three disorders that took place in university settings, a comprehensive study of riot arrestees in over 20 disturbances occurring over the past 3 years, and a computer examination of the effectiveness of police-community relations programs.

In addition, the Commission has undertaken two major surveys of Negro and white attitudes with the aid of the Ford Foundation. The first, a survey of white and Negro attitudes in 15 major cities and four suburban areas, is being conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The second, under the direction of Prof. Peter Rossi and Prof. James Coleman, Johns Hopkins University, is a continuation of the Commission's field effort—a special survey of attitudes of community leaders, elected officials, administrators, policemen, neighborhood leaders, and teachers. The Commission is deeply indebted to the Ford Foundation for its assistance and support.

Analytical Studies

To describe and explain the disorders and to identify operative factors during the period of disorder, the data collected and compiled by field investigators were analyzed by staff social scientists and consultants. The analysis concentrated on collective behavior, leadership structures, the bargaining process operating in the disorders, and the causative factors of the disorders. Detailed analyses of selected cities, and a comprehensive analysis of all disorders studies, were prepared.

The data obtained from the field investigations was further analyzed by the staff and consultants in preparing the chapter on patterns of disorder. Results obtained from a special survey based on probability samples of residents in Detroit and Newark augmented this analysis. A methodology for this survey is set out in the chapter.

In cooperation with the Bureau of the Census, the staff developed socioeconomic profiles for each of the 23 cities studied by the Commission. Primarily based upon 1960 census information, these profiles included statistics on total population, age distribution, education, size of households, income, employment, type of employment, and housing. Separate information on white and nonwhite population was developed for the city studied, the standard metropolitan statistical area containing the city, and the census tracts within the city where the disturbance took place. Whenever possible, census data was updated by more recent information.

Program Studies

The remaining staff and consultant efforts focused on the major substantive problem areas delineated in the President's charge to the Commission.

The chapter on the police and the community was the product of a joint effort of the staff and a large number of consultants and advisers. Initially, a number of academic experts, including many who had served as staff members, consultants or advisors to the Crime Commission, submitted original papers analyzing a variety of problems in police-community relations.

The chapter on control of disorder contains a distillation of some of the extensive material in the control supplement, but with special emphasis on the means by which police—and public officials—can control incidents or disorders in their early stages. A summary of the methodology is contained in a footnote to the chapter.

For the control chapter and supplement, the basic data on police departments was obtained from a survey of 28 city and two state police departments conducted for the Commission by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The survey information, which was obtained from interviews conducted by experienced police personnel, was analyzed by the IACP staff, and a report prepared assessing the state of preparedness and control capabilities of these police departments. The survey and report also covered police-community relations programs and training, information on policy guidelines, and data on Negro personnel in police departments.

A 2-day conference attended by police officials from several leading departments was held for the purpose of reviewing the lessons learned by police as a result of recent disorders. A National Guard commander also participated in discussions relating to police-Guard coordination and operations. A transcript of the conference was prepared to permit full review of the proceedings.

The basic sources of data on the National Guard were:

- After action reports from a number of cities where Guard troops aided in control of disorders; the report on Detroit prepared by Cyrus R. Vance, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense during the 1967 disorder, extensive information on the National Guard furnished by the National Guard Bureau and the Department of the Army; information from Commission investigations, analyses, riot profiles, and hearings; and information furnished by consultants and advisers.

- In August 1967, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives established a special subcommittee to inquire into the capability of the National Guard to cope with civil disturbances. The report and hearings of this subcommittee served as a valuable source of information on the Guard.

- An experienced Guard commander, who also served as a police commissioner, was retained as a consultant on National Guard matters. He, assisted by the staff, reviewed the information from the above sources, and submitted a report based upon this information and his own experience.

- Information about the Army was primarily supplied by the Department of Defense. Additional information was obtained from the Vance report on Detroit, and from Commission hearings.

- Information concerning fire department problems, and suggested recommendations, were primarily obtained from reports prepared by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and by the Chief of the New York Fire Department. Additional information was obtained from reports prepared by fire department observers at several disorders.

- Reports were prepared for the Commission by the Public Administration Service (PAS) of Chicago, Illinois (an organization that also developed information on coordination of police services for the Crime Commission) on intricacy and interjurisdictional coordinated planning at a horizontal level. In preparing these reports, PAS used information from the IACP survey of police departments as well as from its own resources. The Department of Justice furnished information concerning Federal-state planning.

- Information on youth groups was obtained from the Commission hearings.

- Information concerning police department problems, and suggested recommendations, were primarily obtained from reports prepared by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and by the Chief of the New York Fire Department. Additional information was obtained from reports prepared by fire department observers at several disorders.

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- Information on youth groups was obtained from the Commission hearings.

mission field investigations, and from a study prepared for the Commission by the administration of justice unit of the University Research Corp.

Basic information for the section on legal needs was obtained from the IACP survey, from a report prepared for the Commission by the National League of Cities, Washington, D.C., and from the Department of Justice studies. Information from Commission investigations and hearings was also relied upon.

Staff members prepared the initial drafts of the public safety sections using the above information. All or selected parts of these drafts were then submitted to a number of advisers for critical comment in order to ensure not only accuracy, but also full coverage of the subjects under investigation.

The methodology for the media chapter, including the special study of television broadcasting and newspaper stories of the riots, is described in the chapter itself.

Preparation of the remaining portions of parts II and III of the Report drew on the resources of the Commission, the staff, consultants, and advisers. Preliminary drafts were generally prepared based on outlines approved by the Commission and on readily available information. As the drafts progressed through the many revisions leading to a final product, data from the field investigations, hearings and special studies were gradually incorporated. Drafts were circulated among Commission members, other staff members, and consultants for comment. Advisers submitted new ideas and information, and critical commentary. Also at this stage new data received from a variety of outside studies concerning the disorders were fed into the drafts. Finally, after thorough review and reworking by the members of the Commission, who spent 24 days in full Commission meetings reviewing, discussing and revising the drafts, the final versions were completed.

In addition to the foregoing, two special advisory panels were formed by the Commission. On August 10, 1967, the President, after consulting with the Commission, appointed a separate and expert group, the National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, to deal with the insurance problems of urban core residents and businessmen.

The report of the Panel, “Meeting the Insurance Crisis of Our Cities,” was separately published in January, 1968.

A second panel, the Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise, was formed under the chairmanship of Commissioner Thornton. The primary purpose of the Panel was “to assist the Commission and staff in formulating recommendations for increasing employment opportunities.” The members of the Panel included leading businessmen and academic experts. The full text of the Panel’s report is attached as Appendix H.

Acknowledgments

Members of our investigative and research staff received cooperation from numerous persons who gave freely of their time and advice. Individuals are too numerous to mention, but we would like to thank generally the city officials, both elected and appointed, in the cities we visited. State and county officials throughout the country also cooperated with us, as did people throughout the Federal Government.

Remington Arms Company, Inc. and the Winchester-Western Division of Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation also arranged for an independent study by Stanford Research Institute on the role of firearms in disorders, to be released by May 1, 1968.
Footnotes: Chapter Two

Note: In many of these footnotes where a series of disorders is mentioned we have indicated the number of disturbances which have been classified as "major," "serious" or "minor" in the section on "Levels of Violence and Damage" in chapter 2-1, supra.

1. Five sources for our compilation were: Department of Justice, Criminal Division; Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis University; and Congressional Quarterly, September 8, 1967.

2. The following listed:
   - Buffalo, N.Y.
   - Cincinnati, Ohio (June)
   - Detroit, Mich.
   - Milwaukee, Wis.
   - Minneapolis, Minn.
   - Newark, N.J.
   - Plainfield, N.J.
   - Tampa, Fla. (June)

3. The following listed:
   - Albany, N.Y.
   - Atlanta, Ga. (June)
   - Birmingham, Ala.
   - Boston, Mass.
   - Cairo, Ill.
   - Cambridge, Md. (July)
   - Cincinnati, Ohio (July 3–5)
   - Dayton, Ohio (June)
   - Flint, Mich.
   - Fresno, Calif.
   - Grand Rapids, Mich.
   - Houston, Texas (May)
   - Jackson, Miss.
   - Montclair, N.J.
   - Nashville, Tenn.
   - New Haven, Conn.
   - New York, N.Y. (Bronx and East Harlem)
   - Omaha, Nebr.
   - Paterson, N.J.
   - Phoenix, Ariz.
   - Pontiac, Mich.
   - Portland, Ore.
   - Riviera Beach, Fla.

Rochester, N.Y. (July)
Saginaw, Mich.
San Francisco, Calif.
   (May 14–15, July)
Syracuse, N.Y.
Toledo, Ohio
Waterloo, Iowa
Wichita, Kan. (August)
Wilmington, Del.

4. The following listed:
   - Alton, Ill.
   - Asbury Park, N.J.
   - Atlanta, Ga. (July)
   - Aurora, Ill.
   - Bridgeport, Conn.
   - Bridgeston, N.J.
   - Cambridge, Md. (June)
   - Chicago, Ill. (4 disorders)
   - Cincinnati, Ohio (July 27)
   - Clearwater, Fla.
   - Cleveland, Ohio (2 disorders)
   - Columbus, Ohio
   - Dayton, Ohio (September)
   - Deerfield Beach, Fla. (2 disorders)
   - Denver, Colo. (2 disorders)
   - Des Moines, Iowa (2 disorders)
   - Durham, N.C.
   - East Orange, N.J. (2 disorders)
   - East Palo Alto, Calif.
   - East St. Louis, Ill. (2 disorders)
   - Elgin, Ill. (2 disorders)
   - Elizabeth, N.J.
   - Englewood, N.J.
   - Erie, Pa. (2 disorders)
   - Greensboro, N.C.
   - Hamilton, Ohio
   - Hammond, La.
   - Hartford, Conn. (3 disorders)

Houston, Texas (July, August)
Irvington, N.J.
Jackson, Mich.
Jamesburg, N.J.
Jersey City, N.J.
Kalamazoo, Mich.
Kansas City, Mo.
Lackawanna, N.Y.
Lakeland, Fla.
Lansing, Mich.
Lima, Ohio
Long Beach, Calif.
Lorain, Ohio
Los Angeles, Calif.
Louisville, Ky.
Marin City, Calif.
Massillon, Ohio
Maywood, Ill. (2 disorders)
Middletown, Ohio
Mt. Clemens, Mich.
Mt. Vernon, N.Y.
Muskegon, Mich.
New Britain, Conn.
New Brunswick, N.J.
Newburgh, N.Y.
New Castle, Pa.
New London, Conn.
New Rochelle, N.Y.
New York, N.Y. (Fifth Avenue and 2 Brooklyn disorders)
Niagara Falls, N.Y.
Nyack, N.Y. (2 disorders)
Oakland, Calif.
Orange, N.J.
Pasadena, Calif.
Passaic, N.J.
Poughkeepsie, N.Y.
Peoria, Ill.
Philadelphia, Pa. (3 disorders)
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Poughkeepsie, N.Y.
Prattville, Ala.
Rockford, Ill. (2 disorders)
Sacramento, Calif.
St. Louis, Mo.
St. Paul, Minn.
St. Petersburg, Fla.
San Bernardino, Calif.
San Diego, Calif.
Sandusky, Ohio
San Francisco, Calif. (May 21)
Tampa, Fla. (July)
Texarkana, Ark.
Tucson, Ariz.
Vallejo, Calif. (2 disorders)
Wadesboro, N.C.
Washington, D.C.
Waterbury, Conn.
Waukegan, Ill.
West Palm Beach, Fla.
Wichita, Kans. (May and July)
Wyandanch, N.Y.
Youngstown, Ohio
Ypsilanti, Mich.
Cincinnati, Hartford, Houston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Wichita.
Two: Atlanta, Cambridge, Cleveland, Dayton, Deerfield Beach, Denver, Des Moines, East Orange, East St. Louis, Elgin, Erie, Maywood, Nyack, Rochester, Rockford, Tampa, and Vallejo.
6. Cleveland and Rochester.
7. Disorders were counted in the month in which they began. Thus the Omaha disorder, for example, which began on March 31 and ended on April 2, was counted in the March total.
January: Chicago.
March: Omaha.
April: Cleveland, Louisville, Massillon, and Nashville.
May: Two in Chicago, Houston, Jackson (Miss.), Philadelphia, Rochester, San Diego, two in San Francisco, Vallejo, and Wichita.
June: Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Clearwater, Dayton, Lansing, Los Angeles, Maywood, Middletown, Niagara Falls, Philadelphia, Prattville, St. Petersburg, and Tampa.
September: Aurora, Columbus, Dayton, Deerfield Beach, East St. Louis, Hartford (2), New London, New York, Nyack, and Texarkana.
Midwest: Alton, Aurora, Benton Harbor, Cairo, Chicago (4), Cleveland (2), Cincinnati (3), Columbus, Dayton (2), Des Moines (2), Detroit, East St. Louis (2), Elgin (2), Flint, Grand Rapids, Hamilton, Jackson (Mich.), Kalamazoo, Kansas City, Lansing, Lima, Lorain, Massillon, Maywood (2), Middletown, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Mt. Clemens, Muskegon, Omaha, Peoria, Pontiac, Rockford (2), Saginaw, St. Louis, St. Paul, Sandusky, South Bend, Springfield, Toledo, Waterloo, Waukegan, Wichita (3), Youngstown, and Ypsilanti.
South and border States: Atlanta (2), Birmingham, Cambridge (2), Clearwater, Deerfield Beach (2), Durham, Greensboro, Hammond, Houston (3), Jackson (Miss.), Lakeland, Louisville, Nashville, Prattville, Riviera Beach, St. Petersburg, Tampa (2), Texarkana, Wadesboro, West Palm Beach, and Washington.
Detroit: Kalamazoo, Pontiac, Toledo, Flint, Grand Rapids, Muskegon, Saginaw, and Mt. Clemens.
The causal relationship between the Detroit and Newark riots and the disorders in their respective clusters is considered under Precipitating Incidents in part II of this chapter.
The other 21 clusters, arranged by the month in which each cluster began, were:
April:
Cleveland, Massillon.
Nashville, Louisville.
May: San Francisco, Vallejo.
June:
Cincinnati, Dayton, Middletown.
Buffalo, Niagara Falls.
Clearwater, Tampa, St. Petersburg.
July:
Tampa, Deerfield Beach, Lakeland, Riviera Beach, West Palm Beach.
Greensboro, Durham, Wadesboro.
Bronx, East Harlem, New York 5th Avenue, Mt. Vernon, Brooklyn, Peekskill, Lackawanna, Newburgh, Passaic, Poughkeepsie, New Rochelle, New Britain, Bridgeport, Waterbury.
Rochester, Albany.
Philadelphia, Wilmington.
Des Moines, Waterloo, Des Moines.
Minneapolis, St. Paul.
Youngstown, Lima, Cleveland.
Lorain, Springfield, Cincinnati, Hamilton, Sandusky.
Waukegan, Chicago, South Bend, Elgin, Rockford, Peoria.
Tucson, Phoenix.
Sacramento, San Francisco, Oakland.
East Palo Alto, Long Beach, San Bernardino, Pasadena.
September: Dayton, Columbus.

10. This table is based upon the estimated 1967 population of the 128 cities except for New York and Hartford, for which 1966 estimates were used, and 15 cities for which 1960 census figures were used (Deerfield Beach, East Orange, Englewood, Irvington, Lackawanna, Maywood, Montclair, Orange, Pravtive, Rahway, Riviera Beach, Seafield, Spring Valley, Wadesboro, and Waterloo).

11. Figures were unavailable for four communities (East Palo Alto, Jamesburg, Marin City, and Wyandanch).


More recent data indicate that there were 23 riot-related deaths in Newark rather than 25 as reported by the subcommittee. There are similar variations for some cities with regard to the number injured. In addition, Atlanta, in which there was one death and at least nine injuries, was not included in the subcommittee's list. Finally, two of the disturbances included in the subcommittee's figures are not in our list of 164 disorders (Hattiesburg, Miss.—no deaths, five injuries; Montgomery, Ala.—no deaths, no injuries.)

13. In 12 (16 percent) of the disturbances studied by the Permanent Subcommittee there were deaths. Fifty-eight (82 percent) of the deaths and 1,049 (55 percent) of the injuries occurred in two (3 percent) of the disturbances.

According to figures of the Permanent Subcommittee, Detroit experienced 43 deaths and 324 injuries; Newark experienced 25 deaths and 725 injuries.

In six (8 percent) of the disturbances, there were one to four deaths and 11 to 65 injuries reported.

### Deaths and Injuries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Rapids</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartford</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York (July 24 to Aug. 3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York (July 29-31)</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providence</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco (May 14-15)</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco (July 26-31)</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampa</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wichita</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilmington</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deaths</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Injuries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 31 (41 percent) of the disturbances, there were no deaths and from 1 to 10 injuries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati (July 3-4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati (July 22-28)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Englewood</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erie (July 24-Aug. 3)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresno</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greensboro</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hattiesburg</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamiucus</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Beach</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalamazoo</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massillon</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Vernon</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Britain</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Haven</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passaic</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearis</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poughkeepsie</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockford</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saginaw</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bernadino</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Bend</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syracuse</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterbury</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Palm Beach</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This figure represents only injuries to "law officers." No figure was reported for injuries to civilians.

In 17 (23 percent) of the disturbances, there were no injuries and no deaths reported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>Montgomery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Mt. Clemens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayton (6/14-15)</td>
<td>Omaha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elgin</td>
<td>Paterson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flint</td>
<td>Peckskill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston (8/15-17)</td>
<td>Riviera Beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>Washington</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>Wyandanch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louisville</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

14. Atlanta

15. The Detroit Fire Department has listed 682 riot-connected building fires. Of these, 412 buildings were completely demolished. The Cincinnati Fire Department has estimated over $1 million in damage from riot-connected fires during the June disturbance.

16. Of 250 fires during a 6-day period, only 13 were considered serious by Newark authorities. In no case did a fire spread from its original source to other areas.
Damage to glass, fixtures, and buildings was estimated at $1,976,140.

17. On Aug. 15, 1967, it was reported that the state insurance commission estimated the property loss at $144 million and that the Detroit Fire Department's estimate was closer to $200 million, only $84 million of which was insured. A December 1967 estimate by the State insurance commission was between $40 million and $45 million. The insurance commission indicated that almost $33 million will be covered by insurance.

18. The City of Detroit incurred over $5 million in extraordinary expenses, more than $5 million of which was for personnel costs. In Cincinnati, a disorder of 1 week cost three city departments more than $300,000 in extraordinary expenditures, principally for overtime for police and firemen.

19. In Detroit at least 274 families were displaced by the destruction of their homes.

20. Seventy-four (89 percent) of the persons reported killed were civilians. The person killed in Atlanta was also a civilian. Of the 1,897 persons reported injured, 1,185 (62 percent) were civilians and 712 (38 percent) were public officials. There is evidence that many additional injuries to civilians were not reported to officials.

21. Cincinnati New Haven
Dayton Paterson
Englewood Plainfield
Newark Tampa
New Brunswick

22. The New Jersey Commission said:
"The damage caused within a few hours early Sunday morning, July 16, to a large number of stores marked with "Soul" signs to depict nonwhite ownership and located in a limited area reflects a pattern of police action for which there is no possible justification. Testimony strongly suggests that state police elements were mainly responsible with some participation by National Guardsmen."


23. In at least three of the cities (Detroit, Newark, and Plainfield) there was damage to police and/or fire stations. In Cambridge, a public elementary school building was burned. In two of the university settings, school buildings were damaged. There was extensive damage to two dormitories at Texas Southern University in Houston. The bulk of this damage was allegedly caused by police gunfire and subsequent searches of the buildings. At privately owned Fisk University in Nashville, a plate glass door was broken. It is unclear whether this was done by police or students.

Other types of property damage included private cars, buses, and delivery trucks in at least 11 of the 23 cities studied.

Cambridge Newark
Cincinnati Phoenix
Dayton Plainfield
Grand Rapids Tampa
Jersey City Tucson
New Haven

26. The 20 cities were Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cambridge, Cincinnati (the June disorder), Dayton (the June and September disorders), Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson.

The three university settings were Houston, Tex. (Texas Southern University), Jackson, Miss. (Jackson State College), and Nashville, Tenn. (Fisk University and Tennessee A. & I. State College).

See Statement on Methodology, appendix, for a description of our survey procedures.

27. See part IV, The Background of Disorder, infra; and pt. III, The Riot Participant, infra.

28. A final incident was identifiable preceding all 24 surveyed disorders except Rockford. See sec. II, "The Development of Violence," infra, for the time and place of each final incident and the outbreak of violence.

29. In our surveys at least 88 prior incidents were identified by Negro interviewees as having been widely known and remembered at the time of the outbreak of violence, as having been a source or exemplification of grievances, and as having contributed to the disorders. The number of such prior precipitating incidents in a given city cannot be stated with certainty. Different sources recalled different events or stressed different aspects of a single event. However, we have been able to identify multiple incidents in most of the cities surveyed. Such incidents were reported in all except two cities (Elizabeth and Tucson; both minor).

At least 10 prior incidents were identified in Houston (serious); seven in Bridgeton (minor); six in Atlanta, Milwaukee and Nashville (one major, two serious); five in Cincinnati, Newark, and Plainfield (all major); four in Cambridge and the June and September Dayton disorders (two serious, one minor); three in Detroit, Jersey City, New Haven, and Phoenix (one major, two serious, and one minor); two in Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jackson, New Brunswick, Paterson, Rockford, and Tampa (one major, three serious, and three minor).

Twenty-eight prior incidents occurred within a week preceding violence, nine occurred 1 month to 1 week prior, 36 occurred 6 months to 1 month prior, 11 occurred 1 year to 6 months prior to the violence. One year was used as an arbitrary time limit for counting incidents except when the incident was identified as particularly significant to the disorder in that city. Four such incidents were identified: In Newark (the 1965 shooting of a Negro by police), in Jersey City (a disturbance in 1964), in Englewood (a 1962 disturbance), and in Cambridge (racial tensions necessitating the presence of National Guardsmen from 1963 to 1965).

30. See the section on "Grievances" in part IV, infra.

31. Such actions were identified as prior incidents in 35 cases preceding 18 disturbances (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, the June and September Dayton disturbances, Detroit, Englewood, Houston, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, and Tampa; six major, six serious, and six minor).
The percentages used for the frequency of the occurrence of type of incidents total more than 100 percent since a few incidents fell into more than one category.

32. Thirty-two incidents preceding all 18 disorders fit this pattern. Responses to a larger group constituted four incidents, all involving groups of demonstrators (Cincinnati, Nashville, and twice in Houston; one major and two serious).

33. Bridgeton, Cambridge, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Milwaukee, Nashville, Newark, Phoenix, Tampa, and Tucson (four major, six serious, and two minor).

34. The two exceptions were Cambridge and Houston (both serious). The incident in Cambridge occurred when police fired at a group of Negroes leaving a protest meeting, and in Houston when they arrested a Negro trying to address a group of demonstrators.

35. This was the case in 15 instances preceding nine disorders (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cambridge, Houston, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Haven, Newark, and Phoenix; two major, six serious, and one minor).

36. This occurred in five cases preceding four disorders (Cambridge, the June Dayton disturbance, Houston, and Nashville; all serious).

37. Atlanta and the June Dayton disturbance (both serious) featured nationally known militants. Cincinnati, the September Dayton disturbance, and Plainfield (two major and one minor) involved only local leaders.

38. Atlanta, Cincinnati, and the September Dayton disturbance (one major, one serious, and one minor).

39. The June Dayton and Plainfield disturbances (both serious).

40. This occurred in 15 cases preceding nine disturbances (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cambridge, the June Dayton disorder, Detroit, Jackson, Milwaukee, Nashville, and Tampa; three major, five serious, one minor).

41. Atlanta, the June and September Dayton disturbances, Detroit, Englewood, Jersey City, and Paterson (one major, three serious, and three minor). The previous disorder counted in Detroit was the “Kercheval incident” in August of 1966 mentioned in the text of this section, and not the 1943 Detroit riot. In Dayton, the June 1967 disorder was counted as a prior incident in relation to the September disorder.

42. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jersey City, Milwaukee, and Plainfield (three major, three serious, and one minor).

43. The Newark disorder was specifically identified as a prior incident in Bridgeton and Plainfield (one major and one minor). The Detroit riot was so identified in Grand Rapids and Phoenix (both serious).

44. Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, New Brunswick, and Paterson (one serious and four minor).

See part I of this Chapter for a discussion of the patterns of the disorders in terms of timing and geographic distribution. The impact of communications media on the propagation of disorders is discussed in Chapter 16.

45. This was the case in nine or more instances preceding six disturbances (Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Jackson, Milwaukee, Newark, and Plainfield; four major, one serious, and one minor). The initial refusal to fund or the cancellation of funding by officials responsible for federally financed antipoverty programs was included in this category. There were three cases preceding three disturbances (the June Dayton disorder, New Haven, and Phoenix; all serious).

46. This was the case in eight instances preceding eight disorders (Cambridge, Cincinnati, the September Dayton disorder, Detroit, Houston, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, and Paterson; three major, three serious, and two minor).

47. This incident was not included in the category of racist activities, since the shooting apparently was not motivated entirely by the victim’s ethnic origin.

48. Bridgeton, Detroit, Houston, Milwaukee, Nashville, Newark, and Tampa (four major, two serious, and one minor).

49. Atlanta, Cincinnati, and the September Dayton disturbance (one major and two serious).

Meetings to protest actions involved in prior incidents on the part of city officials other than the police were identified as the final incident preceding two disorders (the June Dayton disturbance and Plainfield; one major and one serious).

50. This is readily apparent from the charts annexed to these footnotes at page 359. The charts portray graphically the varying levels of violence during the period of each of the 24 surveyed disorders.

51. All except Bridgeton, Cambridge, Elizabeth, Jersey City, New Brunswick, and New Haven (two serious and four minor disturbances). In eight of the 18 cases the estimated size of the groups ranged from 50 to 100 (the September Dayton disorder, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Paterson, Phoenix, and Plainfield; two major, five serious, and one minor); in six cases from 100 to 200 (Cincinnati, the June Dayton disorder, Englewood, Nashville, Rockford, and Tucson; one major, two serious, and three minor); and in six cases from 200 to 1,000 (Atlanta, Houston, Jackson, Milwaukee, Newark, and Tampa; three major and three serious).

52. Detroit, Englewood, Milwaukee, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson (four major, three serious, and three minor). Seven disorders began on Monday (Atlanta, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, and New Brunswick; one major, three serious, and three minor). Three began on Tuesday (the September Dayton disturbance, Houston, and Phoenix; two serious and one minor), three on Wednesday (the June Dayton disturbance, Jackson, and Newark; one major and two serious), and one Thursday (Bridgeton; minor).

53. Eighteen disorders for which temperature information was available occurred at the end of a day in which the temperature had reached a high of at least 79 degrees. In nine cases the temperature had reached 90 degrees or more during the day (Atlanta, Cambridge, Cincinnati, the June Dayton disturbance, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Tampa, and Tucson; three major, five serious, and one minor). In eight cases the temperature had been in the 80’s (Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, New Brunswick, New Haven, and Rockford; one major, two serious, and five minor), and in one city the high temperature was 79 degrees (Milwaukee; a major disturbance).

54. See the annexed charts of levels of violence.

55. Ibid. Of New Haven’s six cycles of violence, one occurred during early daylight hours and one began and reached its peak during the afternoon. In Plainfield (major) substantial violence began during one afternoon and continued, through a midnight peak, into the following day and evening. In Grand Rapids (serious) two cycles of violence occurred within one 24-hour period, one continuing into daylight hours and the other beginning in the afternoon.

56. In three disorders this was the pattern (Atlanta, Cambridge, and Englewood; two serious and one minor). In a few cases these cycles were separated by one or more 24-hour periods in which little or no violence occurred, even during the first days of the disorder. Also see the charts annexed to this chapter.

57. Violence erupted within less than 30 minutes after the occurrence of the final incident in 11 disorders (Atlanta, Cincinnati, the June and September Dayton disturbances,
Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Milwaukee, Plainfield, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, five serious, and two minor.

In seven other disorders the violence erupted less than 2 hours after the occurrence of a final incident (Bridgeport, Cambridge, Detroit, Nashville, New Haven, Newark, and Phoenix; two major, four serious, and one minor).

The time span between the final incident and the beginning of violence is not easily established for the disturbances in the five New Jersey cities in which the final incidents were reports of disorders in neighboring cities (Elizabeth, Englewood, New Brunswick, Jersey City, and Paterson; one serious and four minor).

58. Violence in 11 disorders reached a peak for the first night, and in some cases an overall peak, in less than 1 hour after the initial outbreak (Atlanta, Bridgeport, the June and September Dayton disorders, Englewood, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, and Rockford; three major, five serious, and three minor). In four other disorders violence reached a first night peak in less than 2 hours (Jersey City, New Brunswick, Paterson, and Tampa; one major, one serious, and two minor), and in eight disorders violence reached a first night peak in less than 5 hours (Cambridge, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Phoenix, and Tucson; one major, five serious, and two minor). In one disturbance (Detroit; major), violence continued to escalate over a period of 12 to 15 hours after the initial outbreak.

59. See the annexed charts of levels of violence.

60. Ibid. All except the June and September Dayton disturbances, Elizabeth, Houston, and New Brunswick (two serious and three minor).

61. Bridgeport, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Nashville, Tampa, and Tucson (two major, five serious, and three minor).

62. Atlanta, Detroit, Jackson, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, and Rockford (three major, five serious, and one minor). See the section on "Control Effort," infra, for a further discussion of violence levels.

63. Of 34 reported occasions of rock and bottle-throwing, 26 occurred in the first two cycles of violence. Of 31 reported occasions of window-breaking, 24 occurred in the first two cycles. Also, see the annexed charts of levels of violence.

64. Of 30 reported occasions of looting, 20 occurred in the first two cycles and 28 in the first three cycles. Also, see the annexed charts of levels of violence.

65. Of 24 reported occasions of fire bombs and Molotov cocktails, 12 occurred in the first two cycles and 12 in the second two. Also, see the annexed charts of levels of violence.

66. Of 26 reported occasions of fires, 18 occurred in the second and third cycles and eight in the first and last.

67. Of 18 reported occasions, 13 occurred in the second and third cycles. Also, see the annexed charts of levels of violence.

68. In only four instances did local police request and receive assistance in the initial response from an outside force (Bridgeport, Cambridge, Englewood, and New Brunswick; one serious, and three minor). In the case of Cambridge, the outside forces consisted of National Guardsmen, state police, and the county sheriff and constable. In the other three cases, they consisted of the police of neighboring towns or county or both. Also, see the annexed charts of levels of violence.

69. In 10 of the 24 disorders, this was the case (Atlanta, both Dayton disorders, Elizabeth, Houston, Jersey City, Nashville, Paterson, Phoenix, and Tucson; six serious and four minor).

70. In a majority of cases for which we have such information, in 12 out of 22, the initial control force was either larger than the crowd on the street or no fewer than a ratio of one policeman to every five persons on the street (Bridgeport, Cambridge, both Dayton disorders, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Paterson, Phoenix, and Rockford; five serious and seven minor).

In one of these instances almost the entire police force of 900 men was moved in before a single rioter appeared on the streets (Jersey City; minor).

In the remaining 10 cases the ratio varied; from one policeman to every six persons on the street (New Haven; serious), to one policeman to 300 people on the street (Tampa; major). The median ratio in these 10 cases was one policeman to 25 persons on the street (Cincinnati, Detroit, Houston, Jackson, Nashville, Plainfield, and Tucson; four major, three serious, and one minor).

71. In at least one case, the police rushed at the crowd with nightsticks (Newark; major). In only one case was a shot fired by the police during the initial response, and in that case it was a single shot (Cambridge; serious).

72. Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Rockford, and Tucson (two major, three serious, and five minor).

In at least five of these cases, arrests were made (Englewood, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Paterson, and Tucson; one serious, and four minor).

73. Atlanta, Bridgeport, Cincinnati, Detroit, Elizabeth, Houston, Phoenix, and Tampa (three major, three serious, and two minor).

74. Detroit, Houston, Phoenix, and Tampa; two major and two serious.

75. Cambridge, both Dayton disturbances, Jackson, Nashville, and Plainfield (one major, four serious, and one minor).

76. See annexed charts of levels of violence. In at least 13 instances the initial control response appeared to fail, in this sense. The three control approaches, dispersal, reconnaissance, and containment, were almost equally represented in this group: six of these were cases of dispersal (Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, and Tucson; two major, two serious, and two minor); four cases of containment (Cambridge, both Dayton disorders and Jackson; three serious and one minor); and three were cases of reconnaissance (Detroit, Houston, and Tampa; two major and one serious).

77. If violence continued, or resumed after a pause, the second control response by local police (and, in the instances we have noted, by the outside forces which by then had arrived) again was one of the three categories of dispersal, reconnaissance, and containment. However, at this stage, dispersal was used in a slightly larger number of cases than at the stage of the initial response: 12 cases, two more than in the initial response (Atlanta, Bridgeport, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Detroit, Englewood, Milwaukee, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, and Rockford; four major, four serious, and four minor). Containment was also now used in a slightly larger number of cases than at the earlier stage: nine cases, one more than before (both Dayton disturbances, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Nashville, Phoenix, Plainfield, Tampa, and Tucson; two major, five serious, and two minor).

Reconnaissance, the most passive tactic and therefore understandably less tenable in the face of continued violence, was abandoned by half the forces which had used it initially but surprisingly was still employed by half: three forces (Cincinnati and Detroit, which turned to dispersal, and Tampa, which turned to containment; three major) abandoned reconnaissance for one of the other tactics, but reconnaissance was still used by three (Cambridge, Elizabeth, and Houston; two serious and one minor).

78. See footnote 22 to the section on "Levels of Violence and Damage" in part I of this chapter. See also the Profiles on Newark and Detroit in chapter I.
79. This combination occurred in at least seven cases, two during the initial response (Englewood and Plainfield; one major and one minor) and five during a subsequent response (Cincinnati, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Nashville, and New Haven; two major and three serious).

80. Atlanta, Detroit, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Milwaukee, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Phoenix, and Plainfield (four major, five serious, and two minor).

81. Cambridge, Nashville, Newark, and New Haven (one major and three serious).

82. One major and one serious.

83. Cincinnati, Detroit, Jackson, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, Phoenix, Rockford, and Tampa (five major, three serious, and one minor). In four of these nine disturbances (Detroit, Jackson, and, arguably, Phoenix and Rockford; one major, two serious and one minor) the entry of extra forces occurred after the first outbreak of violence. In four cities (Cincinnati, Newark, Plainfield, and Tampa; all major) extra forces were brought in after two outbreaks of violence. In one city (New Haven; serious) extra forces were brought in after three outbreaks of violence. See the annexed charts of levels of violence, and type and duration of law enforcement mobilization.

84. In all but two of these cities (Plainfield and, arguably, Rockford; one major and one minor) violence recurred thereafter on two occasions. In three cases (Cincinnati, Tampa, and Phoenix; two major and one serious) the subsequent violence was at lower levels than before the extra forces' arrival. But in the majority of cases (Detroit, Jackson, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield and Rockford; three major, two serious, and one minor) the intensity of violence recurring after the arrival of extra forces was equal to or greater than that of the earlier violence.

85. Bridgeton, Cambridge, Englewood and New Brunswick (one serious and three minor).

86. In one city (Englewood; minor) four outbreaks followed; in four cities (Bridgeton, Cambridge, Grand Rapids, and Jersey City; two serious and two minor) two outbreaks followed; and in one city (New Brunswick; minor) a single outbreak followed.

87. In three of the six cities (Bridgeton, Englewood, and Grand Rapids; one serious and two minor) the level of violence in one or more successive outbreaks was the same as or higher than that in the first outbreak of disorder. In three of these cities (Cambridge, Jersey City, and New Brunswick; one serious and two minor) the later outbreak or outbreaks was of lower intensity than the first or there was no further outbreak of violence.

88. Atlanta, both Dayton disorders, Elizabeth, Houston, Nashville, Paterson, and Tucson (five serious and three minor).

89. Two of these cities (Paterson and Tucson; one serious and one minor), had four outbreaks; one (Atlanta, serious) had three outbreaks; two (Elizabeth and Nashville; one serious and one minor), had two outbreaks; and three (both Dayton disorders and Houston; two serious and one minor), had one outbreak. Of the four cities which had multiple outbreaks, three (Atlanta, Paterson and Tucson; two serious and one minor), had subsequent outbreaks of violence at the same or a higher level of violence than the first outbreak.

90. There is evidence of a total of at least 68 such meetings in 21 of the 24 disturbances studied: only in three disorders (Cambridge, Milwaukee, and Rockford; one major, one serious, and one minor) is there no evidence of such meetings. The annexed charts include, on a horizontal line near the top, a depiction of such meetings through the period of disorder in the 21 cases.

91. In 17 of the 21 disturbances (excepting only Atlanta, Jackson, Jersey City and Paterson; three serious and one minor) the first meetings occurred either immediately before the disorder erupted or during the first or second day of disturbances.

92. Of the 16 disorders which had a duration of more than 2 days, the meetings also continued beyond that point in nine cases (Cincinnati, the Dayton June disturbance, Detroit, Englewood, Grand Rapids, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, and Tampa; five major, three serious, and one minor). In five of these nine cases (the Dayton June disturbance, Detroit, Englewood, Grand Rapids, and Tampa; two major, two serious, and one minor), the meetings also continued through the final 2 days of the disorders.

93. Of the 21 disturbances in which such meetings occurred, established Negro leaders participated in meetings in 18 (all except Englewood, Jackson, and Phoenix; two serious and one minor).

94. Eight out of 21. In three cases (Englewood, Jackson, and Phoenix; two serious and one minor), youths were the sole Negro participants in meetings with government officials.

95. Cincinnati, Nashville, New Brunswick, Plainfield, and Tampa (three major, one serious, and one minor). Of these five cases, the two elements of the Negro community attended meetings together in two disorders (Cincinnati and Plainfield; one major and one serious) and in the remaining three disorders they attended such meetings separately.

96. This was the case in five disorders (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Houston, Plainfield, and Phoenix; two major and three serious). In one of the five disorders (Phoenix; serious) the only meeting in which established Negro leadership participated was one with Negro youths. In the remaining four cases, established Negro leadership also met with government officials. In three of the five disorders, Negro youths also met with government officials (all except Atlanta and Houston; both serious).

97. This occurred in nine of the 21 disturbances in which such meetings took place (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, the Dayton June disturbance, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Newark, New Brunswick, and New Haven; one major, five serious, and three minor). Also involved were representatives of local human relations commissions (Bridgeton, Cincinnati, both Dayton disturbances, Elizabeth, Nashville, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, Tampa and Tucson; four major, three serious, and four minor); state community relations agencies (Jersey City, Newark, Plainfield, and Tampa; three major and one minor) and Federal agencies. In four cities (Cincinnati, Detroit, Jersey City, and Newark) three major and one minor) officials of the Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of Justice were participants in meetings.

98. Meetings during 19 of the 21 disorders followed this pattern (all except Houston and Tucson; one serious and one minor). In 13 cases the grievance related to the handling of the precipitating incident by the police (Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Jersey City, Nashville, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, and Phoenix; three major, six serious, and four minor).

99. Meetings during 12 of the 21 disorders followed this pattern (all except Atlanta, Bridgetown, the Dayton September disturbance, Detroit, Elizabeth, Nashville, Newark, New Haven, and Paterson; two major, four serious, and three minor).

In seven cases the preexisting grievances related to unemployment and underemployment (Cincinnati, the Dayton
June disturbance, Englewood, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Phoenix, and Tucson; one major, two serious, and four minor). In six cases they related to inadequate recreation facilities (the Dayton June disturbance, Englewood, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Plainfield, Tampa and Tucson; two major, one serious, and three minor).

100. This was the case in 10 of the 21 disorders in which meetings were held. In most of these cases (8 of 10), the earlier meetings or early stages of meetings focused on disorder-related grievances and the later meetings, or stages of meetings, focused on preexisting grievances (Cincinnati, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Jersey City, Phoenix, and Tampa; two major, four serious, and two minor). In only two cases (New Brunswick and Plainfield; one major and one minor), was the order of subjects reversed.

101. The only disorders in which counterrioters were not active were Bridgeton, Cambridge, the Dayton September disorder, Englewood, Milwaukee, and Rockford (one major, one serious, and four minor).

102. For a discussion of this study and the characteristics of those who so identified themselves, as compared with rioters, see part III, The Riot Participant, infra.

103. Cincinnati, the Dayton June disorder, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Houston, Nashville, Newark, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, Phoenix, Tampa, and Tucson (five major, seven serious, and three minor).

104. For example, in Cincinnati the police opposed official recognition of counterrioters, whereas in Detroit and Dayton there was close cooperation between police and counterrioters.

105. Nine of fifteen (Cincinnati, the Dayton June disorder, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, New Brunswick, Newark, Phoenix, and Tampa; four major, three serious, and two minor).

106. Houston, Nashville, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, and Tucson (one major, four serious, and one minor).

107. In Elizabeth and Newark the counterrioters wore armbands (one major and one minor).

108. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Jackson, Jersey City, and Newark (three major, two serious, and one minor).

109. Examples are: employees of city agencies (Detroit and Cincinnati; two major); ministers (Atlanta, Phoenix, and Tampa; one major and two serious); college students (Grand Rapids, Newark, Jackson, and Nashville; one major and three serious); civil rights leaders (Atlanta and Cincinnati; one major and one serious); young Negro militants (Phoenix, Jersey City, and New Haven; two serious and one minor); poverty workers (Atlanta, Phoenix, and Cincinnati; one major and two serious); and admitted former riot participants (Tampa; major).

110. Newark (major). In Paterson (serious) they held a block dance; in Phoenix (serious) they promised to make attempts to find jobs for rioters; in Jackson (serious) they kept nonstudents out of college dormitories; and in Atlanta (serious) they attempted to organize a youth corps patrol, similar to Dayton’s “White Hats.” Counterrioters used physical force to restrain rioters in two cities (Tampa and Nashville, one major and one serious). In neither case was the use of force officially authorized.

111. All four sources are subject to limitations, and we have, therefore, used each as a reliability check on the others. Eye-witness accounts are subject to retrospective distortion. Data on arrestees also involve built-in biases. The fact of arrest alone, without subsequent trial and conviction does not constitute evidence of the crime charged, and there has not been sufficient time for many of the 1967 riot arrestees to be brought to trial. Many of the the most active rioters may have escaped arrest, while many of the uninvolved, or even counterrioters, may have been arrested in the confusion. Finally, questions about riot activity in interview surveys may elicit overstatements of participation by some interviewees and understatements by others.

We are conducting a continuing study of arrest records in a number of cities which experienced disorders in 1967 and in some earlier years as well. So far we have studied the records of 13,788 persons arrested during disturbances in 22 cities in 1967. The recently published study of arrestees in Detroit, which was sponsored by the Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, involved interviews with 496 arrestees.

The Detroit and Newark surveys furnish the most comprehensive information on mass participation.

The Detroit survey data represent a reanalysis by Dr. Nathan S. Caplan and Jeffery M. Paige, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, of data collected during the 2 weeks following the disorder, in a study sponsored by the Detroit Urban League. The Newark study was conducted for the Commission by Dr. Caplan and Mr. Paige, approximately 6 months after the disorder.

The Detroit analysis is based on 393 interviews with Negroes aged 15 and over. The Newark data are based on 233 interviews with Negro males between the ages of 15 and 35. In both studies, the sampling area was determined by identifying the 1960 census tracts in which violence and damage occurred. Newspaper accounts were used to identify the location of riot damage, fires, and looting. In Detroit, the sample was drawn from two riot areas, the West Side and the East Side, including the following census tracts: 9–22, 26–28, 36–43, 115–123 and 152–188 (West Side); 759–778 and 789–793 (East Side). The Newark sample was drawn from an inner city area consisting of census tracts 12, 29–33, 38–40, 58–67 and 61–82.

A probability sample was drawn for both cities so that the probability of inclusion for any household in Detroit was approximately one-fiftieth and Newark one forty-fourth. Blocks were selected at random from within the specified census tracts and constituted the primary sampling unit for each study. In Detroit, lists of all dwellings in the selected blocks were prepared from a city directory. Every 15th address was identified and assigned to an interviewer. In Newark, segments of approximately 10 dwelling units were constructed by field enumeration of blocks selected at random and assigned to interviewers. Both studies used techniques described by Leslie Kish in *Survey Sampling*, New York, Wiley, 1965, ch. 9.

Each interviewer in Detroit was instructed to conduct interviews only at those dwelling units on his assignment sheet. Within households only Negroes were to be interviewed, and the interviewer was instructed to list all members of the household 13 years of age and older and then select every other one for interviewing. The interviewer was required to return twice if there was no answer to the initial call or if the respondent to be interviewed was not at home. This procedure yielded 437 interviews for 50 blocks, or 8.7 interviews per block.

In order to enlarge the sample of those who were likely to identify themselves as rioters, interviewers in Newark were told to interview only Negro males between the ages 15 and 35. They were instructed to interview all eligible respondents in each household. They were also required to return three times if there was no answer or if an eligible respondent was not at home. A total of 233 interviews were completed in 24 blocks, or 9.7 interviews per block.

In Detroit, 67.0 percent of all eligible respondents were interviewed; in Newark, 66.0 percent. While these response rates do not compare favorably with the usual 80–85 percent response rate in middle-class samples, they are comparable to the rates in other ghetto area studies. A Negro response rate of 71.0 percent was reported in another study.

In both surveys, questions were designed to permit comparisons of the characteristics and attitudes of those who (a) admitted active participation in rioting, referred to as "self-reported rioters:" (b) those who said they had sought to stop the rioting, the "counterrioters;" and (c) those who claimed not to have been involved, the "noninvolved." These classifications were based on the answers to two questions, one direct and one indirect. The indirect question asked how active the respondent had been during the riot, without specifying in particular what he had been doing. The second question, which appeared later in the questionnaire, asked whether the respondent had participated in various activities, such as trying to stop the riot, calling the fire department, or picking up goods and taking them home. Respondents were classified as "rioters" if they answered either that they were "active" or admitted one or more specific antisocial activities. They were classified as "counterrioters" if they said that they had stayed home and also claimed not to have been "active." If they said that they had stayed home and also claimed not to have participated; and another 15 to 20 percent who claimed to have watched from the front steps or sidewalks in front of their homes. For purposes of analysis all of the 393 respondents other than the self-reported rioters and counterrioters were treated as the "noninvolved." In the Newark survey, the entire sample of 233 was used, and those who refused to answer either of the classificatory questions were included in the "noninvolved."

112. In Detroit, 11.2 percent (44) of the 393 respondents identified themselves as rioters, 15.8 percent (62) as counterrioters, and the majority, 73 percent (287), as noninvolved. Bystanders included approximately 5 percent who admitted having gone into the riot area but claimed not to have participated; and another 15 to 20 percent who claimed to have watched from the front steps or sidewalks in front of their homes.

113. In the more detailed discussion which follows, only those characteristics of the counterrioters which differed from those of the noninvolved are highlighted.

114. Of 13,012 arrestees in 22 cities (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Houston, Jackson, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Nashville, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; six major, nine serious, and seven minor) 10,792 (82.9 percent) were Negroes, 1,967 (15.1 percent) were whites, 78 (0.6 percent) were Puerto Ricans, and 37 (0.3 percent) were of other races. The ethnic origin of 138 arrestees (1.1 percent) was unknown.

A study of 348 arrestees in Grand Rapids (serious) divided the disorder in that city into two time segments of 4 hours and 36 hours. During the first 4 hours of the disorder, 95 percent of the arrestees were Negroes. The proportion of Negro arrestees declined to 66 percent during the remaining 48 hours of the disorder. See "Anatomy of a Riot," United Community Services, Research Department, Grand Rapids and Kent County, Mich., 1967.

115. Age distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Arrest records</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (44)**</td>
<td>Nl (287)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 24</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 35</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 to 50</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p <0.001***

The Grand Rapids data indicate that during the first 4 hours of the disorder 82 percent of the arrestees were under 25 years of age. During the remaining 48 hours, the proportion of arrestees under 25 years of age declined to 58 percent. See "Anatomy of a Riot," op. cit.

116. Sex distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Arrest records</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (44)</td>
<td>Nl (287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<0.025

The Grand Rapids data indicate that during the first 4 hours of the disorders, 45 of the 46 persons arrested (98 percent) were males. During the remaining 48 hours of the disorder female arrestees increased, comprising 10 percent of a total of 274 adults.

117. Marital status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
<th>Detroit arrest study</th>
<th>Arrest records, 4 cities*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (105)</td>
<td>Nl (125)</td>
<td>A (496)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced/separated</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<0.010

* Atlanta, Cincinnati, New Brunswick, and Tucson (1 major, 1 serious, and 2 minor).
118. Family structure in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (49)</td>
<td>N1 (275) CR (91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult male present in family of upbringing:</td>
<td>R (106)</td>
<td>NI (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<0.50

119. Region of upbringing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (27)</td>
<td>N1 (104) CR (62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (106)</td>
<td>N1 (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South**</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North**</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*CR—Counter-rioters.
**In the Detroit survey respondents were asked directly if they were brought up in the North or South; in Newark, South was defined as Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and West Virginia.

120. Of 266 arrestees in five cities (Atlanta, New Brunswick, Plainfield, Tampa, and Tucson; two major, one serious, and two minor), 106 (40 percent) were born in the state in which the disorder occurred; 98 (37 percent) were born in the South (but not in the state in which the disorder occurred in the cases of Atlanta and Tampa; one major and one serious); and 23 (8 percent) were born elsewhere. The state of birth of 39 persons (15 percent) was undetermined. For purposes of the sample, the South was defined as Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and West Virginia.

121. The discrepancy between the percentages of the non-involved brought up in the North in Newark and Detroit (two major) is not significant since the Detroit sample includes more older people than the Newark sample. This difference does not affect the validity of the figures for youthful rioters.

122. Place of birth:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (43)</td>
<td>N1 (285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (127)</td>
<td>N1 (106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in riot city:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<0.001

123. Of 3,395 arrestees in 15 cities (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Dayton, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Jersey City, New Brunswick, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa and Tucson; three major, seven serious, and five minor), 3,054 (90 percent) resided in the city in which the disorder occurred, 228 (7 percent) resided in the State in which the disorder occurred, and 48 (1 percent) resided elsewhere. The residence of 65 persons (2 percent) was undetermined.

124. Income level:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (44)</td>
<td>N1 (287) CR (62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (104)</td>
<td>N1 (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual income*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2,000</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 to 5,000</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 to 7,500</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,500 to 10,000</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 to 12,500</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 12,500</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<0.50

*Annual income for Detroit based on individual income, for Newark on family income.
**All self-reported counterrioters with incomes under $5,000 were female.

125. See the section on “The Pattern of Disadvantage” in pt. IV of this chapter.

126. Educational level:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R(43) N(272) CR(59)</td>
<td>R(106) N(126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than grade 1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 5 years</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated college</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<0.06

127. Employment status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R(27) N(127)</td>
<td>R(310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently employed:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<0.50

*Men only.
**Excludes students.
***Atlanta, Cincinnati, New Brunswick, and Tampa (two major, one serious, and one minor).
128. Underemployment in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R(104)</th>
<th>NI(124)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[In percent]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you been unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as long as a month during</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the last year?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.05

129. Occupational level in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>R(125)</th>
<th>NI(126)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[In percent]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled or better</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.06

130. Job aspiration in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R (82)</th>
<th>NI (99)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[In percent]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel your job is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appropriate considering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the education you have?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present job is about</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>right?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should have job with</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more income and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsibility?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.05

131. Perceived job opportunity in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived opportunity</th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>NI (126)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[In percent]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is possible to obtain</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>desired job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is not possible to</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obtain desired job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.06

132. Perceived obstacles to employment in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>R (71)</th>
<th>NI (68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[In percent]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of training</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of experience</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.025

133. Ability and success in Detroit survey:

| Is getting what you want |
| out of life a matter of |
| ability or being in the |
| right place?             |        |         |
| Ability                  | 76.9   | 76.1    |
| Right place              | 23.1   | 23.9    |
| Total                    | 100.0  | 100.0   |

R-NI p < 0.90
CR-NI p < 0.05
R-CR p < 0.25

134. Racial consciousness:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>R(37)</th>
<th>NI(247)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who do you think are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more dependable?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroes</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newark survey</th>
<th>R(91)</th>
<th>NI(110)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who do you think are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nicer?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroes</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.001

135. Black consciousness in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>NI (126)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-description:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colored</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.025

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R (125)</th>
<th>NI (104)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Negroes should study African history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < 0.06
136. Anti-white attitudes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil rights groups which have white and Negro leaders would do better without whites:</th>
<th>R (36)</th>
<th>NI (245)</th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>NI (124)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ p < 0.1 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newark survey</th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>NI (124)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes I hate white people:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ p < 0.001 \]

137. Hostility toward middle-class Negroes in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negroes who make a lot of money like to think they are better than other Negroes:</th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>NI (126)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ p < 0.06 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negroes who make a lot of money are just as bad as whites:</th>
<th>R (105)</th>
<th>NI (122)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ p < 0.05 \]

138. Half the arrestees were charged with one or more of three offenses: breaking and entering, trespassing, or curfew violation.

Of 13,112 offenses charged against 12,457 persons in 19 cities (Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jackson, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; six major, six serious, and seven minor), 4,108 (31 percent) were charges of breaking and entering or trespassing and 2,506 (19 percent) were charges of curfew violation. The breakdown of charges by categories was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charges*</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breaking and entering or trespassing.</td>
<td>4,108</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew violation.</td>
<td>2,506</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary, larceny, robbery, or theft.</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace or resisting arrest, drunk or traffic violations.</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons charges.</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault.</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vagrancy, loitering, unlawful assembly, or suspicious conduct.</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcotics charges.</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile delinquency.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other charges.</td>
<td>1,196</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown.</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total.</td>
<td>13,112</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These arrest statistics should be interpreted with caution. Felony, misdemeanor and ordinance violation charges are combined. Later dispositions may change this distribution.

139. Political information in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification of political figures—Kenneth Gibson:</th>
<th>R (106)</th>
<th>NI (127)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ p < 0.025 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political information test:</th>
<th>R (106)</th>
<th>NI (112)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High score</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low score</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ p < 0.025 \]

140. Political involvement in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Negro rights discussion:</th>
<th>R(106)</th>
<th>NI(126)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nearly every day</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From time to time</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ p < 0.025 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attend meeting or participation in civil rights group:</th>
<th>R(89)</th>
<th>NI(113)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ p < 0.05 \]
141. Trust of the Government in Newark survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R(105)</th>
<th>N(127)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How much do you think you can trust the Newark government to do what is right?</td>
<td>[in percent]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just about always</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( p < 0.10 \)

142. Political grievances in Detroit survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R (44)</th>
<th>N (286)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How much did anger with politicians have to do with causing riot?</td>
<td>[in percent]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great deal</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( p < .05 \)

143. Perception of country as not worth fighting for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detroit survey</th>
<th>Newark survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R(38)</td>
<td>N(264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country worth fighting for in major world war</td>
<td>[in percent]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worth fighting</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not worth fighting</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-NI p < 0.005
CR-NI p < 0.05
R-CR p < 0.001

\( p < 0.001 \)

144. For purposes of this section the three university-related riots, in Houston, Jackson, and Nashville, have not been included.

145. See the discussion of grievances in relation to the riot process in pt. II of this chapter.

146. Our discussion relies heavily upon 1960 census data, which are always the most complete and usually the most recent data available. Nevertheless, 1960 statistics are outdated for describing American urban life in 1967 and consequently, we used more recent data wherever possible. For detailed 1960 census data on each of the 20 cities surveyed, see the tables annexed to these footnotes, pp. 348–58.

We have examined, for most purposes in this section, 20 of the 23 surveyed riot cities. Three cities (Houston, Jackson, and Nashville; three serious) were excluded because their disturbances were more directly campus-related than city-related.

In each of 17 cities, we have compared conditions in the riot area with conditions elsewhere in (1) the city as a whole, and (2) the metropolitan area of which the city is a part, including the suburban areas. In addition, we have sought to determine whether racial differences affect these comparisons. To do this, we have identified census tracts in which violence and damage occurred. This study of census tracts is limited to 17 cities because identification of the disturbance area for purposes of analysis was not possible for three cities (Bridgeport, Cambridge, and New Brunswick; one serious and two minor). They are not divided into census tracts.

We recognize that participants in the disorders did not necessarily live in the area of disorder. However, we have attempted to learn whether the disturbance areas have characteristics which set them apart from the cities and metropolitan areas in which the disturbance areas are situated.

The disturbance areas were primarily commercial areas in a part of the city having a high concentration of Negro residents. These were usually characterized by a number of retail or wholesale shops, often with residences above the shops and with residential areas immediately adjacent to the commercial streets. In two cities (Atlanta and Tucson; one serious and one minor) the disturbance area was primarily residential.

147. After studying 100 cities, the Department of Labor reached the same conclusion: "...Negroes living in non-poverty areas were not much better off than those in poverty areas; among whites, the differences were very sharp." (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Special Labor Force Report No. 75, "Poverty Areas of Our Major Cities," October, 1966, p. 1105.)

148. The Bureau of the Census categorizes citizens as white and nonwhite. Since 92 percent of the nonwhites in the United States are Negroes, we have used the terms "Negro" and "nonwhite" interchangeably throughout this section. The numbers compared in the section are medians for the 17 cities.

149. In eight cities, white population also increased in that period, however, it did so at a much lower rate. Only Englewood (minor) showed no change in white population during that period.

150. In 13 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Tucson, Rockford, and Tampa; five major, five serious, and three minor), including seven of the cities which experienced the most severe violence, the percentage of Negro population in the disturbance area was more than twice the percentage of Negro population in the entire city; in nine of the cities, the percentage of Negro population in the disturbance area was more than triple the citywide percentage.

151. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro population 24 years of age or younger in all 17 cities exceeded the percentage of whites in that age group. The percentage of Negro population 65 years of age or older, in all 17 cities except two (Phoenix and Tucson; one serious and one minor), was less than one-half the percentage of whites in that age group.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of Negro population 24 years of age or younger living in the disturbance area in approximately half the cities (Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield, and Tucson; three major, two serious, and three minor) exceeded the citywide percentage. The percentages were equal only in Tampa (major).

The differences we have seen are even greater when the age distribution among Negroes in the disturbance areas is com-
pared with the age distribution among whites in the standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA's).

MEDIAN AGE DISTRIBUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Disturbance areas</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>SMSA's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W. N.W.</td>
<td>W. N.W.</td>
<td>W. N.W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, under 25...</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 64........</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, under 25...</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 64........</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

152. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The number of median years of school completed by Negroes was less than the median number for whites in all 17 cities. In 13 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, five serious, and four minor) there was a difference of at least 1 year.

The percentage of Negro population over 25 years of age having 8 years or less of education in all 17 cities was greater than a year's difference) for Negroes in the disturbance area. In the remaining five cities the median rate was slightly higher (less than the median number for whites in all 17 cities. In 13 of the 17 cities: The median years completed by Negroes in the disturbance area and by Negroes in the city were equal. In the remaining five cities the median rate was slightly higher (less than a year's difference) for Negroes in the disturbance area. The difference between the median number of years completed was one-tenth of a year for the 17 cities. The percentage of Negro population in the disturbance area over 25 years of age having 8 years or less education was slightly greater than the citywide percentage in 11 of the 17 cities (Dayton, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, three serious, and four minor).

The differences we have seen are even greater when comparing the level of education of Negroes in the disturbance areas with that of whites in the SMSA's:

MEDIAN EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disturbance areas</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median years of school completed........</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 8 years of schooling (percent)...</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

153. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro males in the labor force in nine of 17 cities (Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Rockford, and Tampa; three major, two serious, and four minor) exceeded the percentage of white males. The proportion of Negro and white males employed or seeking employment was equal in Grand Rapids (serious).

The percentage of Negro females employed exceeded the percentage of white females in the labor force in all 17 cities.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of Negro males in the labor force in all except seven cities (Dayton, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Newark, Plainfield, and Tucson; two major, two serious, and three minor), exceeded the percentage of Negro males in the entire city in the labor force.

The percentage of Negro females in the labor force in the disturbance area, in all except 10 cities (Atlanta, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Paterson, Phoenix, and Plainfield; two major, five serious, and three minor), was larger than the percentage of Negro females in the entire city in the labor force.

The differences in the percentages of Negroes and whites in the labor force again can be seen to be small by comparing Negroes in the disturbance area with whites in the SMSA:

MEDIAN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disturbance areas</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male................</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female..............</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

154. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro male unemployment in all 20 cities was higher than the unemployment rate for white males. In 13 of 20 cities (Bridgeton, Cambridge, Cincinnati, Detroit, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Brunswick, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, Plainfield, and Rockford; four major, five serious, and four minor) the rate of unemployment for Negroes was more than twice the rate for whites.

The unemployment rate for Negro females was more than the rate for white females in all of 20 cities except Plainfield (major).

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The unemployment rate for Negro males in the disturbance area was slightly more than the Negro city-wide rate in 11 of 17 cities and slightly less in the remaining six (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Englewood, New Haven, and Paterson; two major, three serious, and one minor).

The unemployment area unemployment rate for Negro females equalled or exceeded the city-wide rate in seven 17 cities (Cincinnati, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, two serious, and one minor). The differences are even greater when the unemployment rate among Negroes in the disturbance areas is compared with the unemployment rate among whites in the SMSA's:

MEDIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disturbance areas</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
<th>W. N.W.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male................</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female..............</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More recent and complete data indicate that unemployment and underemployment of Negroes are even more serious than the 1960 census revealed.

The Bureau of the Census estimates that one out of every six Negro males between ages 20 and 39 was not counted in the 1960 census. Unemployment is likely to be common among the uncounted men.

The Department of Labor, in November 1966, surveyed 10 slum areas in eight cities and obtained slightly earlier unem-
ployment data for slums in four other cities. "A Sharper Look at Unemployment in U.S. Cities and Slums," a summary report submitted to the President by the Secretary of Labor. Two of these cities, Detroit and Phoenix (one major and one serious) were among the cities we surveyed.

The Department found, in the slum areas surveyed, that:

The unemployment rate was approximately three times the nationwide rate of 3.7 percent;

Six and nine-tenths percent of those listed as employed were working only part time although they were trying to find full-time work; the comparable figure for the Nation as a whole was 2.3 percent;

Twenty-one percent of those working full time were earning less than $60 a week; the comparable figure for the Nation as a whole was 15.4 percent;

One-third of the labor force was subemployed.

The Department of Labor included in its definition of subemployment (i) those unemployed in the sense that they are actively looking for work and unable to find it; (ii) those working only part time when they are trying to get full-time work; (iii) those heads of households under 65 who earn less than $60 per week working full time and those individuals under 65 who are not heads of households and earn less than $56 per week in a full-time job; (iv) half the number of "nonparticipants" (not in the labor force) in the male 20-64 age group; and (v) a conservative and carefully considered estimate of the male undercount.

155. Labor force participation increases as better job opportunities appear:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nonwhite labor force participation rate (%)</th>
<th>81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cities with least, moderate, and most opportunities for other than menial jobs.

156. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro male unskilled and service workers in 10 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Phoenix, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; three major, four serious, and three minor) was at least three times the rate of white men.

The percentage of Negro female unskilled and service workers in all but three of 17 cities (Englewood, Jersey City, and Milwaukee; one major and two minor) was at least three times the percentage of white females.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of Negro male unskilled and service workers in the disturbance areas in 11 of 17 cities (Dayton, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, Tucson, Plainfield, Rockford, and Tampa; three major, four serious, and four minor) slightly exceeded the percentage in the cities as a whole. The difference between the median of percentages in the disturbance areas and the median of percentages in the cities was 4.5 percent.

The percentage of Negro female unskilled and service workers in the disturbance areas in eight of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, New Haven, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, two serious, and two minor) was slightly smaller than the percentage of Negro female unskilled and service workers in the cities. The difference in 17 city medians was 3.6 percent.

The differences are even greater when comparing the percentage of Negro unskilled and service workers in the disturbance areas with whites in the SMSA's:

157. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The median income of Negroes in 17 cities was 69.5 percent of the median income of whites. The 1966 nationwide median income earned by Negroes was 58 percent of the median income earned by whites. ("Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States," Joint Report by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the Census, October 1967, p. 15.

The percentage of Negro families in poverty (having an annual income under $3,000) in 14 of 17 cities was twice the percentage of white families in poverty. In the other three cities (Englewood, Newark, and Paterson, one major, one serious, and one minor) the percentage was at least one and one-half the percentage of white families.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of the families below the poverty line was slightly higher in the disturbance areas in almost two-thirds of 17 cities (Dayton, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Phoenix, Plainfield, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, four serious, and three minor). The differences are even greater when comparing the income levels of Negroes in the disturbance areas with the income levels of whites in the SMSA's:

158. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro children under 18 living with both parents in all 17 cities was less than the percentage of white children that age similarly situated.

Comparing Negroes in the disturbance areas and Negroes in the cities: The percentage of Negro children under 18 living with both parents in the disturbance area was greater than the city-wide percentage in seven of 17 cities (Atlanta, Dayton, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Phoenix, Rockford, and Tucson; two major, three serious, and two minor). The differences are even greater when comparing the family status of Negroes in the disturbance areas and of whites in the SMSA's:
159. Family stability improves as family income rises:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nonwhite children under 18 living with both parents (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cities with lowest to highest median nonwhite family incomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

160. Comparing Negroes and whites in the cities: The percentage of Negro owner-occupied units in all 17 cities was lower than that of whites. In 10 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, and Tampa; five major, three serious and two minor) the proportion of white homeownership was at least one and one-half that of Negroes. In five of the 10 cities (Cincinnati, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, and Paterson; three major and two serious) the percentage of white homeownership was twice that of Negroes.

Although Negroes paid the same or slightly lower rents than did whites among nonhomeowners in 15 of 17 cities (all except New Haven and Paterson; two serious), they paid a higher proportion of income for rent than whites. Median rent as a proportion of median income in 11 of 13 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, and Tampa; six major, four serious, and one minor) was higher for Negroes than for whites. Negroes paid the same proportion as whites in Phoenix (serious) and a smaller proportion than whites in Englewood (minor).

The percentage of overcrowded Negro-occupied homes (homes with more than 1.01 persons per room) in all of the 17 cities except Tucson (minor) was twice the percentage of overcrowded white-occupied homes. In nine of those cities (Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Haven, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, and Tampa; three major, three serious, and three minor) the percentage of overcrowded Negro-occupied homes was three times the percentage of white homes.

The percentage of homes occupied by whites which were sound and had adequate plumbing facilities was 1/2 times the proportion of Negro-occupied homes which met those criteria, in 10 of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Phoenix, and Tucson; three major, four serious, and three minor).

Comparing Negro housing in the disturbance area and in the entire city: The percentage of Negro owner-occupied units in the disturbance area exceeded the Negro citywide percentage in only six of 17 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Jersey City, New Haven, Paterson, and Tucson; one major, three serious, and two minor). The citywide median for 17 cities was 3.8 percentage points higher than the median for the disturbance area.

Negroes in the disturbance area paid more for rent than Negroes paid citywide in eight of 13 cities (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Paterson, and Plainfield; three major, four serious, and one minor). In Milwaukee (major) they paid the same. In four cities they paid less (Englewood, Newark, Phoenix, and Tampa; two major, one serious, and one minor).

The proportion of income paid for rent by Negroes living in the disturbance area slightly exceeded the citywide proportion paid by Negroes in eight of 13 cities (Cincinnati, Dayton, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Newark, Plainfield, and Tampa; four major, one serious, and three minor). The proportions were equal in Detroit (major). The difference in medians was 5/10 of 1 percent.

The percentage of overcrowded homes in which Negroes lived in the disturbance area was slightly greater than the percentage of overcrowded homes in which Negroes lived citywide in eight of 17 cities (Cincinnati, Elizabeth, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Plainfield, Newark, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, one serious, and three minor). This median 17-city difference was 1.1 percentage points.

The percentage of sound homes in the entire city was slightly greater than in the disturbance area in 10 of 17 cities (Dayton, Englewood, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Plainfield, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, three serious, and three minor). The difference in medians was 3/10 of 1 percentage point. The differences are even greater when comparing the housing conditions of Negroes in the disturbance area and of those whites in the SMSA's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RENT*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent as a proportion of median income (percent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data for 13 cities only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEDIAN HOUSING OWNERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[In percent]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEDIAN HOUSING OVERCROWDING AND CONDITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 1.01 persons per room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound with all plumbing facilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

161. For purposes of this section we have not included the three university communities.


163. Detroit, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Rockford, and Tampa (three major, two serious, and three minor). In the case of Paterson, virtually no powers were left to the aldermen.

164. Atlanta, Bridgeton, Cambridge, Englewood, and Plainfield (one major, two serious, and two minor).

165. In the five cities having a council-city manager system, the city manager was appointed by the council, and the mayor's powers were limited (Cincinnati, Dayton, Grand Rapids, Phoenix, and Tucson; one major, three serious, and one minor).

In the one city having a commission form of government (New Brunswick; minor), the mayor was selected by the commission from its own membership and traditionally was the commissioner who received the largest popular vote. The mayor shared executive power with the other commissioners.

166. In three they were elected by the legislative bodies from their own membership (Cincinnati, Dayton, and New Brunswick; one major, one serious, and one minor).

167. Bridgeton, Cambridge, Dayton, Englewood, Grand Rapids, New Brunswick, Plainfield, and Tucson (one major, three serious, and four minor). The part-time mayors had a variety of other occupations: in Bridgeton, the mayor was a clothing store clerk; in Cambridge, a plumbing contractor; in
Dayton, a real estate investor; in Englewood, a businessman who worked in New York; in Grand Rapids, a part-owner of a restaurant supply business; in New Brunswick, a housewife; in Plainfield, a lawyer; and in Tucson, a pharmacist.

168. In 15 of the 20 cities, the principal executive, either the mayor or the city manager, earned an annual salary ranging from $15,000 to $35,000 (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Newark, New Haven, Paterson, Phoenix, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; five major, six serious, and four minor). The other five cities studied had no city manager and a part-time mayor whose annual salary was less than $2,000 in four cases and $5,500 in one case (Bridgeport, Cambridge, Englewood, New Brunswick, and Plainfield; one major, one serious, and three minor). In all five cities having a council-city manager system, the appointed city manager's salary was significantly higher than the salary of the elected mayor (Cincinnati, Dayton, Grand Rapids, Phoenix, and Tucson; one major, three serious, and one minor).

169. Thirteen mayors had terms of 4 years (Atlanta, Cambridge, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Jersey City, Milwaukee, Newark, New Brunswick, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson; four major, four serious, and five minor). Two had terms of 3 years (Bridgeport and Paterson; one serious, and one minor), and five had terms of 2 years (Cincinnati, Englewood, New Haven, Phoenix, and Plainfield; two major, two serious, and one minor).

There appeared to be no pattern as to the length of time a mayor had been in office prior to the disturbance. In four of the 20 cities the mayor had been in office for less than 2 years (Grand Rapids, New Brunswick, Paterson, and Tampa; one major, two serious, and one minor). In three cities the mayor had been in office for 7 years or more (Milwaukee, New Haven, and Rockford; one mayor, one serious, and one minor). In the remaining cities, the mayor's tenure had ranged from 2 to 7 years.

In two cities (Paterson and New Brunswick; one serious and one minor), the mayors had been in office for 6 months and 2 months, respectively. In both cases the mayor appealed to people in the disturbance area to give the new administration a chance to solve the city's problems, and these appeals appeared to have had an effect in dampening the disorders.

170. Atlanta, Bridgeport, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, New Brunswick, Phoenix, and Tampa (three major, three serious, and two minor).


172. Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, Newark, and Plainfield (two major and three minor).

173. Of a total of 207 legislators in the 20 cities, 20 (or 10 percent) were Negroes.

174. Bridgeport, Elizabeth, Grand Rapids, Rockford, Tampa, and Tucson (one major, one serious, and four minor).

175. In Newark the budget director and the director of health and welfare were Negroes; in Cincinnati, the city solicitor was a Negro; in Jersey City, the director of health and welfare was a Negro; and in Detroit, an aide to the mayor was a Negro.

176. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Englewood, Newark, and Phoenix (three major, three serious, and one minor).

177. All except Milwaukee, Tampa, and Tucson (two major and one minor). Of the 205 board of education members in those cities, 24 (or 11 percent) were Negro.

178. Excepting Englewood, New Brunswick, and Paterson (one serious and two minor). In some instances it was called a "community relations commission" or "human rights commission."
or the quality of assistance provided to recipients or its impact on their lives. Qualitative evaluation is the responsibility of many other agencies of the Federal Government and beyond our own mandate. Our evaluation necessarily assumes that all those reached are reached effectively. If the factor of effectiveness were taken into account, the magnitude of the still unmet needs might be even greater than our estimates.

As in "The Pattern of Disadvantage," supra, we have used 1960 census data as the basis for most of our observations as to need. We are keenly aware of difficulties involved in comparing 1967 programs with 1960 needs and have used more recent data wherever available. In most instances the needs were even greater in 1967 than in 1960.

Various Federal programs account for their expenditures in different ways and for different periods of time. We have generally used figures for fiscal year 1967, ending June 30, 1967, or calendar year 1967, as available in each case. We are cognizant also of the difficulties involved in considering only expenditures for 1967 as a measure of Federal efforts to deal with ghetto problems. Much was done in earlier years by these programs and more is being done now. We have generally chosen a single year's funding only as a measure of the level of Federal effort during the most recent period.

The choice of a recent year for measuring Federal expenditures during Federal expenditures created a further problem, however. The amount of funds authorized or obligated for a particular program is usually higher than the actual disbursements for that program in a given time period, but data on disbursements is usually available only some time after the period has ended. With the exception of housing and welfare, we have relied upon the higher obligation figures.

187. Institutional training programs administered through local school boards under the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) have been included instead with education programs.

188. Two of the programs had no fixed number of trainee positions. The following table further describes these programs.

**DETOIT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds obligated, Jan. 1, to Sept. 30, 1967</th>
<th>Enrollee positions available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban area employment project</td>
<td>$5,780,794</td>
<td>1,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Detroit Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC)</td>
<td>2,541,770</td>
<td>1,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Detroit NYC (Summer)</td>
<td>1,106,980</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Detroit on-the-job training (OJT) (2 programs)</td>
<td>2,164,161</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Auto Workers OJT</td>
<td>2,135,309</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union labor council preapprenticeship</td>
<td>94,480</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban beautification</td>
<td>334,456</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of education NYC</td>
<td>1,526,640</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archdiocesan opportunity program NYC</td>
<td>271,730</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Systems, Inc. OJT</td>
<td>362,310</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult youth employment project</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized training employment and placement service</td>
<td>749,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler Motor OJT</td>
<td>53,625</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan Petroleum Association OJT</td>
<td>132,471</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler OJT</td>
<td>183,070</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Hospital OJT</td>
<td>6,022</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes Fabricating &amp; Erecting OJT</td>
<td>113,963</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank's Nursery OJT</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window Cleaners Local No. 139 OJT</td>
<td>9,538</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Service Association OJT</td>
<td>40,508</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,586,795</td>
<td>13,979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NEW HAVEN**

**Endnotes:**

189. Need.—In the spring of 1967 the labor force in Newark numbered 155,770 persons, of whom 90,358 were non-white. The unemployment rate during that period was 5.9 percent for whites, 11.5 percent for Negroses, and 13.4 percent for others (principally Spanish-speaking persons). A Rutgers University study in the spring of 1967 identified 3,859 unemployed whites, 8,932 unemployed Negroses, and 1,700 other unemployed nonwhites.

**Programs.**—During the first two quarters of 1967, 12 job training programs in Newark were supported by $2,681,853 of Federal funds. These programs provided for 2,840 trainees.

**NEWARK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds obligated Jan. 1, 1967 to June 30, 1967</th>
<th>Enrolled Positions available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essex County Youth and Economic Rehabilitation Commission OJT</td>
<td>$107,997</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Newark OJT</td>
<td>267,810</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food service industry project OJT</td>
<td>29,443</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career-oriented preparation for employment</td>
<td>1,207,769</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work training program</td>
<td>246,000</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainside Hospital OJT</td>
<td>10,833</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Newark OJT</td>
<td>296,506</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler Corp. OJT</td>
<td>53,625</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painters' District Council No. 10 OJT</td>
<td>17,224</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Community Corp. OJT</td>
<td>262,313</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamster's Local No. 97 OJT</td>
<td>168,268</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weldotron Corp. OJT</td>
<td>14,945</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,681,853</td>
<td>2,840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Endnotes:**

*Source: Field representative of the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, U.S. Department of Labor, and the United Community Corp. Funds were obligated from Department of Labor and Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.

190. Need.—The Connecticut State Employment Service estimates there were approximately 145,000 to 150,000 non-agrarian workers in the labor force in New Haven and 12 surrounding towns during the first three-quarters of 1967. The unemployment rate for the same period averaged approximately 3.5 percent.

**Programs.**—During the first three quarters of 1967 there were 14 manpower programs in New Haven in various stages of operation. These provided $2,150,828 of Federal funds for 1,574 trainees. The number of trainees was not available for one program.

**NEW HAVEN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds obligated Jan. 1 to Sept. 30, 1967</th>
<th>Enrollee positions available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Division, CPI, administration</td>
<td>328,527</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYC (out-of-school)</td>
<td>379,300</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYC (in school)</td>
<td>370,065</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood employment centers</td>
<td>62,600</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elan Haven Employment Center</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill center</td>
<td>51,915</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic education</td>
<td>61,057</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Progress, Inc., OJT</td>
<td>183,776</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burner repair, OJT</td>
<td>5,753</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerator and air conditioning OJT</td>
<td>12,450</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health aids programs</td>
<td>33,633</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult work training</td>
<td>207,240</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster grandparents</td>
<td>222,832</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential youth center</td>
<td>125,965</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,150,828</td>
<td>1,574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Community Progress, Inc. (CPI), the local community action agency. Funds were obligated from appropriations to the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Office of Economic Opportunity.

**Endnotes:**

*Information not available.
191. Need.—There are more than 295,000 students in the Detroit public schools, of whom 43 percent are white and 56 percent Negro. Nearly 60 percent (about 175,000) are educationally disadvantaged within the definition of Title I. Thirty percent of the white students and 84.5 percent of the Negro students are in this group. There are approximately 180,000 functionally illiterate adults in Detroit. The Detroit school board recently stated that it may cost twice as much to educate a ghetto child as it costs to educate a suburban child and produce the same educational result. The superintendent of Detroit schools has estimated that, to educate inner-city children, as much as $500 or $600 per pupil is needed in addition to the present average State and local expenditures of about $565 per pupil.

Programs.—Detroit schools are scheduled to receive about $11 million during the 1967–68 school year under ESEA Title I. Of the estimated 175,000 low-income students, only about 55,000 are direct beneficiaries of Title I programs. Thus, while the $11 million represents $200 per student for the 55,000 direct recipients, 120,000 (or 69 percent) other educationally disadvantaged students are not participating in the programs.

The adult basic education program is scheduled to receive $244,766 during the 1967–68 school year to serve about 3,900 adults.

Federal funding for public school students from kindergarten through high school for the 1967–68 school year will total $14,514,447. For a student population of 295,000, these funds add an average of about $49 per student to the state and local expenditures of approximately $565 per student.

Detroit* Federal Funds Obligated for 1967–68 School Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Obligated Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title I (Compensatory Education Projects)</td>
<td>$1,221,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title II (Library Materials)</td>
<td>$695,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title III (Supplementary Educational Projects)</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Education</td>
<td>$2,837,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Corps</td>
<td>$240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>$14,514,447</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Federal funding for preschoolers, out-of-school youths, and adults:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Obligated Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOTA</td>
<td>$2,819,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headstart</td>
<td>$1,280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,099,943</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** $18,614,390

*Source: Detroit Board of Education.

Note: Funds were obligated from Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.

192. Need.—There are approximately 75,000 students in the Newark schools of whom 21 percent are whites and 79 percent are Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and others. In the middle and senior high schools an estimated 2,500 students are educationally disadvantaged. Of 33 elementary schools, 14 are designated as inner city or target schools for funds under ESEA Title I, and seven others reportedly could have been so designated. More than 50 percent of all elementary students (6,637 of 13,050) are in the 14 target schools. Twenty-two percent of the white students in the target schools are educationally disadvantaged.

Programs.—Newark schools are scheduled to receive nearly $1 million in the 1967–68 school year under ESEA Title I. Of the 2,500 low-income students in middle and senior high schools, approximately 1,000 are beneficiaries of the Title I programs. Because of the comprehensive nature of the Title I programs in Newark, all 6,637 students in the 14 target elementary schools are recipients of the programs although not all are educationally disadvantaged. The number of educationally disadvantaged students who do not receive benefits from the programs because they attend the 19 nontarget elementary schools is unknown.

The adult basic education program is scheduled to receive $23,000 during the 1967–68 school year to serve almost 700 persons.

Federal funding for public school students from kindergarten through high school for the 1967–68 school year will total $1,090,260. For a student population of 21,000, these funds add an average of nearly $52 per student to the local and state expenditures of approximately $697 per student.

Newark* Federal Funds Obligated for 1967–68 School Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Obligated Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title I (Compensatory Education Projects)</td>
<td>$992,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title II (Library Materials)</td>
<td>$70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title III (Supplementary Educational Projects)</td>
<td>$28,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,090,260</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Federal funding for preschoolers, out-of-school youths, and adults:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Obligated Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult basic education</td>
<td>$23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headstart</td>
<td>$387,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>$410,599</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,500,769</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: New Haven Board of Education. Funds were obligated from Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.

193. Need.—There are more than 21,000 students in the New Haven public schools, of whom 47.9 percent are whites and 52.1 percent are Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and others. In the middle and senior high schools an estimated 2,500 students are educationally disadvantaged. Of 33 elementary schools, 14 are designated as inner city or target schools for funds under ESEA Title I, and seven others reportedly could have been so designated. More than 50 percent of all elementary students (6,637 of 13,050) are in the 14 target schools. Twenty-two percent of the white students and more than 73 percent of the nonwhite students are in the target schools. There are an estimated 20,000 functionally illiterate adults in New Haven.

Programs.—New Haven schools are scheduled to receive nearly $1 million in the 1967–68 school year under ESEA Title I. Of the 2,500 low-income students in middle and senior high schools, approximately 1,000 are beneficiaries of the programs. Because of the comprehensive nature of the Title I programs in New Haven, all 6,637 students in the 14 target elementary schools are recipients of the programs although not all are educationally disadvantaged. The number of educationally disadvantaged students who do not receive benefits from the programs because they attend the 19 nontarget elementary schools is unknown.

The adult basic education program is scheduled to receive $23,000 during the 1967–68 school year to serve almost 700 persons.

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New Haven* Federal Funds Obligated for 1967–68 School Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Obligated Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title I (Compensatory Education Projects)</td>
<td>$992,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title II (Library Materials)</td>
<td>$70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA Title III (Supplementary Educational Projects)</td>
<td>$28,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,090,260</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Federal funding for preschoolers, out-of-school youths, and adults:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Obligated Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult basic education</td>
<td>$23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headstart</td>
<td>$387,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>$410,599</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,500,769</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: New Haven Board of Education. Funds were obligated from Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.

194. We have considered as substandard, in accordance with the definition of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, all units which were characterized by the census as dilapidated or as lacking one or more plumbing facilities. U.S. Bureau of Census, Measuring the Quality of Housing, An Appraisal of Census Statistics and Methods, Working Paper No. 25, Washington, D.C., 1967. We have treated as overcrowded all units identified by the census as having more than 1.01 persons per room, in accordance with the definition recently used by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States, October 1967, p. 57. Since many units are included in both categories, it is not possible to establish a total level of need by adding the numbers of units in the two categories, and we have therefore applied the two standards separately.

195. Need.—In 1960 there were 553,198 housing units in Detroit. Of these, 36,810 were substandard and 45,126 were overcrowded.

Programs.—Federal funds in the amount of $78,656,000 were expended through September 1967 for housing completed under the first three programs examined. An additional $41,000 were expended through December 1967 under the rent supplements program. BMIR mortgages in the amount of $4,173,000 were insured by FHA through September 1967. In the 1957-67 period, although no new public housing was constructed, 25 housing units were added as a result of FHA foreclosures. During this period, 346 units were constructed for the elderly and handicapped; families in 62 units were assisted through rent supplements; and mortgages on 325 units were insured under the BMIR program.

Detroit

[Cumulative through Sept. 30, 1967, except for rent supplements, which are described as of Dec. 31, 1967. Dollar amounts in thousands]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds disbursed (thousands $)</th>
<th>Mortgages insured (thousands $)</th>
<th>Maximum** number of low-income units or accommodations assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing for elderly and handicapped (completed units)</td>
<td>$3,961 (***)</td>
<td>(***</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban renewal, Title I (all projects)</td>
<td>44,318 (***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-rent public housing (bond payments on completed projects)</td>
<td>30,380 (***</td>
<td>8,180</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent supplements</td>
<td>41 (***</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. 221, below market interest rate (BMIR)</td>
<td>(***</td>
<td>$4,173</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$78,700</td>
<td>$4,173</td>
<td>8,180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Department of Housing and Urban Development and Detroit Housing Commission.
**Middle and moderate income units are included in the totals, particularly in the cases of the BMIR and elderly and handicapped programs.
***Indicates that the column is not applicable or the program was not in existence during the period indicated by the column heading.

196. Need.—In 1960 there were 134,872 housing units in Newark. Of these, 23,743 were substandard and 16,600 were overcrowded.

Programs.—Federal funds in the amount of $101,177,000 were expended through September 1967 for housing completed under the first three programs examined. An additional $22,000 were expended through December 1967 under the rent supplements program. BMIR mortgages in the amount of $20,308,000 were insured by FHA through September 1967. Newark has 10,766 public housing units, of which 20 percent (2,174) were constructed after 1959. Since 1959, 299 units have been constructed for the elderly and handicapped; families in 59 units have been assisted through rent supplements; and mortgages on 1,228 units have been insured under the BMIR program.

Newark

[Cumulative through Sept. 30, 1967, except for rent supplements, which are described as of Dec. 31, 1967. Dollar amounts in thousands]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds disbursed (thousands $)</th>
<th>Mortgages insured (thousands $)</th>
<th>Maximum** number of low-income units or accommodations assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing for elderly and handicapped (completed units)</td>
<td>$3,590 (***)</td>
<td>(***</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban renewal, Title I (for all projects)</td>
<td>40,002 (***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-rent public housing (bond payments on completed projects)</td>
<td>57,585 (***</td>
<td>8,592</td>
<td>2,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent supplements</td>
<td>22 (***</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. 221, below market interest rate (BMIR)</td>
<td>(***</td>
<td>$20,308</td>
<td>1,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$101,199</td>
<td>$20,308</td>
<td>8,592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: The Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Housing Authority of the City of Newark.
**Middle- and moderate-income units are included in the totals, particularly in the cases of the BMIR and elderly and handicapped programs.
***Indicates that the column is not applicable or the program was not in existence during the period indicated by the column heading.

197. Need.—In 1960 there were 51,471 housing units in New Haven. Of these, 6,667 were substandard and 4,278 were overcrowded.

Programs.—Federal funds in the amount of $60,393,000 were expended through September 1967 for housing completed under the first four programs examined. BMIR mortgages in the amount of $6,045,000 were insured by FHA through September 1967. Of the 2,074 public housing units in New Haven, only 469 were constructed after 1952. Mortgages on 482 units have been insured under the BMIR program.

New Haven

[Cumulative through Sept. 30, 1967, except for rent supplements which are described as of Dec. 31, 1967]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds disbursed (thousands $)</th>
<th>Mortgages insured (thousands $)</th>
<th>Maximum** number of low-income units or accommodations assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing for elderly and handicapped (completed units)</td>
<td>$3,388 (***)</td>
<td>(***</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban renewal, Title I (for all projects)</td>
<td>3,590 (***)</td>
<td>(***</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-rent public housing (bond payments on completed projects)</td>
<td>6,055 (***)</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent supplements</td>
<td>0 (***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. 221, below-market interest rate (BMIR)</td>
<td>(***</td>
<td>$6,045</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$60,393</td>
<td>$6,045</td>
<td>1,605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: The Department of Housing and Urban Development and the New Haven Redevelopment Agency.
**Middle- and moderate-income units are included in the totals, particularly in the cases of the BMIR and elderly and handicapped programs.
***Indicates that the column is not applicable or the program was not in existence during the period indicated by the column heading.

198. We have not included medical assistance to the aged, because it is not limited to low-income persons.

199. Need.—Of the 1,670,144 residents of Detroit in 1960, 361,348, or 21.6 percent of the city's population, including 204,820 nonwhites and 156,528 whites, were members of families with annual incomes of less than $3,000.

Programs.—The estimated Federal contribution toward
the four programs totalled $28,169,997. An estimated 69,310 poor persons received assistance. The average annual income of an AFDC family of four in Detroit was $1,752. By contrast, a city worker's family budget for a moderate living standard for a family of four in Northern New Jersey is $10,195, according to the Department of Labor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Wayne County</th>
<th>City of Detroit (estimates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons assisted</td>
<td>Monthly average payment per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1967 monthly average)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to aged</td>
<td>12,956</td>
<td>$71.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to blind</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>90.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to disabled</td>
<td>7,141</td>
<td>91.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>77,233</td>
<td>40.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88,006</td>
<td>57,590,458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Michigan Department of Social Services, Research & Program Analysis Section.

200. Need.—Of the 405,220 residents of Newark in 1960, 89,949, or 22.2 percent of the city's population, including 48,098 nonwhites and 41,851 whites, were members of families with annual incomes of less than $3,000.

Programs.—The estimated Federal contribution toward the four programs totalled $14,964,647. An estimated 48,319 poor persons received assistance. The average annual income of an AFDC family of four was $2,759. By contrast, the city worker's family budget for a moderate living standard for a family of four in Northern New Jersey is $10,195, according to the Department of Labor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Essex County</th>
<th>City of Newark (estimates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons assisted during July 1967</td>
<td>Monthly average payment per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to aged</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>$75.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to blind</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>105.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to disabled</td>
<td>2,773</td>
<td>115.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>51,041</td>
<td>55.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57,834</td>
<td>43,067,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Essex County Welfare Board.

201. Need.—Of the 152,048 residents of New Haven in 1960, 31,254, or 20.6 percent of the city's population, including 9,021 nonwhites and 22,233 whites, were members of families with annual incomes of less than $3,000.

Programs.—The estimated Federal contribution toward the four programs totalled $3,889,487. An estimated 12,663 poor persons received assistance.
202. Data as to funding and persons reached have been obtained from community action agencies (CAA’s) in the three cities surveyed. Manpower and employment programs, such as Neighborhood Youth Corps, and Headstart programs have been included in other sections.

203. Need.—As indicated in the section on “Welfare,” in 1960 there were 361,348 people in Detroit who were members of families with annual incomes of less than $3,000.

Programs.—During fiscal year 1967, Federal funds made available for community action programs, excepting manpower and Headstart, totaled $12,576,923. During that period the CAA estimates that these programs reached approximately 110,000 low-income persons.

DETROIT,* FISCAL YEAR 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Funds obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small business development center</td>
<td>$89,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main grant—4 months</td>
<td>2,980,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>431,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-year human capital improvement program</td>
<td>46,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster grandparents</td>
<td>46,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main grant—8 months</td>
<td>3,071,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal services</td>
<td>351,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moms and tots</td>
<td>11,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Services Corps</td>
<td>63,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 summer programs</td>
<td>797,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer programs supplement</td>
<td>249,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moms and tots</td>
<td>11,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police youth program</td>
<td>12,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood service program</td>
<td>49,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency loans for families</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: $12,576,923

*Source: Mayor’s Committee for Human Resources Development. Funds were obligated from Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.

204. Need.—As indicated in the section on “Welfare,” in 1960 there were 89,949 people in Newark who were members of families with annual incomes of less than $3,000.

Programs.—During fiscal year 1967, Federal funds made available for community action programs, excepting manpower and Headstart, totaled $1,901,130. During that period the CAA estimates that these programs reached approximately 39,796 low-income persons.

NEWARK,* FISCAL YEAR 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>League youth culture and education program</td>
<td>$16,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Community Corp., central administration</td>
<td>232,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community action (area boards)</td>
<td>480,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENABLE (family development)</td>
<td>31,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS (Spanish information center)</td>
<td>24,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small business center</td>
<td>22,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer block recreation program</td>
<td>258,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior citizens</td>
<td>399,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal services</td>
<td>365,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: $1,901,130

*Source: United Community Corp. Funds were obligated from Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.

205. Need.—As indicated in the section on welfare, in 1960 there were 31,254 people in New Haven who were members of families with annual incomes of less than $3,000.

Programs.—Federal funds made available for community action programs, excepting manpower and Headstart, during fiscal year 1967, totaled $2,251,042. During that period the CAA estimates that these programs reached 13,000 low-income persons.

NEW HAVEN,* FISCAL YEAR 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Federal funds obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prekindergarten</td>
<td>$11,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutorial</td>
<td>12,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remedial reading</td>
<td>36,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 16 work-study</td>
<td>12,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal services</td>
<td>262,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community schools</td>
<td>122,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community services division</td>
<td>422,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day care</td>
<td>83,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central CAA Administration</td>
<td>322,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library Neighborhood Center</td>
<td>79,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Indigent People</td>
<td>59,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPI manpower division</td>
<td>701,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster grandparents</td>
<td>6,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family services program</td>
<td>12,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth research division</td>
<td>93,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police youth program</td>
<td>12,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile court program</td>
<td>26,967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: $2,251,042

*Source: Community Progress, Inc. Funds were obligated from Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations.

206. Using this material we sought to identify and assign weights to the four types of grievances which appeared to have the greatest significance to the Negro community in each city. We made judgments with regard to the severity of particular grievances and assigned a rank to the four most serious. These judgments were based on the frequency with which a particular grievance was mentioned, the relative intensity with which it was discussed, references to incidents exemplifying the grievance, and estimates of severity obtained from the interviewees themselves. Each priority ranking was weighted by points (four points for the first priority, three for second, two for third, and one for fourth). The points for each grievance for all cities were added to create an intercity ranking. Whenever two grievances were judged to be equally serious for a particular city, the points for the two rankings involved were divided equally (e.g., in case two were judged equally suitable for the first priority, the total points for first and second were divided and each received 3 ½ points).

Annexed are two sets of charts: Chart I shows the pervasiveness of types of grievances in 12 general categories, each of which is subdivided into several specific categories. Chart II shows only the general categories and indicates the number of times that grievances in each were ranked first, second, third, or fourth in terms of relative severity.

207. Education and recreation were ranked equally; municipal services and consumer and credit practices were also ranked equally.

208. Ibid.
209. Ibid.
210. Ibid.
211. In this survey 437 Negroes from the Detroit disturbance area were asked which of 23 grievances had a “great deal,” “something,” or “nothing” to do with the riot. The grievances which received the most responses of “a great deal” were: (1) police brutality, (2) overcrowded living conditions, (3) poor housing, (4) lack of jobs, (5) poverty, and (6) anger with business people. Interviewees who identified themselves as participants in the riot were singled out for special analysis and chose the same six causes but in a slightly different order. Overcrowded living conditions was first instead of police brutality.

212. We found significant grievances concerning police practices in each of 19 cities. Grievances concerning police practices were ranked first in eight cities, second in four cities, third in none, and fourth in two cities. Although such griev-
Grievances were present in five other cities, they were not ranked in the first four orders of intensity.

213. Grievances in the employment area were ranked first in three cities, second in seven cities, third in four cities, and fourth in three cities. In only three cities was such a grievance present but not ranked among the highest four levels of intensity.

214. Grievances in the housing area were found in 18 cities and were ranked first in five cities, second in two cities, third in five cities, and fourth in two cities. In four cities where housing was a grievance, it was not ranked in the first four levels of intensity.

215. Educational grievances were found in 17 cities and were ranked first in two cities, second in one city, third in two cities, and fourth in three cities. In eight cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

216. Grievances relating to recreation were found in 15 cities and were ranked first in three cities, second in one city, third in four cities, and fourth in none. In seven cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

217. Grievances relating to the political structure were found in 16 cities and were ranked first in two cities, second in one city, third in one city, and fourth in one city. In 11 cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

218. Grievances relating to white attitudes were found in 15 cities and were ranked first in no city, second in one city, third in one city, and fourth in two cities. In 11 cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

219. Grievances relating to the administration of justice were found in 15 cities and were ranked first in no city, second in none, third in two cities, and fourth in one city. In 12 cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

220. Grievances relating to Federal programs were found in 16 cities and were ranked first in no city, second in one city, third in none, and fourth in none. In 15 cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

221. Grievances relating to municipal services were found in 11 cities and were ranked first in no city, second in none, third in one city, and fourth in none. In 10 cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

222. Grievances relating to unfair commercial practices were found in 11 cities and were ranked first in no city, second in none, third in none, and fourth in two cities. In nine cities where such a grievance was present, it was not ranked in the first four levels of priority.

223. We surveyed these cities shortly after the disturbances. Consequently, we are not in a position to assess more current events there. As noted elsewhere in this report, the Commission is sponsoring two surveys which will measure the impact of the disorders on the attitudes of whites and Negroes. The surveys are being conducted in 15 cities and four suburban areas, including four of the 20 cities surveyed for this report.

The results of these surveys will be published separately and will provide a more complete treatment of the post-disorder situation.

224. We have noted earlier that no immunization took effect for the 25 cities which experienced two or more disorders in 1967. See "Levels of Violence and Damage," at pp. 65–67. Six of the 20 cities we surveyed had more than one disorder: Atlanta (2), Cambridge (2), Cincinnati (3), Dayton (2), Rockford (2), and Tampa (2). Houston had three disorders in 1967. However, the three cities which had campus-related disorders in our sample of 23 have not been included in our examination for the purpose of this section.

225. Bridgeport, Cincinnati, and Tucson (one major and two minor). In Bridgeport, a white segregationist organization had become more active. In Cincinnati and Tucson, new black organizations tended to follow militant separatist policies.

226. In Atlanta, two new groups were formed, one composed largely of white ministers and lay members, and the other of black youths. Reportedly, the latter group is dedicated to the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of riots.

In Elizabeth, as a result of its leader's antiriot activities during the disturbance, a relatively moderate religious sect, the Orthodox Moslems, appears to have gained stature in the Negro community.

227. Also, in New Haven, at least two black militant organizations emerged after the riot and seemed to have gained support from members of the moderate Negro community. In addition, an integrated group was formed several months after the riot to protest alleged police harassment and repression of the militant Negro leaders.

In Milwaukee, the NAACP Youth Commandos, a militant but nonseparatist group, appeared to have grown in influence in the Negro community after the riot. Also, a coalition of moderate Negro leaders was formed to develop economic and social programs.

228. Atlanta, Milwaukee, New Haven, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, Rockford, and Tucson (three major, three serious, and two minor).

In New Haven, the police department opened a storefront office in the disturbance area where citizens could make complaints or seek assistance. The office was also designed to serve as a "cooling-off" center to avoid the need for a trip to the central stationhouse in minor matters such as domestic quarrels.

In Milwaukee, the police department established a police-community relations division.

In Newark, the Negro captain, whose promotion was announced during the riot, has been appointed commanding officer of the fourth precinct in which the disorders of the summer started.

In Paterson, the program for the police-community relations unit has been expanded to include a police-community relations board consisting of seven policemen and nine civilians. The civilians include representatives from the Negro community.

In Rockford, the mayor's commission on human relations planned a workshop on police-community relations to be conducted by experts from city, county, state and federal agencies. Each member of the Rockford Police force was to be required to take 12 hours of instruction.

In Tucson, the police department planned to sponsor an institute of police-community relations, including seminars on the nature of prejudice and on the attitudes of Negroes, Mexican-Americans, and Indians toward the police.

In Plainfield, the police department began actively recruiting Negro officers. The department also republished its complaint procedures.

229. Cambridge, Cincinnati, Detroit, Grand Rapids, New Brunswick, Paterson, Phoenix, Tampa, and Tucson (three major, four serious, and two minor).

In Cambridge and Tampa, the local community relations commissions increased their efforts to induce employers to hire more Negroes. Tampa's commission employed a full-time job developer and established a job-training program.

In Grand Rapids, a coalition of public and private organizations began a crash employment program to find 1,000 jobs in 3 months.

In New Brunswick, the business community sought to
raise $75,000 for job training; $25,000 of this amount was contributed by one local pharmaceutical company.

In Phoenix, the antipoverty program initiated a project to train 2,500 heads of households in ghetto areas.

After the Tampa disturbance, the local antipoverty agency and area industries sponsored an on-the-job training program, and the Tampa Merchants Association established a job-training course.

230. Cambridge, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Milwaukee, Plainfield, Tampa, and Rockford (five major, two serious, and two minor).

In Cincinnati, the urban renewal agency established a complaint office in the ghetto. The office, which was open 3 days a week, was closed after 38 days of operation. The city manager said the experiment was abandoned because citizens had failed to use it.

In Elizabeth, the city council approved the local housing authority's request to submit an application to the Federal Government for 400 low-income apartment units. The mayor also appointed a Negro to the local redevelopment agency.

In Milwaukee, the city council passed an open-housing ordinance. However, Negro leaders denounced the ordinance on the ground that it merely restates the provisions of state law, which reportedly exclude 66 percent of the housing in Milwaukee from coverage. The lone Negro council member voted against the ordinance as "mere tokenism."

In Plainfield, a Negro was appointed to a 5-year term as a member of the housing authority.

In Tampa, a block club staged a march on the Tampa Housing Authority's offices to publicize complaints against the authority, such as billing public housing residents for grasscutting where there is no grass. The authority promised to consider the charges seriously.

In Rockford, the county housing authority is constructing a 75-unit housing development for the elderly in a Negro slum. The project was planned before the disturbance but construction began afterward. A community development corporation was also initiated before the disorder to encourage community self-help programs for home improvement, and local businesses contributed "seed money" to guarantee improvement loans. The city annexed the pilot project block in order to provide municipal services and planned to annex additional blocks as the program expands.

231. Newark is the headquarters office for two of the life insurance companies in the consortium of 350 which pledged to set aside $1 billion to finance ghetto housing under FHA insurance.

232. Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Plainfield, and Rockford (two major, one serious, and two minor).

The Dayton board of education issued a policy statement that it would attempt to decrease de facto segregation in city schools.

Elizabeth's board of education instituted a program of free adult basic education.

The Plainfield board of education formalized its practice of permitting parents to have a third person present when talking to school officials. It also hired its first full-time Negro counselor.

233. In Detroit, as aforementioned, the Michigan Bell Telephone Co. plans to "adopt" one of the city's high schools and provide funds for special programs.

234. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dayton, and Tampa (two major and two serious).

In Atlanta, despite united resistance by local Negro leaders, the administration continued to build "portable" classrooms for use at predominantly black schools, maintained double sessions only in Negro schools, and refused to reconsider its "freedom of choice" desegregation procedures.

In Dayton and Tampa, bond issues for school construction were defeated. The Tampa referendum was opposed by local Negroes because most of the money was to be used in all-white, suburban schools.

Also in Tampa, the interscholastic athletic conference to which Tampa's white schools belong refused to admit the city's predominantly Negro schools to membership and made it impossible for the county schools to form a separate conference in which the Negro schools could participate in the highest class of competition.

235. Atlanta, Elizabeth, New Brunswick, and Tampa (one major, one serious, and two minor).

In Atlanta, immediately after the disturbance, work began on a playground for which area residents had been petitioning for 2 years.

In Elizabeth, shortly after the disturbance, the recreation department moved a playground closer to a poor Negro neighborhood.

In Tampa, a former local high school coach, popular among Negro youths, was hired as director of youth services for the neighborhood service centers of the county antipoverty program.

236. Cincinnati, Englewood, Phoenix, Tampa, and Tucson (two major, one serious, and two minor).

237. President of city council in Englewood, member of civil service commission in Tucson and members of housing authority and board of adjustments in Plainfield (one major and two minor).

In elections for state office, the situation was mixed. A Negro candidate for State assemblyman from Newark was elected, but two incumbent Negro legislators from Newark were defeated. The incumbent Negro assemblyman whose district included Englewood was defeated by the candidate who had been mayor of that city during the disorder.

238. Cambridge and New Brunswick (one serious and one minor).

In Cambridge, the Governor of Maryland appointed a community relations committee immediately after the disturbance.

In New Brunswick, the mayor established an "open door" policy to facilitate the airing of grievances directly with her. A human relations commission, planned prior to the disturbance, was established, and several Negroes were appointed as commissioners.

239. In Tampa, some of the counterrioters known as "White Hats" were hired by the city's commission on community relations to improve communication with ghetto youths. The program was recently terminated upon the indictment of several White Hats on felony charges not connected with the disorder.

240. Atlanta, Dayton, Detroit, Elizabeth, Englewood, New Haven, Newark, and Tampa (three major, three serious, and two minor).

In six of the cities surveyed (Atlanta, Dayton, Detroit, New Haven, Newark, and Tampa) Model Cities applications have been approved by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. In Elizabeth and Tampa, new legal services programs, funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, were instituted.

A YWHA building, valued at $50,000, near Elizabeth's disturbance area was donated for use by the local Community Action Agency as a community center.

The County Community Action Agency opened an office in Englewood.

241. Tampa and Milwaukee (two major).

The nomination to the board of the County Community Action Agency of the former commander of the Milwaukee police precinct which includes much of the ghetto area was resisted by Negro residents. The nomination was never voted on as the nominee moved from the city before a vote was taken.
In Tampa, a highly publicized controversy arose because a Negro neighborhood worker was fired by a local antipoverty agency. The discharged employee filed charges of racial discrimination in the hiring and job placement practices of the county antipoverty program.

242. Atlanta, Dayton, Elizabeth, and New Brunswick (two serious and two minor).

Elizabeth opened a “little city hall” in the disturbance area.

In New Brunswick, the administration rented an armory for use as a neighborhood center.

243. In Elizabeth, the county legal services agency announced plans for 1-day consumer clinics in various low-income neighborhoods for training and counseling on complaints about credit and other consumer practices.

244. Cincinnati and Detroit (two major).

In Detroit, as stated, CCAC began developing proposals for new businesses in the riot area, including a Negro-owned cooperative food market and a number of other cooperative business ventures.

In Cincinnati, newspapers reported that two Negroes who had long sought financing for a new business center in the disturbance area had succeeded since the disturbance.

245. Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Newark, and Tampa (four major and one serious).

In Atlanta, the police and fire departments announced the formulation of a confidential coordinated plan to cope with any future disturbances.

In Cincinnati, voters approved a bond issue to establish a countywide police communications center and command post for normal conditions as well as riot conditions. The new city budget included $500,000 for 50 additional policemen.

In Newark, the city council appropriated $200,000 for the purchase of armored cars, riot guns, helmets, and other riot control equipment.

In Tampa, city and county law enforcement departments prepared a detailed “After-action Report” describing the city’s disorder and how it was controlled. The report recommended purchase of riot control equipment and suggested tactical improvements.

246. Dayton, Elizabeth, Paterson, and Tampa (one major, two serious, and one minor).

In Dayton, the organizers of the “White Hats” stated that the group would be used again if another riot occurred. The organizers also stated that they expected city officials to cooperate with them again as they had during the June disorder.

In Elizabeth, there was evidence that city officials planned to ask Negro community leaders to assist in future peacekeeping as they did during the disorder.

In Paterson, the Community Action agency gave a leadership course for Negro teenagers in the hope that the youths will act as counterrioters should the need arise.

247. In Tampa, as indicated above, the “White Hats” program, which had been continued after the disorder, ended with the indictment of several youths on non-riot-connected charges.

248. Also, in Cincinnati, according to unofficial estimates, about 50 percent of the businesses damaged during that city’s riot had reopened by mid-December, 1967.

In Dayton, where the total estimated property damage from the June disorder was relatively small, most of the store fronts damaged in the West Dayton business area were repaired.

249. Detroit and Plainfield (two major). In Plainfield, two Negro organizations demanded that any new building be undertaken only after consultation with representatives of the Negro community.

In Detroit, CCAC insisted that no rebuilding be started until Negro citizens of the area decided how they want their neighborhoods redeveloped.
Tables on Socioeconomic Data

(See Footnote 146 to Chapter II)

Source: 1960 Census Data

ATLANTA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Nonwhite</th>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
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<td>4.6</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
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<td>Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
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<td>Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force</td>
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<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
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<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>61.5</td>
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<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under six years of age</td>
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<td>11.5</td>
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<td>10.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
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<td>Housing:</td>
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<td>Total occupied units</td>
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<td>48,188</td>
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<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
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<td>36.7</td>
<td>73.0</td>
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<td>Percent renter-occupied units</td>
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<td>$75</td>
<td>$54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent with 1 or more persons per room</td>
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<td>23.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
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<td>Percent built before 1939</td>
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<td>58.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<td>Percent sound with all plumbing facilities</td>
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<td>Percent of household heads who moved in 1956-60</td>
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<td>27.5</td>
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<td>27.7</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>33.4</td>
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*Census tract F-83.
**BRIDGETON**

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<tr>
<td>Age distribution:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male, under 15</td>
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<td>15-24</td>
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<td>25-64</td>
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<td>65 and over</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female, under 15</td>
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<td>65 and over</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of children under 18 living with both parents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of persons age 25 or above having received 8 years or less education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median school years completed</td>
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<td>Households:</td>
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<td>1-person households</td>
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<td>2-5-person households</td>
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<td>6-or-more-person households</td>
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<td>Economic:</td>
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<td>Percent of males age 14 and over in civilian labor force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of males in the labor force who are unemployed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of women age 14 and over in the labor force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of females in the labor force who are unemployed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc</td>
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<td>Percent of women in the labor force who are in the labor force</td>
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<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
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<td>Housing:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total occupied units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median value of owner-occupied units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of households with all plumbing facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of household heads who moved in 1958-60</td>
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*Bridgeston has never been divided into Census tracts.

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**CAMBRIDGE**

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<td>Percent of persons age 25 or above having received 8 years or less education</td>
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<td>Median school years completed</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-person households</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2-5-person households</td>
<td>2,168</td>
<td>809</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6-or-more-person households</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>Economic:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$4,935</td>
<td>$2,450</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of males age 14 and over in civilian labor force</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of males in the labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women age 14 and over in the labor force</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of females in the labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>66.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women in the labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total occupied units</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>1,099</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value of owner-occupied units</td>
<td>$8,600</td>
<td>$5,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with 1.01 or more persons per room</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of households with all plumbing facilities</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of household heads who moved in 1958-60</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cambridge has never been divided into Census tracts.
### CINCINNATI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$6,616</td>
<td>$3,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of males age 14 and over in civilian labor force</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of males in civilian labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, household workers</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of persons age 25 or over who are in the labor force</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of females in the labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, household workers</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of persons in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of occupied units</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$15,700</td>
<td>$11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$725</td>
<td>$457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with 1 or more persons per room</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent built before 1950</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$725</td>
<td>$457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent built after 1950</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value of owner-occupied units</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>$12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$725</td>
<td>$457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$725</td>
<td>$457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with 1 or more persons per room</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>56.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$725</td>
<td>$457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$725</td>
<td>$457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$725</td>
<td>$457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent built after 1950</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$725</td>
<td>$457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$725</td>
<td>$457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of persons age 25 or over who are in the labor force</strong></td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, household workers</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of persons in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### DAYTON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$6,951</td>
<td>$4,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of males age 14 and over in civilian labor force</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of males in civilian labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, household workers</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of persons age 25 or over who are in the labor force</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of females in the labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, household workers</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of persons in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of occupied units</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$18,431</td>
<td>$16,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of occupied units</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$875</td>
<td>$577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent built before 1950</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of households with all plumbing facilities</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of households with all plumbing facilities</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Census tracts 7-1, 8-1A, 8-2, 8-6.
### DETROIT

#### Population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>SMSA White</th>
<th>SMSA Nonwhite</th>
<th>City White</th>
<th>City Nonwhite</th>
<th>Discharge area 1*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of people</td>
<td>3,195,372</td>
<td>566,988</td>
<td>1,182,970</td>
<td>487,174</td>
<td>69,525</td>
<td>215,438</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Age distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age, under 15</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>15-24</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>25-64</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>65 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Economic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic characteristic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$7,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of males age 14 and over in civilian labor force</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of males in civilian labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of females in the labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Housing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing characteristic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total occupied units</td>
<td>932,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent occupied units</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value of owner-occupied units</td>
<td>$32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>302,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent per income $3,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent per income $5,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent per income $10,000</td>
<td>104,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of persons 25 or over having received 8 years or less education</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### ELIZABETH (SMSA Newark)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population:</th>
<th>Number of people</th>
<th>Age distribution:</th>
<th>Economic:</th>
<th>Housing:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of people</td>
<td>1,462,248</td>
<td>Male, under 15</td>
<td>Median family income:</td>
<td>Total occupied units:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female, under 15</td>
<td>$7,503</td>
<td>449,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>$4,807</td>
<td>61,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25-64</td>
<td>$6,613</td>
<td>31,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>$4,585</td>
<td>2,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$5,798</td>
<td>38,222</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$6,455</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$5,318</td>
<td>1,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$5,274</td>
<td>10,639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes:

2. Denotes data for 58 of the Census tracts in which disorders occurred.

---

*Denotes data for 58 of the Census tracts in which disorders occurred.*
Population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of people</td>
<td>1,142,124</td>
<td>44,749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age distribution:

| Male, under 15                         | 167,944 | 7,343  |
| 15-24                                  | 56,566  | 2,997  |
| 25-64                                  | 286,730 | 9,727  |
| 65 and over                            | 44,960  | 1,902  |

Female, under 15:

| 15-24                                  | 161,234 | 7,150  |
| 25-64                                  | 63,913  | 3,708  |
| 65 and over                            | 304,157 | 11,546 |

Number of children under 18 living with both parents:

| 352                                     | 4,793   | 942    |

Percent of persons age 25 or above having received 8 years or less education:

| 36.5                                    | 5,227   | 10.3    |

Median school years completed:

| 11.1                                    | 8.8     | 9.7     |

Households:

| 1-person households                     | 313,514 | 1,239  |
| 2-person households                     | 283,998 | 8,038  |
| 6-or-more-person households             | 27,650  | 2,067  |

Economic:

| Median family income                    | $7,514  | $4,294  |
| Percent of families with income under $3,000 | 8.0    | 21.8    |
| Percent of males age 14 and over in civilian labor force | 82.0  | 81.3    |
| Percent of males in civilian labor force who are unemployed | 3.2    | 8.7     |
| Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc | 29.7  | 8.8     |
| Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers | 9.2    | 30.9    |
| Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force | 34.4  | 51.4    |
| Percent of females in the labor force who are unemployed | 5.9    | 8.8     |
| Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc | 17.9  | 6.9     |
| Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers | 11.0   | 50.6    |
| Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age | 7.5   | 12.7   |

Housing:

| Total occupied units                    | 345,162 | 11,342 |
| Percent owner-occupied units            | 66.5    | 1,515  |
| Median value of owner-occupied units    | $19,000 | $15,600 |
| Percent renter-occupied units           | 31.5    | 68.5    |
| Median rent                            | $96     | $150    |
| Percent built before 1959               | 55.6    | 83.5    |
| Percentage of units with plumbing facilities | 92.7   | 53.2    |
| Percent of household heads who moved in 1958-60 | 23.5  | 37.3    |

*Census tract 69.

GRAND RAPIDS

Population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of people</td>
<td>347,851</td>
<td>15,336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Age distribution:
  Male, under 15                        | 59,156 | 3,150   |
  15-24                                  | 20,959 | 932     |
  25-64                                  | 74,764 | 3,029   |
  65 and over                            | 14,348 | 328     |
  Female, under 15                       | 56,955 | 3,146   |
  15-24                                  | 24,200 | 1,053   |
  25-64                                  | 78,956 | 3,364   |
  65 and over                            | 18,613 | 334     |

Number of children under 18 living with both parents:

| 121,895                                 | 4,795   | 1,957   |

Percent of persons age 25 or above having received 8 years or less education:

| 33.4                                    | 50.3    | 50.3    |

Median school years completed:

| 11.1                                    | 9.0     | 9.0     |

Households:

| 1-person households                     | 15,815  | 537     |
| 2-person households                     | 75,287  | 2,431   |
| 6-or-more-person households             | 12,827  | 871     |

Economic:

| Median family income                    | $6,410  | $4,128  |
| Percent of families with income under $3,000 | 12.1   | 33.7    |
| Percent of males age 14 and over in civilian labor force | 80.0  | 77.4    |
| Percent of males in civilian labor force who are unemployed | 4.9    | 15.1    |
| Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc | 23.6  | 7.1     |
| Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers | 10.4   | 40.4    |
| Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force | 35.2  | 50.0    |
| Percent of females in the labor force who are unemployed | 5.1    | 12.1    |
| Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc | 18.2   | 5.7     |
| Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers | 18.9   | 67.3    |
| Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age | 11.1   | 16.8   |

Housing:

| Total occupied units                    | 101,926 | 3,839  |
| Percent owner-occupied units            | 77.7    | 71.8   |
| Median value of owner-occupied units    | $12,490 | $10,000 |
| Percent renter-occupied units           | 22.3    | 28.2   |
| Median rent                            | $89     | $99    |
| Percent built before 1939               | 61.3    | 96.6   |
| Percent owned with plumbing facilities  | 94.9    | 92.9   |
| Percent of household heads who moved in 1958-60 | 27.7  | 45.7    |

*Census tracts 23, 24, 28.
### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>SMSA White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
<th>City White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Male, under 15</td>
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<td>144,260</td>
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<td>Female, under 15</td>
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<td>65 and over</td>
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<td>14,439</td>
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<td>Number of children under 18 living with both parents</td>
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<td>Percent of persons 25 or above having received 8 years or less education</td>
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<td>54.2</td>
<td>46.9</td>
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<td>Median school years completed</td>
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<td>9.4</td>
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<td>Percent of households</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-person households</td>
<td>39,906</td>
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<td>2-5-person households</td>
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<td>6-or-more-person households</td>
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<td>Economic:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$6,268</td>
<td>$4,450</td>
<td>$6,166</td>
<td>$4,456</td>
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<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
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<td>27.3</td>
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<td>27.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of persons age 14 and over in civilian labor force</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>78.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of persons in civilian labor force who are unemployed</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
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<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc</td>
<td>16.1</td>
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<td>Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>35.0</td>
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<td>Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force</td>
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<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
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<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc</td>
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<td>9.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
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<td>Housing:</td>
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<td>Total occupied units</td>
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<td>11,556</td>
<td>78,339</td>
<td>10,213</td>
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<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
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<td>11.7</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median value of owner-occupied units</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$10,700</td>
<td>$12,300</td>
<td>$9,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent renter-occupied units</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>88.4</td>
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<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$550</td>
<td>$450</td>
<td>$550</td>
<td>$450</td>
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<td>Percent with 1.01 or more persons per room</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of households who moved in 1958-60</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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</table>

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### Milwaukee

#### Population

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<th>City White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Number of people</td>
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<td>675,786</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male, under 15</td>
<td>172,933</td>
<td>14,485</td>
<td>95,813</td>
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<td>15-24</td>
<td>66,679</td>
<td>4,075</td>
<td>41,196</td>
<td>3,690</td>
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<td>25-64</td>
<td>267,656</td>
<td>15,627</td>
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<td>13,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female, under 15</td>
<td>166,061</td>
<td>14,483</td>
<td>93,503</td>
<td>11,493</td>
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<td>15-24</td>
<td>74,762</td>
<td>6,794</td>
<td>48,803</td>
<td>5,694</td>
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<td>25-64</td>
<td>275,588</td>
<td>15,633</td>
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<td>Number of children under 18 living with both parents</td>
<td>357,721</td>
<td>21,560</td>
<td>159,957</td>
<td>21,343</td>
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<td>Percent of persons 25 or above having received 8 years or less education</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>46.5</td>
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<td>Median school years completed</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of households</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1-person households</td>
<td>46,079</td>
<td>3,832</td>
<td>35,668</td>
<td>1,814</td>
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<td>2-5-person households</td>
<td>261,324</td>
<td>10,361</td>
<td>160,749</td>
<td>10,246</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-or-more-person households</td>
<td>33,572</td>
<td>3,868</td>
<td>16,646</td>
<td>3,844</td>
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<td>Economic:</td>
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<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$7,095</td>
<td>$4,872</td>
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<td>$4,842</td>
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<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
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<td>26.9</td>
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<td>Percent of persons age 14 and over in civilian labor force</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>81.2</td>
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<td>Percent of persons in civilian labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
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<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>31.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
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<td>43.2</td>
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<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
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<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>54.7</td>
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<td>Housing:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total occupied units</td>
<td>341,208</td>
<td>16,061</td>
<td>215,065</td>
<td>15,922</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
<td>59.9</td>
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<td>Median value of owner-occupied units</td>
<td>$16,600</td>
<td>$10,900</td>
<td>$15,300</td>
<td>$10,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent renter-occupied units</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>74.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$660</td>
<td>$360</td>
<td>$660</td>
<td>$360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent with 1.01 or more persons per room</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of households who moved in 1958-60</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>52.8</td>
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</table>
NEWARK

Population:
Number of people: 1,462,248
Age distribution:
Male, under 15: 200,041
Female, under 15: 193,116
65 and over: 2,128
Median family income $7,503
Age distribution:
Percent of families with income under $3,000: 8.7
Total occupied units: 449,642
Housing:
Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers: 10.6
Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers: 10.6
Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers: 10.6
Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc: 18.9
Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc: 18.9
Number of children under 18 living with both parents: 424,552
Percent of people aged 14 or above having received 8 years or less education: 34.2
Percent of household heads who moved in 1958-60: 11.5
Median school years completed: 11.5
Percent of persons age 25 or above having received 8 years or less education: 44.8

NEW BRUNSWICK

Population:
Number of people: 33,810
Age distribution:
Male, under 15: 3,461
Female, under 15: 3,562
65 and over: 1,005
Median family income $9,500
Housing:
Percent of people aged 14 or above having received 8 years or less education: 17.5
Median school years completed: 17.5
Percent of persons age 25 or above having received 8 years or less education: 34.2

*New Brunswick has never been divided into Census tracts.
### NEW HAVEN

#### Economic:
- **Total occupied units:** 88,752
- **Percent renter-occupied units:** 41.2
- **Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers:** 12.0
- **Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.:** 11.6
- **Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.:** 11.0
- **Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age:** 6.4
- **Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force:** 38.2
- **Median value of owner-occupied units:** $19,000
- **Percent of males in civilian labor force who are unemployed:** 3.2
- **Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force:** 34.4
- **Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers:** 12.0
- **Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers:** 11.6
- **Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.:** 11.0
- **Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age:** 7.5
- **Percent of household heads who moved in 1958-60:** 23.5

#### Households:
- **1-person households:** 12,322
- **2-person households:** 69,652
- **6-or-more-person households:** 6,778
- **Median school years completed:** 11.2

#### Economic:
- **Median family income:** $6,777
- **Median value of owner-occupied units:** $17,000
- **Median rent:** $76
- **Percent with 1.01 or more persons per room:** 6.0
- **Percent sound with all plumbing facilities:** 86.8
- **Percent of household heads who moved in 1958-60:** 26.4

#### Housing:
- **Total occupied units:** 88,752
- **Percent owner-occupied units:** 58.8
- **Percent renter-occupied units:** 41.2
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 86.8
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 26.4
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 11.1

### NEW HAVEN SMSA

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<td>$4,205</td>
<td>$4,120</td>
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<td>Persons per room</td>
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<td>Plumbing</td>
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<td>86.8</td>
<td>84.8</td>
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### PATerson (SMSA Paterson—Clifton—Passaic)

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<td>Income</td>
<td>$4,330</td>
<td>$4,205</td>
<td>$4,205</td>
<td>$4,120</td>
<td>$4,120</td>
<td>$4,120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>$76</td>
<td>$76</td>
<td>$75</td>
<td>$74</td>
<td>$74</td>
<td>$74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persons per room</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plumbing</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>84.8</td>
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* Census tract 5-7.

### Population:
- **Number of people:** 1,142,124
- **Median family income:** $7,514
- **Median value of owner-occupied units:** $17,000
- **Median rent:** $76
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 86.8
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 26.4
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 11.1

### Households:
- **1-person households:** 33,514
- **2-person households:** 285,988
- **6-or-more-person households:** 27,650

### Economic:
- **Median family income:** $7,514
- **Median value of owner-occupied units:** $17,000
- **Median rent:** $76
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 86.8
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 26.4
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 11.1

### Housing:
- **Total occupied units:** 345,162
- **Percent owner-occupied units:** 66.5
- **Median value of owner-occupied units:** $19,000
- **Median rent:** $86
- **Percent of 1.01 or more persons per room:** 8.6
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 93.2
- **Percent of households with all plumbing facilities:** 23.5

* Census tract 14.
### PHOENIX

#### Population:

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<tr>
<td>Male, under 15</td>
<td>107,333</td>
<td>7,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, under 15</td>
<td>42,161</td>
<td>2,925</td>
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<td>15-24</td>
<td>141,583</td>
<td>7,162</td>
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<td>25-64</td>
<td>22,220</td>
<td>1,127</td>
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<td>65 and over</td>
<td>103,324</td>
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<td>Total children under 18 living with both parents</td>
<td>213,160</td>
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<td>Median school years completed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Households</td>
<td>23,764</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total occupied units</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$6,016</td>
<td>$2,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families in the labor force who are employed</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Percent of females in the labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>37.0</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total occupied units</td>
<td>181,896</td>
<td>9,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value of owner-occupied units</td>
<td>$12,100</td>
<td>$6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td>17.9</td>
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</tr>
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### Economic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$6,016</td>
<td>$2,760</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### PLAINFIELD (SMSA Newark)

#### Population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of people</td>
<td>1,462,248</td>
<td>227,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age distribution:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, under 15</td>
<td>200,341</td>
<td>37,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, under 15</td>
<td>76,145</td>
<td>13,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>366,574</td>
<td>51,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-64</td>
<td>63,164</td>
<td>4,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>185,116</td>
<td>28,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children under 18 living with both parents</td>
<td>424,562</td>
<td>99,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of persons age 25 or above having received 8 years or less education</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total occupied units</td>
<td>54,527</td>
<td>8,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value of owner-occupied units</td>
<td>$12,100</td>
<td>$6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>45.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of families in the labor force who are employed</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>69.1</td>
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<td>37.0</td>
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<td>18.3</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$7,503</td>
<td>$4,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families in the labor force who are employed</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
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<td>11.6</td>
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<td>37.0</td>
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<td>12.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Census tracts 82, 92, 93.

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*Census tracts 93-95.
### Population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of people</td>
<td>200,998</td>
<td>8,767</td>
<td>121,256</td>
<td>5,450</td>
<td>2,466</td>
<td>1,132</td>
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#### Age distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Male, under 15</th>
<th>Female, under 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>33,376</td>
<td>1,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-64</td>
<td>11,353</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>45,881</td>
<td>1,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,902</td>
<td>735</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32,292</td>
<td>1,938</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-24</td>
<td>13,639</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65,265</td>
<td>29,380</td>
<td>1,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,586</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children under 18 living with both parents</td>
<td>69,246</td>
<td>3,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of persons age 25 or above having received 8 years or less education</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median school years completed</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Economic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$6,774</td>
<td>$4,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of males age 14 and over in civilian labor force</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of males in civilian labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women age 14 and over who are in the labor force</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of females in the labor force who are unemployed</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are laborers, service workers, private household workers</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Housing:

| Total occupied units | 60,644 |
| Percent owner-occupied units | 68.4 |
| Median value of owner-occupied units | $13,900 |
| Percent renter-occupied units | 31.6 |
| Median rent | $85 |
| Percent with 1 or more persons per room | 3.7 |
| Percent built before 1939 | 16.4 |
| Percent sound with all plumbing facilities | 83.4 |
| Percent of household heads who moved in 1958-60 | 15.6 |

### Population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of people</td>
<td>683,313</td>
<td>89,140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Age distribution:
  | Male, under 15 | Female, under 15 |
  | 85,263 | 16,047 |
  | 34,261 | 6,203 |
  | 146,988 | 18,733 |
  | 62,602 | 2,931 |
  | 82,257 | 16,303 |
  | 36,769 | 6,613 |
  | 169,790 | 29,319 |
  | 64,763 | 2,571 |
| Number of children under 18 living with both parents | 172,249 |
| Number of persons age 25 or above having received 8 years or less education | 36.0 |
| Median school years completed | 11.0 |
| Houses:
  | 1-person households | 41,239 |
  | 2-person households | 184,477 |
  | 58,241 |
| 6-or-more-person households | 15,197 |

#### Economic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic characteristic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$4,691</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of males age 14 and over in civilian labor force</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed males who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>28.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13.4</td>
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<td>20.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc.</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women in labor force with own children under 6 years of age</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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#### Housing:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Housing characteristic</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total occupied units</td>
<td>241,315</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
<td>77.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value of owner-occupied units</td>
<td>$11,400</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent renter-occupied units</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with 1 or more persons per room</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent built before 1939</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent sound with all plumbing facilities</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of household heads who moved in 1958-60</td>
<td>41.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Characteristic</td>
<td>SMSA</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Population:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of people</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age distribution:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, under 15</td>
<td>41,278</td>
<td>3,123</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>18,714</td>
<td>1,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-64</td>
<td>54,411</td>
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<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>8,902</td>
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<td>Female, under 15</td>
<td>36,684</td>
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<td>15-24</td>
<td>18,356</td>
<td>1,208</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-64</td>
<td>57,985</td>
<td>3,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>9,823</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children under 18 living with both parents</td>
<td>81,037</td>
<td>4,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of persons age 25 or above having received 8 years or less education</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median school years completed</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-person households</td>
<td>10,154</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5-person households</td>
<td>54,773</td>
<td>2,389</td>
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<td>6-or-more-person households</td>
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<td>971</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$5,823</td>
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<td>Percent of families with income under $3,000</td>
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<td>Percent of males age 14 and over in civilian labor force</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>32.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of employed females who are managers, officials, professional, technical, etc</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
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<td>25.3</td>
<td>72.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total occupied units</td>
<td>73,447</td>
<td>3,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value of owner-occupied units</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent renter-occupied units</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$722</td>
<td>$474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with 1.01 or more persons per room</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent built before 1939</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent sound with all plumbing facilities</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of household heads who moved in 1958-60</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Census tract 14.
Charts on Levels of Violence and Negotiations
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
Levels of Violence

**KEY**
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50-300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

- **A:** Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
- **B:** Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
- **C:** Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
- **D:** A few fires and rock-throwing
- **E:** Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Period of disorder:
- **JUNE 17:** Rocks thrown and windows broken
- **JUNE 18:** Rocks and fire bombs thrown
- **JUNE 19:** Windows broken, Molotov cocktails thrown and reported sporadic shooting
- **JUNE 20:** Rocks thrown
- **JUNE 21:** Period of disorder
**ATLANTA, GEORGIA**

**Negotiations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>State Police</th>
<th>Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police</th>
<th>Local Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization**

- **JUNE 17**: Period of disorder
- **JUNE 18**: Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
- **JUNE 19**: Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
- **JUNE 20**: Meeting of approximately 250 Negroes, State Senator, ministers and Stokely Carmichael
- **JUNE 21**: Meeting of Mayor and elected Negro officials

*Note: The diagram shows the type and duration of law enforcement mobilization during the period of disorder.*
BRIDGETON, NEW JERSEY
Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1. Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2. One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3. One sizeable crowd (50-300 persons)
4. Several small groups
5. One small group

Cross burned and windows broken

Windows broken

Three crosses burned and windows broken

Period of disorder
BRIDGETON, NEW JERSEY

Negotiations

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Meeting of Human Relations Commissioners, City Councilmen and representatives from the Negro community

Period of disorder
CAMBRIDGE, MARYLAND

Levels of Violence

KEY

Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50–300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Period of disorder

- Fire in elementary school
- Bricks, bottles and rocks thrown
- Rap Brown speech to approximately 300 people
CAMBRIDGE, MARYLAND

Negotiations

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Period of disorder

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
JULY 24

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
JULY 25

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
JULY 26

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
JULY 27

Army
National Guard
State Police
Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
Local Police
Levels of Violence

Rocks, fire bombs and Molotov cocktails thrown, windows broken and fires
Rocks thrown, windows broken and some fires
Rocks and fire bombs thrown and reported shooting
Windows broken, some looting and some fires

Period of disorder

JUNE 12  JUNE 13  JUNE 14  JUNE 15  JUNE 16  JUNE 17
CINCINNATI, OHIO

Negotiations

Meeting of Human Relations Commissioners, City Manager and representatives of Negro community

Meeting of Negro youths and representatives of NAACP

Several meetings of Mayor, Human Relations Commissioners, Police Chief, representatives of NAACP, Negro youths and other representatives of Negro community

Meeting of Mayor, City Councilmen, representatives of Negro community

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Army

National Guard

State Police

Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police

Local Police

Period of disorder
DAYTON, OHIO (June 1967)
Levels of Violence

Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50–300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Period of disorder

Rocks thrown, windows broken and looting
DAYTON, OHIO (June 1967)

**Negotiations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 14</td>
<td>Army, National Guard, State Police, Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police, Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 15</td>
<td>Followup meeting of participants as well as young Negro militants and representatives of U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity and Ohio Civil Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Period of disorder**

- JUNE 14 - JUNE 17
DAYTON, OHIO (September 1967)
Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50-300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Period of disorder

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
SEPT. 19

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
SEPT. 20

Windows broken and widespread looting

Fighting and rocks thrown
DAYTON, OHIO (September 1967)

Negotiations

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

- Army
- National Guard
- State Police
- Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
- Local Police

Period of disorder

SEPT. 19

SEPT. 20
DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Negotiations

Negotiations were continuous during the period of the disorder.

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Army

National Guard

State Police

Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police

Local Police

Period of disorder

JULY 23  JULY 24  JULY 25  JULY 26  JULY 27  JULY 28  JULY 29

3 6 9 12 3 6 9 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 3 6 9 12 3 6 9
ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY
Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50-300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Period of disorder

July 17
July 18
July 19
July 20

Windows broken and looting
Rocks thrown and windows broken
ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY

Negotiations

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

- Army
- National Guard
- State Police
- Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
- Local Police

Meeting of antipoverty workers and representatives from Negro community

Meeting of same participants with Mayor. Counter-rioters group, peace keepers, formed

Period of disorder

- JULY 17
- JULY 18
- JULY 19
- JULY 20
ENGLEWOOD, NEW JERSEY
Levels of Violence

**KEY**

Line represents level of violence on the following scales:

A  Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B  Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C  Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D  A few fires and rock-throwing
E  Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:

1  Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2  One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3  One sizeable crowd (50–300 persons)
4  Several small groups
5  One small group

Period of disorder: July 21 to July 26

- July 21: Level E
- July 22: Level C, rocks and fire bombs thrown, windows broken and reported sniping
- July 23: Level E
- July 24: Level E
- July 25: Level E
- July 26: Level E

**NOTES**

- Rocks, fire bombs and Molotov cocktails thrown, windows broken, and reported shooting
ENGLEWOOD, NEW JERSEY

Negotiations

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

- July 21: Meeting of Mayor and Negro youths
- July 22: Meeting of Mayor and representatives from Negro community
- July 23: Meeting with same participants
- July 24: Meeting with same participants
- July 25: Period of disorder
- July 26: Period of disorder
- July 27: Period of disorder

Army
National Guard
State Police
Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
Local Police
GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN
Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
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Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50-300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group
GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN

Negotiations

Meetings of Mayor, local anti-poverty workers and procurers

Two meetings of Mayor, Chief of Police, State officials and 10 representatives from Negro community

Meetings of Mayor, local and State officials, Negro militants and local anti-poverty workers

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Army

National Guard

State Police

Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police

Local Police

Period of disorder
HOUSTON, TEXAS
Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
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1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50–300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Period of disorder:
- Reported sporadic gunfire
- Bottles and rocks thrown at police cars

MAY 16
MAY 17
HOUSTON, TEXAS

Negotiations

Meeting of Negro leaders, local officials and students

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

- Army
- National Guard
- State Police
- Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
- Local Police

Period of disorder

MAY 16
MAY 17
MAY 18
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI
Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
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Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50–300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

Negotiations

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

MAY 10

Meeting of Mayor and students

MAY 11

MAY 12

MAY 13

MAY 14

Period of disorder

Army

National Guard

State Police

Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police

Local Police

3 6 9 12 3 6 9

3 6 9 12 3 6 9

3 6 9 12 3 6 9

3 6 9 12 3 6 9

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY

Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1. Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2. One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3. One sizeable crowd (50–300 persons)
4. Several small groups
5. One small group

Period of disorder

Rocks thrown and windows broken
JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY

Negotiations

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>State Police</th>
<th>Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police</th>
<th>Local Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JULY 17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 18</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JULY 19</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 20</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

Levels of Violence

**KEY**

Lines represent level of violence on the following scales:

- **A** Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
- **B** Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
- **C** Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
- **D** A few fires and rock-throwing
- **E** Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:

1. Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2. One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3. One sizeable crowd (50-300 persons)
4. Several small groups
5. One small group

---

**Pre-incident period (weeks)**

- **A** Some windows broken, car overturned and Molotov cocktails thrown
- **B** Groups of Negroes roved a 3-mile square area breaking windows and looting
- **C** Looting, bomb scare and reports of sniping
- **D** A woman died of a heart attack, fire bombs thrown and looting
- **E** Fistfight between two women, small crowd gathered, some windows broken

**Period of disorder**

- **AUG. 1**
- **AUG. 2**
- **AUG. 3**
- **AUG. 6**
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Army
National Guard
State Police
Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
Local Police

JULY 30
JULY 31
AUG. 1
AUG. 2
AUG. 3
AUG. 6

Period of disorder
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
Levels of Violence

KEY
Lines represents level of violence on the following scales:
A. Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B. Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C. Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D. A few fires and rock-throwing
E. Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1. Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2. One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
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4. Several small groups
5. One small group

Period of disorder

APRIL 8  APRIL 9  APRIL 10  APRIL 11
### NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

#### Negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 8</td>
<td>Meeting of representatives of Nashville Human Relations Committee and police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 9</td>
<td>Meeting of police and Negro students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization**

- **Army**
- **National Guard**
- **State Police**
- **Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police**
- **Local Police**

**Period of disorder**:

- **3 6 9 12 3 6 9**
- **4 APRIL 8**
- **3 6 9 12 3 6 9**
- **4 APRIL 9**
- **3 6 9 12 3 6 9**
- **4 APRIL 10**
- **3 6 9 12 3 6 9**
- **4 APRIL 11**
- **3 6 9 12 3 6 9**
- **4 APRIL 12**
Levels of Violence

NEW BRUNSWICK, NEW JERSEY

KEY
Lines represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50–300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Windows broken and stones thrown

Period of disorder

JULY 17
JULY 18
JULY 19
NEW BRUNSWICK, NEW JERSEY

Negotiations

Meeting of Mayor, City Councilmen and antipoverty workers

Meeting of Mayor and Negro teenagers

Meeting of Mayor, City Commissioners, other local officials, and representatives of Negro community

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Army

National Guard

State Police

Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police

Local Police

JULY 17

JULY 18

JULY 19

Period of disorder
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
Levels of Violence

Period of disorder

AUG. 19  AUG. 20  AUG. 21  AUG. 22  AUG. 23  AUG. 24

- Large fire destroying multifamily dwelling
- Liquor and other retail stores looted and some fires
- Sporadic looting and some fires
- Rocks and bottles thrown at cars
- Windows broken
- Rocks thrown at cars
- Windows broken and looting
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

Negotiations

Meeting of head of Negro community group, Hill Parents Association and two spokesmen for Mayor

Several meetings of Mayor, Hill Parents Association representatives and Negro ministers

Two meetings of ad hoc committee appointed during disturbance by the Mayor, Negro community leaders and white and Negro ministers

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

- Army
- National Guard
- State Police
- Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
- Local Police

Period of disorder

AUG. 19 | AUG. 20 | AUG. 21 | AUG. 22 | AUG. 23 | AUG. 24
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
Levels of Violence

KEY
Lines represent level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50–300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Period of disorder
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

Negotiations

Meeting of Police Inspector, representatives of CORE, Urban League and local anti-poverty agency

Meeting of Mayor, Director of Public Safety, Human Relations Commission Chairman and representatives from Negro community

Meeting of State and local officials and representatives of Negro community

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

- Army
- National Guard
- State Police
- Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
- Local Police

Period of disorder:
- July 12
- July 13
- July 14
- July 15
- July 16
- July 17
- July 18
PATERSON, NEW JERSEY
Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50–300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Period of disorder

JULY 15
JULY 16
JULY 17
JULY 18
JULY 19
JULY 20
PATERNON, NEW JERSEY

Negotiations

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

- Army
- National Guard
- State Police
- Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
- Local Police

Period of disorder

JULY 13
JULY 14
JULY 15
JULY 16
JULY 17
JULY 18
JULY 19
JULY 20
PHOENIX, ARIZONA
Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
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Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50-300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Period of disorder

- Rocks, fire bombs thrown, looting and reported sniping
- Fires, reported sporadic sniping
- Rocks thrown and reported sniping
- Looting and fires
PHOENIX, ARIZONA

Negotiations

Meeting of Mayor, police chief, city commissioners and two Negro youths

Meeting on street with same participants

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

- Army
- National Guard
- State Police
- Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
- Local Police

Period of disorder

JULY 25
JULY 26
JULY 27
JULY 28
JULY 29
PLAINFIELD, NEW JERSEY

Levels of Violence

**KEY**

Line represents level of violence on the following scales:

A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50-300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Policeman killed by youths, rocks thrown, fires and widespread looting

Rocks and fire bombs thrown, looting and fires

Fistfight at White Star Diner, windows broken, Molotov cocktail thrown

House-to-house search for weapons by officials

Period of disorder

JULY 14

JULY 15

JULY 16

JULY 17

JULY 18

JULY 19
PLAINFIELD, NEW JERSEY
Negotiations

Meeting at West End Housing project of Negro councilmen, Negro newspaperman and Negro youths

Meeting at Teen Center between Mayor, Negro councilmen, Negro reporter, representative of NAACP and Negro youths

Meeting at Greenbrook Park of representatives of the Human Relations Council and Negro youths

Meeting at City Hall, continued in the West End, of State and local officials, and representatives of Negro community

Meeting at City Hall of Mayor and State officials, which a representative of Negro youths joined

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Army

National Guard

State Police

Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police

Local Police

to July 21

Period of disorder

JULY 14  JULY 15  JULY 16  JULY 17  JULY 18  JULY 19  JULY 20
ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS

Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking
Within the A through E categories:
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3 One sizeable crowd (50-300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Period of disorder
ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS

Negotiations

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Army
National Guard
State Police
Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
Local Police

Period of disorder

JULY 28
JULY 29
JULY 30
JULY 31
TAMPA, FLORIDA
Levels of Violence

Lines represent level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
D A few fires and rock-throwing
E Rock and bottle throwing and window breaking

Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50–300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group

Period of disorder

JUNE 11
Fires, looting and reported shooting

JUNE 12
Windows broken, fires, looting and reported sniping

JUNE 13
Some fires

JUNE 14
Knifing, crowd starts to build up and is dispersed by White Hats

JUNE 15
Hostile crowd gathers

Stones thrown at cars and windows broken

Sones broken, fires, looting and reported sniping

KEY

JUNE 11
JUNE 12
JUNE 13
JUNE 14
JUNE 15
TAMPA, FLORIDA

Negotiations

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Army

National Guard

State Police

Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police

Local Police

JUNE 11  JUNE 12  JUNE 13  JUNE 14  JUNE 15

Period of disorder
TUCSON, ARIZONA
Levels of Violence

KEY
Line represents level of violence on the following scales:
A Widespread fires, looting and reported sniping and enormous damage
B Many fires and much looting, serious damage and in some cases, reported sniping
C Some but isolated looting, fires and rock-throwing
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Within the A through E categories:
1 Many small groups and several sizeable or large crowds
2 One large crowd (more than 300 persons)
3 One sizeable crowd (50-300 persons)
4 Several small groups
5 One small group
TUCSON, ARIZONA

Negotiations

Meeting of representatives of City Councilmen, Human Relations Commissioners and representatives of Negro community

Meeting of Negro youths and Mayor

Type and Duration of Law Enforcement Mobilization

Army
National Guard
State Police
Massed Local Police; or Town or County Police
Local Police

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
JULY 23

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
JULY 24

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
JULY 25

3 6 9 12 3 6 9
JULY 26

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