

# Appendix for Income, Ideology and Representation\*

Chris Tausanovitch<sup>†</sup>  
Department of Political Science  
UCLA

Monday 14<sup>th</sup> December, 2015

## Contents

<b>A Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>B Tables for the House of Representatives</b>	<b>2</b>
B.1 Tables for the 106th House of Representatives . . . . .	3
B.2 Tables for the 107th House of Representatives . . . . .	7
B.3 Tables for the 108th House of Representatives . . . . .	11
B.4 Tables for the 109th House of Representatives . . . . .	15
B.5 Tables for the 110th House of Representatives . . . . .	19
B.6 Tables for the 111th House of Representatives . . . . .	23
B.7 Tables for the 112th House of Representatives . . . . .	27
<b>C Tables for the Senate</b>	<b>31</b>
C.1 Tables for the 106th Senate . . . . .	32
C.2 Tables for the 107th Senate . . . . .	36
C.3 Tables for the 108th Senate . . . . .	40
C.4 Tables for the 109th Senate . . . . .	44
C.5 Tables for the 110th Senate . . . . .	48
C.6 Tables for the 111th Senate . . . . .	52
C.7 Tables for the 112th Senate . . . . .	56
<b>D Tables for the House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES</b>	<b>60</b>
D.1 Tables for the 106th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES . . .	61
D.2 Tables for the 107th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES . . .	65
D.3 Tables for the 108th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES . . .	69

---

\*Prepared for the Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, Conference on Big Data in Political Economy

<sup>†</sup>Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, UCLA, [ctausanovitch@ucla.edu](mailto:ctausanovitch@ucla.edu)

D.4	Tables for the 109th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES . . .	73
D.5	Tables for the 110th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES . . .	77
D.6	Tables for the 111th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES . . .	81
D.7	Tables for the 112th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES . . .	85
<b>E</b>	<b>Tables for the Senate excluding the 2012 CCES</b>	<b>89</b>
E.1	Tables for the 106th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES . . . . .	90
E.2	Tables for the 107th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES . . . . .	94
E.3	Tables for the 108th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES . . . . .	98
E.4	Tables for the 109th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES . . . . .	102
E.5	Tables for the 110th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES . . . . .	106
E.6	Tables for the 111th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES . . . . .	110
E.7	Tables for the 112th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES . . . . .	114

## A Introduction

This Appendix replicates the analysis and tables from the main paper for the Senate and the House for each Congress from the 106th through the 112th. It should be noted that these are not independent analyses. In each case the data for districts and states are the same, with only the number of observations changing due to legislators leaving mid-session (recall that the unit of observation is a legislator-district or state). There is substantial overlap in the set of legislators that represent these constituencies. In the Senate in particular, Senators serve for three consecutive sessions before facing reelection. The main text uses the analyses for the 111th Congress rather than pooling all of the data. This avoids inflating the number of observations by including a set of substantively similar observations in the same analysis. Nonetheless, the fact that using legislators from other sessions leads to some changes in the results gives cause to doubt some of the findings that stem from the choice to focus on the 111th Congress.

The second half of this Appendix repeats all of these analysis again, this time leaving out data from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The coding of income in this study required that the boundary defining low and medium low income be different than in the other studies: \$30,000 rather than \$25,000 in household income. As this Appendix shows, the results are not heavily dependent on this distinction.

## B Tables for the House of Representatives

## B.1 Tables for the 106th House of Representatives

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.88			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.85	0.90		
$\mu_L$	0.75	0.80	0.80	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.95	0.86

Table 1: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 2: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.06*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.55*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			0.21 (0.41)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.99*** (0.36)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.98** (0.46)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			1.92*** (0.58)
Constant	0.27*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)
Observations	427	427	427
R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.27	0.39
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.27	0.38

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 3: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.09*** (0.09)		
$\mu_H$		0.56*** (0.05)	
$p_H$	-0.42 (0.67)	-0.42 (0.69)	-0.20 (0.66)
$p_L$	-1.52*** (0.54)	-1.37** (0.56)	-0.81 (0.54)
$p_{ML}$	0.10 (0.87)	0.18 (0.89)	-0.50 (0.84)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			0.13 (0.42)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.19*** (0.36)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.36*** (0.47)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			1.06 (0.66)
Constant	0.62 (0.38)	0.27 (0.39)	0.41 (0.37)
Observations	427	427	427
R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.29	0.40
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.28	0.39

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 4: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-5.22*** (0.65)		
$\mu_H$		-2.58*** (0.35)	
$p_H$	-0.34 (4.24)	-0.27 (4.13)	-0.46 (4.47)
$p_L$	8.37** (3.48)	8.13** (3.49)	6.75* (3.76)
$p_{ML}$	-2.78 (5.53)	-4.06 (5.48)	0.31 (5.85)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			0.39 (3.14)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-4.31* (2.55)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-9.84*** (3.52)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-7.86* (4.73)
Constant	-2.10 (2.40)	-0.26 (2.34)	-1.78 (2.55)
Observations	425	425	425
Log Likelihood	-243.12	-250.36	-227.64
Akaike Inf. Crit.	496.25	510.72	471.27

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



## B.2 Tables for the 107th House of Representatives

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.88			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.85	0.90		
$\mu_L$	0.75	0.81	0.80	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.95	0.87

Table 5: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 6: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.10*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.58*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			0.59 (0.41)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.03*** (0.36)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.69 (0.45)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.05*** (0.58)
Constant	0.28*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)
Observations	429	429	429
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.30	0.41
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.30	0.41

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 7: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.13*** (0.09)		
$\mu_H$		0.58*** (0.05)	
$p_H$	-0.30 (0.67)	-0.34 (0.68)	0.08 (0.65)
$p_L$	-2.12*** (0.54)	-2.01*** (0.55)	-1.37** (0.53)
$p_{ML}$	0.97 (0.87)	1.08 (0.88)	0.59 (0.83)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			0.50 (0.41)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.25*** (0.36)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.13** (0.46)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.87 (0.65)
Constant	0.50 (0.38)	0.14 (0.38)	0.16 (0.37)
Observations	429	429	429
R <sup>2</sup>	0.36	0.33	0.43
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.35	0.33	0.42

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 8: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-5.54*** (0.68)		
$\mu_H$		-2.89*** (0.37)	
$p_H$	0.20 (4.37)	0.26 (4.30)	-1.11 (4.67)
$p_L$	14.27*** (3.72)	14.20*** (3.74)	12.36*** (3.98)
$p_{ML}$	-9.18 (5.79)	-10.41* (5.79)	-7.44 (6.16)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-3.18 (3.37)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-4.43* (2.63)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-8.73** (3.62)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-6.84 (4.87)
Constant	-1.72 (2.47)	0.20 (2.44)	-0.59 (2.65)
Observations	427	427	427
Log Likelihood	-233.65	-237.64	-216.89
Akaike Inf. Crit.	477.30	485.28	449.78

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### B.3 Tables for the 108th House of Representatives

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.87			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.84	0.90		
$\mu_L$	0.75	0.81	0.80	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.95	0.87

Table 9: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 10: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.20*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.66*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.30*** (0.37)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.74** (0.33)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.57 (0.41)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.75*** (0.53)
Constant	0.32*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)
Observations	440	440	440
R <sup>2</sup>	0.37	0.37	0.50
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.37	0.37	0.50

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 11: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.32*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.69*** (0.04)	
$p_H$	-0.33 (0.60)	-0.25 (0.61)	0.31 (0.57)
$p_L$	-2.61*** (0.48)	-2.39*** (0.49)	-1.69*** (0.46)
$p_{ML}$	0.27 (0.78)	0.48 (0.79)	0.09 (0.72)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.18*** (0.36)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.18*** (0.31)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.37*** (0.40)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.74 (0.57)
Constant	0.86** (0.34)	0.37 (0.34)	0.34 (0.32)
Observations	440	440	440
R <sup>2</sup>	0.46	0.44	0.56
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.46	0.44	0.56

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 12: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-7.48*** (0.81)		
$\mu_H$		-4.07*** (0.45)	
$p_H$	3.45 (4.61)	3.15 (4.56)	1.43 (5.28)
$p_L$	20.11*** (4.05)	19.84*** (4.09)	18.47*** (4.54)
$p_{ML}$	-2.58 (6.04)	-5.10 (6.00)	0.21 (6.66)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-10.02** (4.07)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-5.24* (2.96)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-12.35*** (4.08)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-6.51 (5.38)
Constant	-5.78** (2.63)	-2.81 (2.57)	-4.37 (2.96)
Observations	439	439	439
Log Likelihood	-214.92	-217.29	-185.70
Akaike Inf. Crit.	439.85	444.59	387.40

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



## B.4 Tables for the 109th House of Representatives

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.87			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.84	0.89		
$\mu_L$	0.75	0.80	0.80	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.95	0.86

Table 13: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 14: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.25*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.70*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.42*** (0.36)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.89*** (0.32)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.42 (0.40)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.81*** (0.52)
Constant	0.34*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.16*** (0.03)
Observations	438	438	438
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.41	0.54
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.38	0.40	0.54

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 15: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.38*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.75*** (0.04)	
$p_H$	0.37 (0.59)	0.50 (0.59)	1.17** (0.54)
$p_L$	-2.42*** (0.48)	-2.17*** (0.48)	-1.43*** (0.44)
$p_{ML}$	1.03 (0.78)	1.24 (0.77)	0.98 (0.69)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.42*** (0.34)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.35*** (0.30)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.28*** (0.38)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.58 (0.54)
Constant	0.51 (0.34)	-0.01 (0.33)	-0.11 (0.30)
Observations	438	438	438
R <sup>2</sup>	0.48	0.49	0.61
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.48	0.48	0.60

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 16: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-8.17*** (0.85)		
$\mu_H$		-5.05*** (0.52)	
$p_H$	-0.25 (4.72)	-0.79 (4.78)	-5.01 (5.83)
$p_L$	20.69*** (4.19)	21.55*** (4.38)	19.53*** (4.98)
$p_{ML}$	-7.42 (6.24)	-10.25 (6.40)	-6.03 (7.30)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-16.34*** (4.76)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-6.78** (3.24)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-13.70*** (4.56)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-4.75 (5.79)
Constant	-4.18 (2.68)	-1.03 (2.71)	-1.75 (3.23)
Observations	437	437	437
Log Likelihood	-203.42	-195.17	-159.43
Akaike Inf. Crit.	416.85	400.35	334.86

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## B.5 Tables for the 110th House of Representatives

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.87			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.84	0.90		
$\mu_L$	0.75	0.81	0.80	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.95	0.86

Table 17: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 18: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.24*** (0.07)		
$\mu_H$		0.69*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.04*** (0.36)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.13*** (0.32)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.50 (0.40)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.51*** (0.52)
Constant	0.29*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)
Observations	446	446	446
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.41	0.53
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.41	0.52

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 19: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.37*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.74*** (0.04)	
$p_H$	0.09 (0.60)	0.18 (0.60)	0.81 (0.55)
$p_L$	-2.09*** (0.48)	-1.91*** (0.48)	-1.22*** (0.45)
$p_{ML}$	0.41 (0.78)	0.61 (0.77)	0.29 (0.70)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.04*** (0.35)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.58*** (0.30)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.22*** (0.39)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.57 (0.55)
Constant	0.62* (0.34)	0.12 (0.34)	0.06 (0.31)
Observations	446	446	446
R <sup>2</sup>	0.46	0.47	0.59
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.46	0.46	0.58

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 20: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-7.82*** (0.83)		
$\mu_H$		-4.92*** (0.50)	
$p_H$	2.42 (4.59)	1.64 (4.71)	0.65 (5.51)
$p_L$	16.31*** (3.92)	17.62*** (4.11)	16.07*** (4.59)
$p_{ML}$	-0.44 (5.98)	-2.77 (6.16)	4.22 (6.99)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-10.89** (4.37)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-8.78*** (3.15)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-12.37*** (4.19)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-6.59 (5.53)
Constant	-5.11* (2.61)	-2.21 (2.65)	-4.25 (3.10)
Observations	446	446	446
Log Likelihood	-219.61	-208.81	-177.93
Akaike Inf. Crit.	449.21	427.62	371.86

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



## B.6 Tables for the 111th House of Representatives

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.87			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.84	0.89		
$\mu_L$	0.75	0.81	0.80	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.95	0.86

Table 21: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 22: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.26*** (0.07)		
$\mu_H$		0.71*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.46*** (0.36)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.93*** (0.32)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.32 (0.40)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.67*** (0.52)
Constant	0.27*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)
Observations	445	445	445
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40	0.43	0.53
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.42	0.52

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 23: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.38*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.76*** (0.04)	
$p_H$	0.51 (0.60)	0.66 (0.59)	1.40** (0.56)
$p_L$	-1.77*** (0.48)	-1.50*** (0.48)	-0.69 (0.45)
$p_{ML}$	0.82 (0.78)	0.93 (0.76)	0.84 (0.71)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.54*** (0.36)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.34*** (0.31)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.97** (0.40)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.89 (0.56)
Constant	0.35 (0.34)	-0.15 (0.33)	-0.31 (0.32)
Observations	445	445	445
R <sup>2</sup>	0.46	0.48	0.58
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.46	0.48	0.57

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 24: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-7.81*** (0.83)		
$\mu_H$		-5.24*** (0.53)	
$p_H$	-1.17 (4.67)	-2.66 (4.85)	-4.03 (5.64)
$p_L$	13.72*** (3.98)	15.00*** (4.20)	10.91** (4.51)
$p_{ML}$	-4.24 (6.05)	-6.17 (6.40)	-1.59 (7.10)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-19.68*** (4.75)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-4.55 (3.09)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-8.71** (4.14)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-9.71* (5.53)
Constant	-2.64 (2.64)	0.32 (2.73)	-0.60 (3.14)
Observations	445	445	445
Log Likelihood	-218.33	-202.27	-180.35
Akaike Inf. Crit.	446.67	414.53	376.71

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## B.7 Tables for the 112th House of Representatives

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.87			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.84	0.90		
$\mu_L$	0.74	0.80	0.80	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.95	0.86

Table 25: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 26: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.44*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.84*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.12*** (0.35)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.29*** (0.31)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.14*** (0.39)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.12*** (0.50)
Constant	0.43*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.18*** (0.03)
Observations	442	442	442
R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.51	0.62
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.51	0.62

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 27: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.51*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.86*** (0.04)	
$p_H$	-0.68 (0.63)	-0.39 (0.60)	0.13 (0.55)
$p_L$	-2.16*** (0.50)	-1.72*** (0.48)	-1.03** (0.44)
$p_{ML}$	-0.13 (0.82)	0.03 (0.78)	-0.46 (0.70)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.05*** (0.35)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.61*** (0.30)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.74*** (0.39)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.75 (0.55)
Constant	1.03*** (0.36)	0.41 (0.34)	0.44 (0.31)
Observations	442	442	442
R <sup>2</sup>	0.49	0.54	0.65
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.49	0.53	0.64

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 28: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-9.81*** (0.97)		
$\mu_H$		-7.06*** (0.70)	
$p_H$	9.54* (4.96)	8.80 (5.42)	11.63* (6.83)
$p_L$	17.05*** (4.09)	16.96*** (4.59)	17.30*** (5.38)
$p_{ML}$	7.33 (6.43)	7.19 (6.93)	20.92** (8.38)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-16.94*** (5.50)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-10.23*** (3.87)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-20.44*** (5.70)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-11.38* (6.62)
Constant	-9.61*** (2.87)	-6.43** (3.04)	-11.84*** (3.84)
Observations	442	442	442
Log Likelihood	-190.50	-168.43	-128.69
Akaike Inf. Crit.	391.00	346.86	273.37

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



## C Tables for the Senate

## C.1 Tables for the 106th Senate

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.92			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.87	0.94		
$\mu_L$	0.81	0.88	0.91	
$\mu$	0.93	0.98	0.97	0.93

Table 29: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 30: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.07*** (0.22)		
$\mu_H$		0.66*** (0.13)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.36** (1.96)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-1.14 (1.69)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			2.73 (2.20)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-0.99 (2.67)
Constant	0.25*** (0.06)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.11)
Observations	102	102	102
R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.21	0.27
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.20	0.24

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 31: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.10*** (0.30)		
$\mu_H$		0.72*** (0.16)	
$p_H$	-1.23 (3.16)	-1.23 (3.05)	0.74 (3.15)
$p_L$	-3.68* (1.92)	-4.73** (1.91)	-3.33* (1.88)
$p_{ML}$	2.38 (4.10)	3.60 (3.84)	4.47 (4.05)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.11** (1.99)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-0.39 (1.77)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			2.65 (2.22)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-2.13 (2.77)
Constant	0.54 (1.80)	0.10 (1.69)	-0.75 (1.78)
Observations	102	102	102
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.27	0.31
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.24	0.26

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 32: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-3.96** (1.92)		
$\mu_H$		-2.42** (1.05)	
$p_H$	10.54 (19.16)	9.22 (19.63)	-1.55 (21.34)
$p_L$	28.64** (12.32)	32.25** (13.02)	26.13** (13.30)
$p_{ML}$	-22.65 (25.34)	-29.76 (25.49)	-39.82 (28.41)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-24.94* (13.67)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			6.23 (11.71)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-8.78 (14.28)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			10.25 (18.23)
Constant	-2.18 (10.92)	0.38 (10.84)	6.31 (12.07)
Observations	102	102	102
Log Likelihood	-60.98	-60.40	-58.59
Akaike Inf. Crit.	131.96	130.80	133.17

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## C.2 Tables for the 107th Senate

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.92			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.88	0.95		
$\mu_L$	0.82	0.89	0.91	
$\mu$	0.94	0.98	0.98	0.93

Table 33: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 34: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.18*** (0.22)		
$\mu_H$		0.73*** (0.12)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.66** (1.94)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-0.68 (1.66)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.74 (2.16)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.05 (2.60)
Constant	0.23*** (0.05)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.11)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.26	0.32
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.25	0.29

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 35: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.27*** (0.29)		
$\mu_H$		0.82*** (0.15)	
$p_H$	-0.34 (3.14)	-0.35 (2.98)	1.61 (3.11)
$p_L$	-3.01 (1.91)	-4.22** (1.88)	-2.74 (1.85)
$p_{ML}$	2.35 (4.09)	3.80 (3.77)	4.57 (4.00)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.46** (1.98)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.14 (1.75)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.88 (2.18)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-1.43 (2.74)
Constant	0.27 (1.80)	-0.24 (1.66)	-1.06 (1.76)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.32	0.35
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.29	0.31

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



Table 36: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-5.62*** (2.17)		
$\mu_H$		-3.32*** (1.16)	
$p_H$	0.94 (19.62)	-3.34 (20.09)	-12.56 (22.10)
$p_L$	23.64* (12.41)	28.41** (13.10)	22.86* (13.37)
$p_{ML}$	-25.58 (25.89)	-39.42 (26.47)	-46.98 (30.06)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-25.96* (14.06)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.27 (11.62)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-2.84 (13.98)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			4.42 (18.40)
Constant	1.09 (11.18)	6.21 (11.07)	10.97 (12.53)
Observations	100	100	100
Log Likelihood	-59.16	-58.34	-56.38
Akaike Inf. Crit.	128.32	126.68	128.77

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### C.3 Tables for the 108th Senate

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.92			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.87	0.94		
$\mu_L$	0.81	0.88	0.91	
$\mu$	0.93	0.98	0.97	0.93

Table 37: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 38: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.26*** (0.21)		
$\mu_H$		0.76*** (0.12)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.40** (1.81)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-0.21 (1.55)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.26 (2.02)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.70 (2.45)
Constant	0.25*** (0.05)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.10)
Observations	100	100	100
R <sup>2</sup>	0.27	0.29	0.36
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.28	0.34

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 39: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.41*** (0.29)		
$\mu_H$		0.88*** (0.15)	
$p_H$	1.04 (2.91)	1.23 (2.77)	3.04 (2.82)
$p_L$	-3.34* (1.77)	-4.53** (1.73)	-3.17* (1.68)
$p_{ML}$	4.39 (3.79)	6.24* (3.48)	6.62* (3.62)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.18** (1.79)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.88 (1.58)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.60 (1.97)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-1.45 (2.48)
Constant	-0.42 (1.66)	-1.11 (1.53)	-1.79 (1.59)
Observations	100	100	100
R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.38	0.44
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.35	0.39

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 40: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-7.71*** (2.60)		
$\mu_H$		-4.46*** (1.34)	
$p_H$	-10.44 (20.49)	-20.53 (21.59)	-34.37 (24.82)
$p_L$	29.31** (13.27)	36.09** (14.25)	31.75** (14.93)
$p_{ML}$	-41.16 (28.23)	-67.72** (30.10)	-79.61** (36.36)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-27.23* (14.66)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-3.59 (12.57)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-8.29 (14.67)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			9.97 (20.08)
Constant	5.60 (11.89)	15.36 (12.03)	21.97 (14.37)
Observations	99	99	99
Log Likelihood	-54.88	-53.87	-50.71
Akaike Inf. Crit.	119.75	117.73	117.43

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## C.4 Tables for the 109th Senate

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.92			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.87	0.94		
$\mu_L$	0.81	0.88	0.91	
$\mu$	0.93	0.98	0.97	0.93

Table 41: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 42: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.43*** (0.22)		
$\mu_H$		0.91*** (0.12)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.65*** (1.77)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.10 (1.52)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			2.89 (1.97)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-2.37 (2.38)
Constant	0.32*** (0.05)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.09 (0.10)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.37	0.46
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.36	0.44

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 43: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.41*** (0.30)		
$\mu_H$		0.97*** (0.15)	
$p_H$	0.74 (3.03)	0.62 (2.78)	3.40 (2.76)
$p_L$	-2.51 (1.86)	-4.03** (1.76)	-2.51 (1.65)
$p_{ML}$	4.15 (3.96)	5.50 (3.53)	6.73* (3.57)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.56** (1.77)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.00 (1.56)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			3.22 (1.95)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-4.44* (2.44)
Constant	-0.45 (1.74)	-0.89 (1.55)	-2.09 (1.57)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.33	0.43	0.51
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.40	0.47

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



Table 44: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-7.42*** (2.52)		
$\mu_H$		-5.21*** (1.42)	
$p_H$	-9.87 (20.33)	-18.32 (22.01)	-45.35* (27.49)
$p_L$	23.17* (13.05)	32.11** (14.58)	29.11* (16.79)
$p_{ML}$	-41.04 (27.52)	-63.59** (30.67)	-94.38** (40.12)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-31.97** (15.84)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-6.87 (13.59)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-20.70 (16.21)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			38.06 (23.22)
Constant	6.62 (11.79)	14.58 (12.35)	29.28* (15.93)
Observations	100	100	100
Log Likelihood	-54.26	-51.00	-44.87
Akaike Inf. Crit.	118.51	111.99	105.73

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## C.5 Tables for the 110th Senate

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.92			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.87	0.94		
$\mu_L$	0.80	0.87	0.90	
$\mu$	0.93	0.98	0.97	0.92

Table 45: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 46: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.49*** (0.22)		
$\mu_H$		0.93*** (0.12)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.90** (1.78)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.58 (1.51)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			2.39 (1.97)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-1.20 (2.33)
Constant	0.30*** (0.05)	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.09 (0.10)
Observations	102	102	102
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.37	0.46
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.37	0.44

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 47: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.65*** (0.30)		
$\mu_H$		1.08*** (0.15)	
$p_H$	-1.26 (3.10)	-1.43 (2.88)	0.36 (2.80)
$p_L$	-2.55 (1.86)	-4.46** (1.79)	-3.38** (1.67)
$p_{ML}$	0.01 (4.02)	1.92 (3.61)	1.73 (3.60)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.19* (1.78)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			2.02 (1.55)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			2.96 (1.95)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-3.06 (2.38)
Constant	1.06 (1.77)	0.48 (1.59)	-0.02 (1.58)
Observations	102	102	102
R <sup>2</sup>	0.33	0.42	0.51
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.40	0.47

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 48: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-9.34*** (2.75)		
$\mu_H$		-5.71*** (1.43)	
$p_H$	9.77 (20.21)	4.99 (21.35)	-5.17 (23.95)
$p_L$	23.84* (12.63)	33.71** (13.94)	34.82** (15.74)
$p_{ML}$	-3.42 (25.88)	-24.72 (27.44)	-30.45 (33.11)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-22.22 (15.97)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-11.29 (13.04)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-19.72 (15.69)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			19.77 (21.73)
Constant	-7.22 (11.55)	0.07 (11.65)	3.67 (13.49)
Observations	101	101	101
Log Likelihood	-56.07	-53.55	-47.24
Akaike Inf. Crit.	122.14	117.11	110.48

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## C.6 Tables for the 111th Senate

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.92			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.87	0.95		
$\mu_L$	0.81	0.88	0.91	
$\mu$	0.93	0.98	0.97	0.93

Table 49: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 50: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.44*** (0.22)		
$\mu_H$		0.99*** (0.12)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.41** (1.84)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.29 (1.59)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			2.06 (2.05)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-0.57 (2.49)
Constant	0.24*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.12 (0.10)
Observations	107	107	107
R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.40	0.43
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.39	0.41

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 51: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.44*** (0.31)		
$\mu_H$		1.08*** (0.15)	
$p_H$	2.04 (2.98)	1.36 (2.65)	3.77 (2.76)
$p_L$	-2.04 (1.85)	-3.65** (1.68)	-1.87 (1.69)
$p_{ML}$	5.46 (3.77)	5.69* (3.24)	6.48* (3.43)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.12** (1.84)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.13 (1.64)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			2.71 (2.03)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-2.78 (2.55)
Constant	-1.19 (1.70)	-1.23 (1.46)	-2.22 (1.55)
Observations	107	107	107
R <sup>2</sup>	0.33	0.46	0.48
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.44	0.45

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



Table 52: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-6.91*** (2.41)		
$\mu_H$		-6.21*** (1.50)	
$p_H$	-4.72 (20.55)	-6.10 (22.56)	-14.18 (24.63)
$p_L$	18.64 (12.86)	33.89** (14.72)	28.58* (15.47)
$p_{ML}$	-30.33 (25.18)	-45.18 (28.83)	-52.17 (32.21)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-29.54* (15.94)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-7.83 (12.34)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-9.91 (14.83)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			14.80 (20.30)
Constant	4.52 (11.40)	8.03 (12.13)	12.74 (13.51)
Observations	106	106	106
Log Likelihood	-58.66	-51.92	-50.14
Akaike Inf. Crit.	127.32	113.84	116.28

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## C.7 Tables for the 112th Senate

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.92			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.87	0.94		
$\mu_L$	0.80	0.88	0.90	
$\mu$	0.93	0.98	0.97	0.92

Table 53: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 54: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.65*** (0.24)		
$\mu_H$		1.08*** (0.13)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.70* (1.97)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.04 (1.70)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.79 (2.21)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.04 (2.67)
Constant	0.35*** (0.06)	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.11)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.33	0.41	0.45
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.41	0.42

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 55: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.56*** (0.33)		
$\mu_H$		1.10*** (0.16)	
$p_H$	-2.03 (3.30)	-1.72 (2.97)	-0.29 (3.18)
$p_L$	-3.24 (2.00)	-4.71** (1.85)	-3.17* (1.87)
$p_{ML}$	1.50 (4.32)	3.32 (3.76)	2.98 (4.10)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.40* (2.03)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.68 (1.79)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.59 (2.24)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-0.62 (2.80)
Constant	0.90 (1.88)	0.20 (1.64)	-0.21 (1.80)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.35	0.46	0.47
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.33	0.44	0.43

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 56: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-7.31*** (2.48)		
$\mu_H$		-6.38*** (1.56)	
$p_H$	13.59 (21.30)	9.15 (23.66)	7.04 (25.34)
$p_L$	23.42* (13.16)	36.33** (15.29)	29.84* (15.57)
$p_{ML}$	-13.76 (26.36)	-31.53 (29.73)	-31.20 (31.94)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-32.67** (16.55)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-7.93 (12.41)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.15 (15.05)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-1.17 (19.74)
Constant	-4.27 (11.76)	1.13 (12.56)	2.61 (13.66)
Observations	100	100	100
Log Likelihood	-54.49	-47.93	-47.48
Akaike Inf. Crit.	118.98	105.85	110.96

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**D Tables for the House of Representatives excluding  
the 2012 CCES**

## D.1 Tables for the 106th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.85			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.82	0.88		
$\mu_L$	0.68	0.73	0.75	
$\mu$	0.91	0.96	0.94	0.81

Table 57: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 58: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.01*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.55*** (0.05)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			0.30 (0.39)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.89*** (0.32)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.12*** (0.40)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			1.91*** (0.58)
Constant	0.26*** (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)
Observations	427	427	427
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.26	0.38
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.26	0.38

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



Table 59: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.04*** (0.09)		
$\mu_H$		0.55*** (0.05)	
$p_H$	-0.43 (0.63)	-0.12 (0.64)	-0.01 (0.60)
$p_L$	-1.81*** (0.54)	-1.36** (0.55)	-0.86 (0.52)
$p_{ML}$	0.53 (0.80)	0.69 (0.81)	-0.04 (0.75)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			0.20 (0.40)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.07*** (0.33)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.40*** (0.41)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			1.12* (0.64)
Constant	0.54 (0.37)	0.04 (0.37)	0.26 (0.35)
Observations	427	427	427
R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.28	0.40
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.28	0.27	0.39

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 60: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-4.91*** (0.66)		
$\mu_H$		-2.55*** (0.35)	
$p_H$	-0.35 (3.87)	-1.38 (3.78)	-1.32 (4.11)
$p_L$	8.98*** (3.31)	7.60** (3.32)	6.71* (3.65)
$p_{ML}$	-4.17 (4.94)	-5.37 (4.94)	-1.56 (5.27)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-0.59 (2.99)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-3.44 (2.29)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-9.94*** (3.07)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-8.66* (4.54)
Constant	-1.69 (2.26)	0.61 (2.21)	-1.07 (2.41)
Observations	425	425	425
Log Likelihood	-249.14	-252.00	-228.05
Akaike Inf. Crit.	508.28	514.00	472.10

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## D.2 Tables for the 107th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.85			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.82	0.87		
$\mu_L$	0.68	0.74	0.75	
$\mu$	0.91	0.96	0.94	0.81

Table 61: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 62: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.06*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.58*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			0.64* (0.38)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.98*** (0.32)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.83** (0.40)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.07*** (0.58)
Constant	0.28*** (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)
Observations	429	429	429
R <sup>2</sup>	0.27	0.28	0.41
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.27	0.28	0.41

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 63: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.08*** (0.09)		
$\mu_H$		0.57*** (0.05)	
$p_H$	-0.42 (0.63)	-0.15 (0.63)	0.13 (0.59)
$p_L$	-2.45*** (0.53)	-2.04*** (0.54)	-1.43*** (0.51)
$p_{ML}$	1.20 (0.80)	1.37* (0.80)	0.78 (0.74)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			0.49 (0.39)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.17*** (0.32)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.17*** (0.40)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			1.05* (0.62)
Constant	0.49 (0.36)	-0.02 (0.36)	0.09 (0.34)
Observations	429	429	429
R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.32	0.44
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.31	0.43

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 64: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-5.17*** (0.68)		
$\mu_H$		-2.86*** (0.37)	
$p_H$	1.16 (3.98)	-0.01 (3.96)	-0.82 (4.31)
$p_L$	14.98*** (3.55)	13.72*** (3.55)	12.71*** (3.90)
$p_{ML}$	-8.73* (5.19)	-9.95* (5.24)	-7.14 (5.61)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-3.11 (3.20)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-4.05* (2.36)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-9.29*** (3.18)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-7.96* (4.68)
Constant	-1.87 (2.33)	0.55 (2.31)	-0.62 (2.53)
Observations	427	427	427
Log Likelihood	-240.37	-239.41	-215.94
Akaike Inf. Crit.	490.75	488.82	447.89

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### D.3 Tables for the 108th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.85			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.82	0.88		
$\mu_L$	0.68	0.74	0.75	
$\mu$	0.91	0.96	0.94	0.81

Table 65: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 66: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.15*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.66*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.45*** (0.35)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.73** (0.29)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.67* (0.36)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.64*** (0.53)
Constant	0.31*** (0.03)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)
Observations	440	440	440
R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.36	0.50
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.36	0.49

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



Table 67: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.27*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.70*** (0.04)	
$p_H$	-0.43 (0.58)	-0.03 (0.57)	0.41 (0.52)
$p_L$	-2.94*** (0.48)	-2.36*** (0.48)	-1.66*** (0.45)
$p_{ML}$	0.58 (0.73)	0.76 (0.72)	0.30 (0.65)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.25*** (0.34)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.13*** (0.28)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.29*** (0.35)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.92* (0.55)
Constant	0.83** (0.34)	0.20 (0.33)	0.24 (0.30)
Observations	440	440	440
R <sup>2</sup>	0.41	0.44	0.56
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.41	0.43	0.55

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 68: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-7.12*** (0.80)		
$\mu_H$		-4.05*** (0.45)	
$p_H$	2.55 (4.19)	1.16 (4.19)	-0.35 (4.86)
$p_L$	20.12*** (3.84)	18.05*** (3.80)	17.27*** (4.38)
$p_{ML}$	-4.68 (5.41)	-6.12 (5.47)	-2.12 (6.09)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-10.38*** (3.83)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-4.85* (2.65)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-11.59*** (3.58)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-9.51* (5.19)
Constant	-4.84** (2.46)	-1.51 (2.44)	-3.09 (2.81)
Observations	439	439	439
Log Likelihood	-223.23	-219.44	-185.60
Akaike Inf. Crit.	456.46	448.87	387.20

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## D.4 Tables for the 109th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.85			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.82	0.87		
$\mu_L$	0.68	0.74	0.74	
$\mu$	0.91	0.96	0.94	0.81

Table 69: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 70: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.18*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.70*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.52*** (0.35)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.88*** (0.29)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.65* (0.35)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.56*** (0.52)
Constant	0.33*** (0.03)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)
Observations	438	438	438
R <sup>2</sup>	0.33	0.39	0.53
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.39	0.53

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 71: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.31*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.75*** (0.04)	
$p_H$	0.16 (0.57)	0.59 (0.55)	1.08** (0.49)
$p_L$	-2.81*** (0.49)	-2.21*** (0.47)	-1.49*** (0.43)
$p_{ML}$	1.24* (0.73)	1.41** (0.70)	1.03* (0.62)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.42*** (0.33)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.28*** (0.27)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.30*** (0.34)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.66 (0.53)
Constant	0.52 (0.34)	-0.12 (0.32)	-0.13 (0.29)
Observations	438	438	438
R <sup>2</sup>	0.43	0.48	0.61
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.43	0.47	0.60

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 72: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-7.58*** (0.83)		
$\mu_H$		-4.91*** (0.52)	
$p_H$	-0.52 (4.23)	-2.19 (4.38)	-5.82 (5.33)
$p_L$	21.13*** (3.98)	19.97*** (4.06)	19.50*** (4.84)
$p_{ML}$	-9.41* (5.57)	-10.99* (5.84)	-8.39 (6.72)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-15.01*** (4.39)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-6.45** (2.90)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-14.14*** (4.01)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-6.93 (5.54)
Constant	-3.32 (2.49)	0.17 (2.57)	-0.68 (3.05)
Observations	437	437	437
Log Likelihood	-213.89	-198.60	-159.16
Akaike Inf. Crit.	437.77	407.19	334.31

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## D.5 Tables for the 110th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.85			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.82	0.88		
$\mu_L$	0.68	0.74	0.75	
$\mu$	0.91	0.96	0.94	0.81

Table 73: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 74: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.17*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.69*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.13*** (0.35)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.13*** (0.29)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.71** (0.36)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.14*** (0.52)
Constant	0.28*** (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)
Observations	446	446	446
R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.39	0.52
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.39	0.51

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



Table 75: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
Legislator DW-NOMINATE score			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.28*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.74*** (0.04)	
$p_H$	-0.05 (0.59)	0.39 (0.56)	0.88* (0.51)
$p_L$	-2.46*** (0.50)	-1.88*** (0.48)	-1.23*** (0.44)
$p_{ML}$	0.76 (0.75)	0.94 (0.71)	0.51 (0.63)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.05*** (0.33)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.55*** (0.27)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.26*** (0.34)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.45 (0.54)
Constant	0.58* (0.34)	-0.06 (0.33)	-0.05 (0.30)
Observations	446	446	446
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40	0.45	0.58
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.45	0.57

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 76: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-7.06*** (0.79)		
$\mu_H$		-4.73*** (0.49)	
$p_H$	1.67 (4.13)	-0.51 (4.28)	-1.58 (5.02)
$p_L$	16.31*** (3.70)	15.68*** (3.81)	15.31*** (4.46)
$p_{ML}$	-3.22 (5.30)	-4.79 (5.55)	0.73 (6.29)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-9.44** (4.02)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-9.67*** (2.84)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-11.96*** (3.65)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-6.86 (5.30)
Constant	-3.98* (2.41)	-0.63 (2.48)	-2.59 (2.91)
Observations	446	446	446
Log Likelihood	-232.25	-214.23	-178.63
Akaike Inf. Crit.	474.50	438.47	373.25

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## D.6 Tables for the 111th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.85			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.82	0.87		
$\mu_L$	0.68	0.74	0.74	
$\mu$	0.91	0.96	0.94	0.81

Table 77: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 78: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.17*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.71*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.54*** (0.35)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.96*** (0.29)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			0.60* (0.36)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			2.11*** (0.52)
Constant	0.26*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)
Observations	445	445	445
R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.41	0.51
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.41	0.51

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 79: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.27*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.76*** (0.04)	
$p_H$	0.33 (0.59)	0.84 (0.55)	1.47*** (0.52)
$p_L$	-2.20*** (0.50)	-1.53*** (0.47)	-0.80* (0.45)
$p_{ML}$	1.26* (0.74)	1.35* (0.69)	1.17* (0.64)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.54*** (0.34)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.34*** (0.28)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.10*** (0.35)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.51 (0.55)
Constant	0.29 (0.34)	-0.35 (0.32)	-0.45 (0.30)
Observations	445	445	445
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.47	0.57
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.38	0.46	0.56

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 80: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-6.74*** (0.78)		
$\mu_H$		-5.09*** (0.53)	
$p_H$	-2.13 (4.16)	-5.45 (4.42)	-7.75 (5.10)
$p_L$	13.90*** (3.72)	13.60*** (3.90)	10.10** (4.35)
$p_{ML}$	-8.23 (5.33)	-10.05* (5.79)	-7.54 (6.36)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-17.55*** (4.31)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-5.98** (2.75)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-8.86** (3.59)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-7.12 (5.25)
Constant	-1.06 (2.41)	2.52 (2.56)	2.24 (2.92)
Observations	445	445	445
Log Likelihood	-233.13	-205.56	-182.34
Akaike Inf. Crit.	476.26	421.12	380.69

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## D.7 Tables for the 112th House of Representatives excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.85			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.82	0.87		
$\mu_L$	0.67	0.73	0.74	
$\mu$	0.91	0.96	0.94	0.81

Table 81: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within congressional districts

Table 82: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.34*** (0.08)		
$\mu_H$		0.83*** (0.04)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.23*** (0.34)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.32*** (0.28)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.22*** (0.35)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			1.74*** (0.51)
Constant	0.41*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)
Observations	442	442	442
R <sup>2</sup>	0.37	0.49	0.61
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.37	0.49	0.60

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



Table 83: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.39*** (0.09)		
$\mu_H$		0.86*** (0.04)	
$p_H$	-0.84 (0.62)	-0.18 (0.57)	0.26 (0.51)
$p_L$	-2.56*** (0.52)	-1.71*** (0.48)	-1.07** (0.44)
$p_{ML}$	0.33 (0.79)	0.41 (0.71)	-0.07 (0.63)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			1.12*** (0.33)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			1.61*** (0.28)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			1.68*** (0.35)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			0.52 (0.54)
Constant	0.97*** (0.36)	0.23 (0.33)	0.29 (0.30)
Observations	442	442	442
R <sup>2</sup>	0.42	0.52	0.63
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.41	0.51	0.63

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 84: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each district, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-districts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-8.47*** (0.88)		
$\mu_H$		-6.72*** (0.67)	
$p_H$	8.08* (4.35)	5.97 (4.76)	7.73 (5.98)
$p_L$	16.51*** (3.74)	15.00*** (4.20)	15.89*** (4.98)
$p_{ML}$	2.95 (5.48)	4.04 (6.00)	14.00* (7.16)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-15.28*** (5.01)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-11.07*** (3.41)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-18.54*** (4.71)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-10.14* (6.08)
Constant	-7.79*** (2.57)	-4.54* (2.75)	-9.00*** (3.45)
Observations	442	442	442
Log Likelihood	-210.42	-175.94	-134.69
Akaike Inf. Crit.	430.84	361.89	285.39

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## E Tables for the Senate excluding the 2012 CCES

## E.1 Tables for the 106th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.91			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.83	0.92		
$\mu_L$	0.76	0.86	0.89	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.97	0.91

Table 85: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 86: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.04*** (0.24)		
$\mu_H$		0.68*** (0.14)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.13*** (1.53)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-2.46* (1.35)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			5.61*** (1.70)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-3.87 (2.63)
Constant	0.26*** (0.06)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.08 (0.11)
Observations	102	102	102
R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.20	0.31
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.15	0.19	0.29

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 87: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.02*** (0.35)		
$\mu_H$		0.69*** (0.17)	
$p_H$	0.26 (2.86)	-0.81 (2.77)	-0.40 (2.63)
$p_L$	-2.86 (1.88)	-4.06** (1.85)	-3.37* (1.82)
$p_{ML}$	3.58 (3.49)	3.72 (3.28)	2.85 (3.21)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.50** (1.57)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-1.57 (1.44)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			5.55*** (1.71)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-5.38** (2.69)
Constant	-0.28 (1.64)	-0.24 (1.56)	-0.27 (1.51)
Observations	102	102	102
R <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.26	0.35
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	0.23	0.30

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 88: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-2.67 (2.08)		
$\mu_H$		-2.22** (1.06)	
$p_H$	-0.81 (17.12)	2.07 (17.57)	-1.27 (19.39)
$p_L$	21.60* (11.65)	26.32** (12.19)	22.21 (13.72)
$p_{ML}$	-33.26 (21.85)	-33.74 (22.05)	-34.44 (23.92)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-26.22* (14.17)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			17.45 (13.15)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-29.35** (13.80)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			29.39 (19.33)
Constant	4.97 (9.93)	4.66 (9.93)	6.71 (11.01)
Observations	102	102	102
Log Likelihood	-62.07	-60.57	-56.03
Akaike Inf. Crit.	134.14	131.14	128.06

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## E.2 Tables for the 107th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.91			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.84	0.93		
$\mu_L$	0.78	0.86	0.90	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.97	0.91

Table 89: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states



Table 90: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.14*** (0.24)		
$\mu_H$		0.76*** (0.13)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.41*** (1.51)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-2.32* (1.34)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			5.32*** (1.68)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-3.21 (2.61)
Constant	0.25*** (0.06)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.10 (0.11)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.25	0.35
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.24	0.33

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 91: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.18*** (0.34)		
$\mu_H$		0.78*** (0.16)	
$p_H$	1.96 (2.86)	0.80 (2.74)	1.30 (2.62)
$p_L$	-1.98 (1.88)	-3.34* (1.82)	-2.45 (1.80)
$p_{ML}$	4.70 (3.53)	5.01 (3.25)	4.15 (3.20)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.86** (1.54)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-1.44 (1.42)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			5.27*** (1.69)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-4.71* (2.69)
Constant	-1.06 (1.67)	-1.07 (1.55)	-1.13 (1.51)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.30	0.39
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.28	0.34

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 92: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-4.02* (2.26)		
$\mu_H$		-2.96** (1.15)	
$p_H$	-13.64 (18.19)	-11.15 (18.58)	-16.57 (19.97)
$p_L$	16.18 (12.00)	22.62* (12.55)	16.55 (13.77)
$p_{ML}$	-42.37* (23.52)	-46.53* (23.76)	-48.31* (25.44)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-29.18* (14.95)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			16.08 (13.36)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-26.53** (13.02)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			22.23 (19.56)
Constant	10.76 (10.66)	11.69 (10.55)	14.51 (11.37)
Observations	100	100	100
Log Likelihood	-60.10	-58.04	-53.98
Akaike Inf. Crit.	130.20	126.07	123.97

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### E.3 Tables for the 108th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.90			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.83	0.92		
$\mu_L$	0.77	0.86	0.89	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.97	0.91

Table 93: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 94: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.23*** (0.23)		
$\mu_H$		0.78*** (0.13)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.11*** (1.41)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-1.82 (1.25)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			4.94*** (1.57)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-2.70 (2.46)
Constant	0.27*** (0.06)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.09 (0.10)
Observations	100	100	100
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.27	0.40
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.26	0.37

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 95: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.37*** (0.33)		
$\mu_H$		0.82*** (0.15)	
$p_H$	2.68 (2.67)	1.59 (2.56)	1.92 (2.39)
$p_L$	-2.33 (1.75)	-3.66** (1.70)	-3.05* (1.64)
$p_{ML}$	5.54* (3.28)	6.30** (3.03)	5.04* (2.92)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.30** (1.41)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-0.55 (1.30)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			5.01*** (1.54)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-4.69* (2.45)
Constant	-1.31 (1.55)	-1.53 (1.44)	-1.39 (1.37)
Observations	100	100	100
R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.36	0.46
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.33	0.42

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 96: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-6.18** (2.67)		
$\mu_H$		-3.87*** (1.33)	
$p_H$	-20.57 (18.96)	-20.25 (19.36)	-28.69 (21.91)
$p_L$	21.14* (12.65)	29.04** (13.24)	25.14 (15.57)
$p_{ML}$	-49.67** (25.12)	-61.25** (25.78)	-63.53** (29.38)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-31.98* (17.39)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			15.85 (15.81)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-34.71** (14.74)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			24.76 (21.73)
Constant	12.52 (11.14)	16.34 (11.08)	19.30 (12.57)
Observations	99	99	99
Log Likelihood	-56.70	-54.61	-48.93
Akaike Inf. Crit.	123.40	119.22	113.86

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## E.4 Tables for the 109th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.90			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.83	0.92		
$\mu_L$	0.77	0.86	0.89	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.97	0.91

Table 97: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states



Table 98: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.38*** (0.24)		
$\mu_H$		0.95*** (0.13)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.44*** (1.37)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-1.23 (1.21)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			5.83*** (1.52)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-5.67** (2.37)
Constant	0.33*** (0.06)	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.19* (0.10)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.35	0.49
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.25	0.35	0.47

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 99: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.26*** (0.35)		
$\mu_H$		0.93*** (0.15)	
$p_H$	3.43 (2.78)	2.12 (2.54)	2.72 (2.29)
$p_L$	-1.35 (1.83)	-2.99* (1.70)	-2.56 (1.58)
$p_{ML}$	7.04** (3.44)	7.01** (3.03)	6.22** (2.83)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.80*** (1.37)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-0.15 (1.26)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			5.76*** (1.49)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-7.56*** (2.36)
Constant	-2.07 (1.62)	-1.94 (1.44)	-2.06 (1.33)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.42	0.55
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.27	0.40	0.51

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 100: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-5.30** (2.56)		
$\mu_H$		-4.90*** (1.47)	
$p_H$	-25.80 (19.53)	-24.84 (20.26)	-38.91 (24.07)
$p_L$	14.42 (12.65)	25.73* (13.93)	25.30 (18.91)
$p_{ML}$	-59.19** (25.82)	-66.69** (27.43)	-80.32** (33.07)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-34.65* (19.62)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			7.88 (17.95)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-42.73*** (16.44)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			56.48** (25.83)
Constant	17.56 (11.59)	19.34* (11.74)	27.19* (13.90)
Observations	100	100	100
Log Likelihood	-55.70	-50.55	-41.38
Akaike Inf. Crit.	121.40	111.10	98.76

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## E.5 Tables for the 110th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.91			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.83	0.92		
$\mu_L$	0.76	0.85	0.89	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.97	0.90

Table 101: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 102: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.43*** (0.24)		
$\mu_H$		0.99*** (0.13)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.71*** (1.38)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-1.73 (1.22)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			6.01*** (1.49)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-4.54* (2.29)
Constant	0.32*** (0.06)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.16 (0.10)
Observations	102	102	102
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.37	0.51
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.25	0.36	0.49

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 103: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.55*** (0.36)		
$\mu_H$		1.06*** (0.16)	
$p_H$	2.15 (2.87)	0.29 (2.61)	0.85 (2.34)
$p_L$	-1.29 (1.85)	-3.51** (1.72)	-3.05* (1.60)
$p_{ML}$	3.82 (3.53)	3.99 (3.09)	2.97 (2.86)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.83*** (1.39)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-0.44 (1.28)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			6.33*** (1.48)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-6.53*** (2.34)
Constant	-0.87 (1.66)	-0.69 (1.47)	-0.67 (1.34)
Observations	102	102	102
R <sup>2</sup>	0.28	0.42	0.55
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.25	0.40	0.52

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 104: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-6.97** (2.73)		
$\mu_H$		-5.83*** (1.53)	
$p_H$	-10.35 (18.36)	-4.46 (19.44)	-14.34 (23.64)
$p_L$	14.34 (11.85)	28.98** (13.27)	26.48 (17.07)
$p_{ML}$	-28.55 (23.00)	-34.48 (24.48)	-39.23 (29.92)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-45.38** (19.71)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			19.40 (17.69)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-47.93*** (16.99)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			37.21 (24.76)
Constant	5.85 (10.65)	6.26 (10.88)	10.17 (13.25)
Observations	101	101	101
Log Likelihood	-58.82	-52.32	-42.81
Akaike Inf. Crit.	127.63	114.64	101.62

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## E.6 Tables for the 111th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.91			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.84	0.93		
$\mu_L$	0.77	0.86	0.90	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.97	0.91

Table 105: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states



Table 106: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.42*** (0.24)		
$\mu_H$		1.04*** (0.13)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			4.39*** (1.43)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-1.52 (1.28)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			5.67*** (1.61)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-3.95 (2.51)
Constant	0.26*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.04)	-0.19* (0.11)
Observations	107	107	107
R <sup>2</sup>	0.25	0.39	0.46
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.24	0.39	0.44

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 107: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.35*** (0.36)		
$\mu_H$		1.05*** (0.15)	
$p_H$	4.39 (2.72)	2.51 (2.42)	3.32 (2.32)
$p_L$	-0.75 (1.81)	-2.52 (1.63)	-1.75 (1.62)
$p_{ML}$	7.63** (3.19)	6.71** (2.74)	6.20** (2.71)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.57** (1.44)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-0.41 (1.33)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			5.72*** (1.58)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-5.92** (2.51)
Constant	-2.58 (1.56)	-2.10 (1.35)	-2.31* (1.32)
Observations	107	107	107
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.46	0.52
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.28	0.44	0.48

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 108: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-4.96* (2.62)		
$\mu_H$		-5.84*** (1.51)	
$p_H$	-20.55 (19.35)	-12.20 (21.06)	-12.03 (21.89)
$p_L$	9.69 (12.41)	25.59* (13.87)	25.10 (16.52)
$p_{ML}$	-47.62** (23.42)	-47.22* (25.70)	-49.65* (26.69)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-26.81* (14.80)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			2.46 (13.03)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-30.17** (12.98)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			41.43* (23.06)
Constant	14.93 (11.06)	12.44 (11.64)	14.22 (11.86)
Observations	106	106	106
Log Likelihood	-59.77	-51.59	-48.20
Akaike Inf. Crit.	129.54	113.17	112.39

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## E.7 Tables for the 112th Senate excluding the 2012 CCES

	$\mu_H$	$\mu_{MH}$	$\mu_{ML}$	$\mu_L$
$\mu_H$				
$\mu_{MH}$	0.90			
$\mu_{ML}$	0.83	0.92		
$\mu_L$	0.76	0.85	0.89	
$\mu$	0.92	0.97	0.97	0.90

Table 109: Pearson correlations between mean preferences of incomes groups within states

Table 110: Regression of legislator position on income group preferences. The character  $mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.65*** (0.26)		
$\mu_H$		1.13*** (0.14)	
$p_H \times \mu_H$			3.49** (1.58)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-0.10 (1.40)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			4.29** (1.76)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-2.29 (2.75)
Constant	0.38*** (0.07)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.10 (0.12)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.40	0.45
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.40	0.43

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 111: Regressions controlling for income-only variables. The dependent variable is again legislator ideological positions. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator DW-NOMINATE score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	1.54*** (0.38)		
$\mu_H$		1.10*** (0.17)	
$p_H$	0.11 (3.06)	-1.27 (2.75)	-0.74 (2.75)
$p_L$	-2.36 (1.98)	-4.05** (1.81)	-3.18* (1.86)
$p_{ML}$	3.35 (3.77)	3.51 (3.27)	2.40 (3.37)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			2.94* (1.63)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			0.64 (1.49)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			4.20** (1.78)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			-3.59 (2.82)
Constant	-0.19 (1.77)	-0.19 (1.55)	-0.13 (1.58)
Observations	101	101	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.45	0.48
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.43	0.44

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 112: Logistic regressions explaining legislator party, where 1 is a Democrat. The character  $\mu$  stands for the mean preferences of each income group in each state, where  $L$  denotes the lower income,  $ML$  denotes “medium low,”  $MH$  denotes “medium high” and “H” denotes high income.  $p$  stands for the proportion of the population in each group. Units are legislator-states

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislator Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mu_L$	-5.90** (2.72)		
$\mu_H$		-6.55*** (1.63)	
$p_H$	2.10 (19.05)	12.58 (21.55)	13.06 (22.46)
$p_L$	17.06 (12.38)	32.14** (14.44)	27.70* (15.92)
$p_{ML}$	-24.17 (23.09)	-22.07 (24.99)	-23.29 (25.23)
$p_H \times \mu_H$			-29.32** (14.63)
$p_{MH} \times \mu_{MH}$			-0.68 (12.35)
$p_{ML} \times \mu_{ML}$			-16.92 (12.44)
$p_L \times \mu_L$			20.81 (21.04)
Constant	2.41 (10.90)	-0.39 (11.54)	1.10 (11.74)
Observations	100	100	100
Log Likelihood	-56.44	-47.29	-47.31
Akaike Inf. Crit.	122.89	104.58	110.62

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01